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Documents and Correspondence Relating to Palestine – Aug. 1939-Mar. 1940.

British Mandate PalestineFacts and Figures Concerning the Palestine Land Transfers Regulations (Cmd. 6180)

1. The area of Palestine (west of the Jordan) exclusive of lakes is 6,504,000 acres, of which 381,000, or 5.8 per cent, are in Jewish hands.

2. Palestine has now been divided into three zones- Zone A, where no land may be bought by Jews; Zone B, where Jewish land purchase may be allowed only under special circumstances; and the “Free Zone,” where Jewish land purchase is not subjected to administrative restrictions.

3. Zone A. comprises 4,104,000 acres, or about 63.1 per cent of the total;

Zone B, 2,067,840 acres, or 31.8 per cent.

The “Free Zone,” 332,160 acres, or 5.1 per cent.

4. In the prohibited zone the Jews own about 80,500 acres, or 1.4 per cent of the total area. Of this, 20,000 are owned by the Palestine Potash Company, not a purely Jewish concern, whose land is not used for agriculture,

5. In the restricted zone the Jews own 130,617 acres of land Of the remaining 1,937,223 acres, fully 1,700,000 acres are in the Southern Negeb–an arid area practically uninhabited and as yet unexplored.

6. In the “free” zone 170,000 acres are owned by Jews and 162,160 acres by Arabs. This area, which is all that is open to Jewish land purchase without legal restrictions, forms 2.6 per cent of non-Jewish land in Palestine. 48,500 Arabs live on it.

7. Mr. MacDonald stated in the House of Commons on March 6, 1940, that “the transfer of land from Jews to Arabs is to continue freely, absolutely unrestricted . . . throughout practically the whole length and breadth of the maritime plain.”

The Maritime Plain is defined in the Memoranda prepared by the Palestine Government for the Royal Commission (page 22) as stretching “from the southern boundary of Palestine near Rafa to the northern boundary at Naqura.” It covers 931,000 acres, of which 332,000 acres are the Free Zone.

8. Mr. MacDonald said- “There will be no prohibition in the rest of the plain country . . . there will be no prohibition in the famous, spacious territory called the Negeb.”

The greater part of the Plain of Beisan, the Jordan Plain down to the Dead Sea, the plateau north of Beersheba and the great southern plain round Gaza and Beersheba, including the northern and more promising part of the Negeb, are in the prohibited zone. The southern plain alone in the Gaza and Beersheba Sub-Districts comprises 1,400,000 acres, a large part of it good agricultural land, with a rural population of little over 100,000.

9. Over two million acres of plain country are in the prohibited and another two million acres in the restricted zone; while practically the whole of the hill country is completely closed to the Jews.

10. Here are the relevant figures in tabulated form, with the population added-

Area  % of Jewish Jewish Arab Arab

(Acres) Total Land Rural Land Rural

(Acres) Pop. (Acres) Pop.

Zone A. (Prohibited) 4,104,000 63 80,500 5,000 4,203,500 564,000

Zone B. (Restricted) 2,067,840 32 130,617 13,000 1,937,223 54,000

Free Zone 332,160 5 170,000 48,000 162,160 48,500

Note- Although two months have elapsed since the promulgation of the Land Transfers Regulations and the debate in the House of Commons on March 6th, the Government have not placed before Parliament or given to the press any map or exact figures of the three zones. We are therefore forced to give our own estimate.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . . 5

I. PALESTINE LAND TRANSFERS REGULATIONS, FEBRUARY 1940.

Statement by the London Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine . . . . . . 7

Letter to the High Commissioner . . . . . . 8

The Three Zones under the Land Regulations . . . . . . 11

II. THE PALESTINE WHITE PAPER BEFORE THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION.

Extracts from the Minutes . . . . . . 13

Observations of the Commission . . . . . . 20

III. THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND THE WAR.

Dr. Weizmann to the Prime Minister . . . . . . 22

The Prime Minister to Dr. Weizmann . . . . . . 22

Statement by the Executive of the Jewish Agency . . . . . . 23

Registration for National Service . . . . . . 23

APPENDIX A.

Letter to The Times from Prof. L. B. Namier . . . . . . 25

APPENDIX B.

Letter to The Times from Mr. M. Shertok . . . . . . 27

[5] IT is with deep sorrow that the Jewish Agency break the silence which they have imposed on themselves since the outbreak of the war. Rather they would concentrate all their thoughts on how to serve the cause of Great Britain, which is also the Jewish cause. But the Land Regulations now published leave them no choice.

The immigration clauses of the White Paper of May 1939, rendered even more merciless by an inadmissible administrative interpretation,1 have deprived hunted, tortured Jews of their most rightful refuge. The constitutional provisions, adumbrated for the future, make a mockery of the National Home by placing Palestine Jewry as a permanent minority under Arab rule. The Land Regulations debar the Jews from access to the soil in the greatest part of Palestine, while in most of the rest they subject Jewish land purchases to restrictions not far removed from prohibition.

On the outbreak of war the Jewish Agency declared, on behalf of the Jewish people, their desire to render their utmost assistance to Great Britain in every sphere of war activity. Dr. Weizmann wrote to the Prime Minister in this sense,2 and a similar statement was issued by the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Palestine.3 With regard to the differences which had arisen over the White Paper, Dr. Weizmann wrote that “we would like these differences to give way before the greater and more pressing necessities of the time.” The Agency understood that their offer of co-operation was welcome,4 and it seemed reasonable to assume that, while the war lasted, nothing would be done by His Majesty’s Government which would make that co-operation more difficult.

A truce over the White Paper seemed to be indicated also because the validity of the White Paper had been very seriously questioned by the Permanent Mandates Commission.5 The Jews thought that Great Britain, standing for the rule of law and for international justice, would not ignore the views expressed by the spokesmen of impartial public opinion on the Permanent Mandates Commission, or take further steps to implement the White Paper in disregard of the fact that its reversal of policy had not been approved by the Council of the League.

In the next months, however, the Jews perceived, with growing surprise and pain, that His Majesty’s Government were resolved to put into force the White Paper as fully as possible without regard for the rights of the Jewish people or for the effect which their action might have upon Jewish co-operation in the present emergency. When, on the outbreak of war, the Jewish Agency organised in [6] Palestine a national registration,6 90,000 men and 46,000 women volunteered for national service, the vast majority of the men specifically mentioning their readiness to serve with the British Army. On the strength of this, the Jewish Agency offered to raise a Jewish force for service wherever required by His Majesty’s Government; for the defence of Palestine three Jewish divisions could be raised. Moreover, the Jewish Agency offered to develop war industries in Palestine. Like other nations, the Jews, to exert their supreme war effort, must act as a nation- but only individual service by Jews has so far been admitted, coupled with reminders that it was being rendered unconditionally. It even seems as if, in certain quarters, a war effort on the part of the Jewish people was opposed for fear that the credit which they would gain thereby might interfere with the policy of applying the White Paper with full rigour in the future.

There are more than three million Jews in Poland; they fought with courage and devotion on the Allied side. Almost two millions now suffer hideous persecution under Nazi rule- they are driven from their homes, deprived of their property, debarred from earning a living, forced to perform slave labour; thousands have been executed, hundreds of thousands are being ill-treated, all who are still alive are facing death by starvation. Their eyes turn to Palestine. But the present suspension of Jewish immigration has been made to apply also to refugees, and even the pittance of immigration permits left to the Jews under the White Paper is being withheld from them. A request to allow Jewish children from Poland to be taken to Palestine has been met with a blank refusal.

The Jews have been the first and foremost victims of Nazi persecution. A tragedy incredible in size and character is being enacted. However many Jews may perish before the end of the war, a problem of first-class magnitude will still confront the world–it will call out for a solution, and that solution Palestine alone can offer. The determination of the Jewish people to uphold their national rights and regain their national heritage, their bitter need and its impact on the non-Jewish world, must sweep away the sterile restrictions and prohibitions of the White Paper. Meanwhile, with its denial of rights and its indifference to human suffering, it works destruction and engenders bitterness. But even under its shadow the Jews are loth to believe that the British Government, Parliament, or nation could be persuaded to countenance the policy of the White Paper if they clearly envisaged its nature and consequences.

1 See Appendix A.

2 Document No. III (1).

3 Document No. III (3).

4 See Prime Minister’s Letter, Document No. III (2).

5 Document No. II.

6 Document No. III (4).

[7] I. PALESTINE LAND TRANSFERS REGULATIONS

Statement by the London Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

The Jewish Agency deeply regret that the controversy between His Majesty’s Government and themselves over the Statement of Policy published in May, 1939, is now reopened by the enacting of the Land Regulations. At a time when, under the Nazis, millions of Jews suffer as no nation has suffered in modern history, His Majesty’s Government take action endangering the Jewish national heritage, of which they are the appointed trustee.

These Land Regulations forbid the acquisition of land by Jews in the greater part of Palestine, and severely restrict it in most of the rest; thus they bar to the Jews access to the soil of Palestine, and confine them to a Pale of Settlement in the country of their National Home; they make a mockery of the obligation placed upon His Majesty’s Government by the Mandate to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land; they discriminate against the Jews on grounds of race and religion, such discrimination being explicitly forbidden by the Mandate.

When the White Paper of May, 1939, came before the Permanent Mandates Commission, it was unanimously pronounced to be contrary to the interpretations previously placed by His Majesty’s Government on the Mandate, and accepted by the League. The majority of the Commission declared it incompatible with any construction which could properly be put upon the Mandate. In carrying out the White Paper after its legality has been so authoritatively challenged, His Majesty’s Government are acting in an arbitrary manner.

His Majesty’s Government argue that these Land Regulations are necessary in order to prevent the rise of a considerable landless Arab population. But the legend of Arab displacement was disproved when submitted to factual examination. Wherever the Jews have settled on the land, the neighbouring Arab villages have benefited and prospered, whereas other districts have remained backward and undeveloped. Not even land officially classified as “uncultivable” is exempted from the new prohibitions. The new Regulations are a concession to Arab political claims, not a measure for the protection of Arab cultivators.

When war broke out, the Jewish Agency felt that the fate of Jewry was bound up with this life-and-death struggle forced upon civilised humanity. They ranged themselves on the side of Britain and France, and, while they would not, and could not renounce any of their national rights they made no conditions and only asked for opportunity to throw their full weight on the side of the Allies. Nor [8] were these offers mere vague assurances; they were made in concrete terms and it has depended solely upon His Majesty’s Government to make use of them. But His Majesty’s Government is apparently advised that it will better repay to let the Jewish offer lie, and through the three features of the White Paper to reproduce for the Jews in their National Home the root-evils of the Dispersion–barred doors, discrimination on grounds of race and religion, and permanent minority status.

Once more we declare our conviction that the White Paper is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Mandate. We shall continue to uphold our rights and to oppose their infringement by every legitimate means at our disposal. We are as ready as ever for cooperation with the Arab people, both in the economic and in the political sphere, on the basis of mutual respect for the rightful interests of both nations in the reconstruction of the Middle East. We appeal to the British public for their understanding and support in our struggle against the sterile restrictions and prohibitions of the White Paper.

We call upon the Jews to keep firm and united, working for the day when the Rule of Law will be re-established in the world and the rights of the weak be made as safe as those of the strong.

28th February, 1940.

Letter to the High Commissioner.

His Excellency,

The High Commissioner for Palestine,

Government House,

Jerusalem.

Your Excellency,

We have the honour to refer to the Land Transfer Regulations, a copy of which was communicated to us today, and to request that our following submissions be transmitted to the Secretary of State for the consideration of His Majesty’s Government.

2. We do not propose in these submissions to offer any criticisms on points of detail but to make some observations on the general principles on which the Regulations are based.

3. The effect of these Regulations is that no Jew may acquire in Palestine a plot of land, a building, or a tree, or any right in water, except in towns and in a very small part of the country. The Regulations deny to Jews equality before the law and introduce racial discrimination. They confine the Jews within a small pale of settlement similar to that which existed in Czarist Russia before the last war, and such as now exists only under Nazi rule. They not only violate the terms of the Mandate but completely nullify its primary purpose.

4. The Preamble to the Mandate provides that the “Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty . . . . in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a [9] National Home for the Jewish people.” Article 2 enjoins that the “Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home as laid down in the Preamble.” Article 6 prescribes that the “Administration of Palestine shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.” Article 15 stipulates that “no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language.” All of these provisions are swept aside by the new Regulations.

5. According to the Explanatory Note accompanying them, these Regulations are intended to give effect to the Statement of Policy of His Majesty’s Government dated the 17th May, 1939. In our letter to Your Excellency dated the 31st May and in a supplementary memorandum dated the 4th June, 1939, we contended that this Statement of Policy was incompatible with the terms of the Mandate. The Permanent Mandates Commission, at its thirty-sixth session, unanimously held that that policy was not in accordance with the interpretation which had always been placed on the Palestine Mandate by the Council of the League of Nations and by His Majesty’s Government, while a majority of the Commission reached the conclusion that the policy of the White Paper was not in conformity with the Mandate and that any contrary conclusion was “ruled out by the very terms of the Mandate and the fundamental intentions of its authors.” The conclusion of this impartial body, which is charged by the League of Nations with examining the administration of the Mandate, bears out our contention regarding the Statement of Policy.

The assent given by a majority of the House of Commons to the Statement of Policy on May 21, 1939 was, as we understood it, based on the assumption made by the Secretary of State in the debate, that there was no contradiction between the Statement of Policy and the terms of the Mandate. As indicated above, this assumption was found by the Permanent Mandates Commission to be unwarranted.

6. As stated in the Explanatory Note, the Regulations have been made in order to give effect to paragraph 16 of the Statement of Policy. This paragraph purports to be based on purely economic grounds. It is asserted that owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the sale of Arab land to Jews, there is no room for further transfer of Arab land to Jews in certain areas. We challenge the accuracy of this assertion. We contend that the greater part of the land of Palestine is still not cultivated; that the development of their holdings by the Arabs was rendered possible largely by the sale of part of their land to Jews; that precisely in those areas where Arabs sold some of their land to Jews the economic position of the Arabs was improved, while in the areas where this was not the case the situation of the rural population has remained stagnant and a considerable proportion of the land lies waste.

A mere cursory examination of the map referred to in the [10] Regulations is sufficient to demonstrate how unfounded is the economic argument on which the Regulations are supposedly based. The restrictions imposed by the Regulations do not apply to the small area of land from Tantura to the southern boundary of the Ramleh Sub-District. This is precisely the area where there have been considerable sales of land to Jews, where Jewish settlement is most concentrated and where at the same time the increase of the Arab population has been greater than in any other part of the country. Conversely, in Zone A, where very little land was transferred to Jews the Arab population has hardly increased. It is in this zone, which comprises the greatest part of the country, that the transfer of land to Jews is to be entirely prohibited.

7. We have on several occasions requested the Government to furnish us with the factual and statistical data on which it is sought to justify land restrictions, in order that our experts might examine them. This request has been consistently refused. If the new land policy can really be justified on purely economic grounds, as claimed in the Statement of Policy, we fail to understand why it should have been found necessary to keep this material secret.

8. In a public statement made by the Arab delegation to the Palestine Conference in London last year it was admitted that there were some nineteen million dunams of land in Palestine west of the Jordan, out of a total of less than twenty-seven million dunams, which were not cultivated by Arabs and which were uncultivable by them. The acquisition and development by Jews of practically all of these lands have now been prohibited on the pretext of a shortage of land.

9. We submit that far from benefitting the Arabs, the Regulations will be harmful to their interests. They will condemn the greater part of Palestine to remain waste and will paralyse the agricultural progress of the Arab cultivators by depriving them of one of the surest means of improving their holdings.

10. Apart from any question of the validity, justice and economic soundness of the Regulations, we submit that their enactment at the present moment is most unfortunate. The country is only now beginning to recover from the disastrous effects of four years of disturbances. The introduction of the Regulations in these circumstances, can only interfere with the return to normality, the restoration of peaceful relations between Jews and Arabs and their cooperation with the Government.

While it is claimed for the new policy that it is designed to establish peace and co-operation between Jews and Arabs, the Regulations are bound to widen the gulf between the two communities and to prevent any co-operation in the important sector of agriculture.

11. The new land policy embodied in the Regulations strikes at the heart of the Jewish National Home by depriving the Jews of the right to settle on the land outside a small pale of settlement and compels them, as in the Diaspora, to be town-dwellers. This attempt to frustrate the age-long aspiration of the Jewish people to become rooted again in the soil of its ancient Homeland is made at a time when millions of Jews are being mercilessly persecuted by a cruel enemy. This blow is being inflicted by the Government of a great [11] nation which undertook to restore the Jewish People to their National Home. The Jewish People will not submit to the conversion of the Jewish National Home into a ghetto, nor can it believe that Great Britain would consciously be responsible for such a travesty of an international obligation.

12. In 1930 His Majesty’s Government published a White Paper containing proposals which seemed to involve new restrictive tests for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon who contended that these innovations were inconsistent with the Mandate, wrote a letter to The Times in which they said as follows-

“We are not at present concerned with the expediency of the Government’s policy but the Mandate constitutes for the people of this country a legal as well as a moral duty and breach of its terms by any British Government would lay this country open to the grave charge of a breach of faith and disregard of its international obligations . . . . this country cannot afford to allow any suspicion to rest on its good faith or on its determination to carry out to the full its international obligations. If, therefore, the terms of the White Paper are the deliberate and considered announcement of Government’s policy we would suggest that immediate steps be taken to induce the Council of the League of Nations to obtain from The Hague Court an advisory opinion on the question involved and that the British Government should not enforce those paragraphs which are challenged unless and until the Court has pronounced in their favour.”

13. The Jewish Agency respectfully submits that the procedure suggested by these eminent legal authorities should be followed by His Majesty’s Government in regard to the new land Regulations.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency’s most obedient servant,

(Signed) D. Ben Gurion,

Executive of The Jewish Agency.

Jerusalem, 27th February, 1940.

The Three Zones under the Land Regulations.

1. The area of Palestine (west of the Jordan) exclusive of lakes is 6,504,000 acres, of which 381,000, or 5.8 per cent, are in Jewish hands.

2. Palestine has now been divided into three zones- Zone A, where no land may be bought by Jews; Zone B, where Jewish land purchase may be allowed only under special circumstances; and the “Free Zone,” where Jewish land purchase is not subjected to administrative restrictions.

3. Zone A comprises 4,104,000 acres, or about 63.1 per cent of the total;

Zone B, 2,067,840 acres, or 31.8 per cent;

[12] The “Free Zone,” 332,160 acres, or 5.1 per cent.

4. In the prohibited zone the Jews own about 80,500 acres, or 1.4 per cent of the total area. Of this, 20,000 are owned by the Palestine Potash Company, not a purely Jewish concern, whose land is not used for agriculture.

5. In the restricted zone the Jews own 130,617 acres of land. Of the remaining 1,937,223 acres, fully 1,700,000 acres are in the Southern Negeb–an arid area practically uninhabited and as yet unexplored.

6. In the “free” zone 170,000 acres are owned by Jews and 162,160 acres by Arabs. This area, which is all that is open to Jewish land purchase without legal restrictions, forms 2.6 per cent of non-Jewish land in Palestine. 48,500 Arabs live on it.

7. Mr. MacDonald stated in the House of Commons on March 6, 1940, that “the transfer of land from Jews to Arabs is to continue freely, absolutely unrestricted . . . throughout practically the whole length and breadth of the maritime plain.”

The Maritime Plain is defined in the Memoranda prepared by the Palestine Government for the Royal Commission (page 22) as stretching “from the southern boundary of Palestine near Rafa to the northern boundary at Naqura.” It covers 931,000 acres, of which 332,000 acres are the Free Zone.

8. Mr. MacDonald said- “There will be no prohibition in the rest of the plain country . . . there will be no prohibition in the famous, spacious territory called the Negeb.”

The greater part of the Plain of Beisan, the Jordan Plain down to the Dead Sea, the plateau north of Beersheba and the great southern plain round Gaza and Beersheba, including the northern and more promising part of the Negeb, are in the prohibited zone. The southern plain alone in the Gaza and Beersheba Sub-Districts comprises 1,400,000 acres, a large part of it good agricultural land, with a rural population of little over 100,000.

9. Over two million acres of plain country are in the prohibited and another two million acres in the restricted zone; while practically the whole of the hill country is completely closed to the Jews.

10. Here are the relevant figures in tabulated form, with the population added-

Area  % of Jewish Jewish Arab Arab

(Acres) Total Land Rural Land Rural

(Acres) Pop. (Acres) Pop.

Zone A. (Prohibited) 4,104,000 63 80,500 5,000 4,203,500 564,000

Zone B. (Restricted) 2,067,840 32 130,617 13,000 1,937,223 54,000

Free Zone 332,160 5 170,000 48,000 162,160 48,500

Note- Although two months have elapsed since the promulgation of the Land Transfers Regulations and the debate in the House of Commons on March 6th, the Government have not placed before Parliament or given to the press any map or exact figures of the three zones. We are therefore forced to give our own estimate.

[13] II. THE PALESTINE WHITE PAPER BEFORE THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION

Thirty-Sixth Session, Geneva, June 1939

Extracts from the Minutes

M. Rappard-

. . . Not only was the obligation to establish and maintain a Jewish National Home not recognised [in the White Paper] as a primary obligation, but Jewish and Arab interests did not appear to be considered as being on an equal footing as a matter of right.

. . . In the matter of immigration in the first place, the Mandates Commission would be going back on its own decision if it were to state that the policy enunciated in the White Paper was in conformity with the mandate. When two years previously the mandatory Power had declared that it was ceasing, for the time being, to apply the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, the Mandates Commission had regarded that as a suspension of the mandate, justifiable only as a provisional measure in view of the prevailing political crisis in Palestine. But it was important to note that it was proposed to apply immediately and for an indefinite period the policy enunciated in the present White Paper.

. . . But how could that be regarded as other than an infringement of the positive obligation on the mandatory Power to “facilitate” Jewish immigration? Jewish immigration, moreover, had never received any positive encouragement, though, hitherto, in normal times it had been permitted within the limits of economic possibilities. It was now proposed first of all to restrict it for political reasons, then, in point of fact–for it would be idle to entertain any illusions as to Arab acquiescence–to stop it completely. In M. Rappard’s opinion, it was impossible to reconcile the views of the mandatory Power and the requirements of the mandate on that point.

Nor did they appear any more compatible so far as the land system was concerned. The mandate imposed the obligation to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land. Was it encouraging settlement to restrict and even forbid the acquisition of land by Jewish settlers?

In the third place, it was difficult to express an opinion on the Constitution which would be given to the country, for it had not yet even been outlined; two points could, however, already be noted with regard to it. The first was that the Constitution was to be framed during a period in which, in accordance with the wishes of the mandatory Power, the Arabs would possess a numerical preponderance over the Jews of two to one.

. . . The mandatory Power was contemplating the substitution of independent government for its own guardianship after it had [14] so exercised the latter as to ensure an Arab majority in perpetuity. If, during the final period of the mandate, the balance were not held equal by the mandatory Power between the Jewish element and the Arab element, was it not certain that, as soon as the country acquired independence, the Jewish National Home would be sacrificed to the hostility of the Arab majority?

M. Rappard must therefore answer the Chairman’s question [whether the policy outlined in the White Paper of May 1939 was, or was not, in conformity with the terms of the mandate] very definitely in the negative.

(p. 199)

Mlle. Dannevig-

Mlle. Dannevig agreed with M. van Asbeck that illegal immigration into Palestine bore quite a different aspect from illegal immigration into any other country in the world because of the stipulation in article 6 of the mandate and of the peculiarly difficult situation of the Jews. It was heartbreaking to think of the miserable Jewish refugees who, according to recent reports, had been driven away from their homes and led to believe that they would be admitted into Palestine and who were undergoing great sufferings on board ill-fitted vessels in the Mediterranean. Did the United Kingdom Government propose to take any measures to alleviate, as soon as possible, the sufferings of those unfortunate people?

Mr. MacDonald seemed unjustifiably optimistic regarding the attitude of the Jews towards immigration restrictions. The Jews, she held, were fighting for their lives, whereas the Arabs were fighting only for their political rights and national prestige. Should the question not be looked at from that point of view?

(p. 132)

Mlle. Dannevig stated that, in regard to Jewish immigration, the changes proposed by the mandatory Power in the policy hitherto followed did not appear to her to be in keeping with the terms of the mandate, because their effect would be to prevent the promised immigration by an arbitrary act–namely, the application of a political criterion. On that point, it had already been observed by the Mandates Commission that the application of a political criterion could only be accepted as a temporary measure.

Furthermore, after a period of five years, the mandatory Power proposed, in its White Paper, that no further Jewish immigration should be authorised unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to acquiesce in it. That second obstacle to Jewish immigration was also, in her opinion, in contradiction with article 6 of the mandate.

In regard to the land question, if the High Commissioner were given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land, and if he used those powers in certain parts of Palestine, no-one could say that the promise to encourage the close settlement by Jews on the land had been fully carried out; and there again the White Paper was at variance with the mandate.

[15] It was difficult to pass judgment on the future constitution which, according to the White Paper, was to be given to Palestine, but which was hardly yet sketched out; she did not, however, see how, in a State with democratic forms, the Jews, who would be far fewer in number than the Arabs would be able to assert themselves politically.

(p. 196)

M. van Asbeck-

. . . Both the mandate and the Balfour Declaration contained one paramount obligation–namely, the foundation of a Jewish National Home. That was the primary purpose of the mandate as outlined in its preamble. M. van Asbeck was, therefore, disinclined to agree with the way in which paragraph 2 of the White Paper presented the “three main obligations,” and demurred to the rather subordinate place allotted to the really paramount obligation. The novel feature of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was that, for the first time, it gave an official promise of British assistance and the realisation of Zionist aspirations, which could be summed up in the phrase that the Jews would cease to be a minority in one part of the world. It was therefore quite natural that British and Allied statesmen should, in the first years after the Declaration, have talked about the future Jewish “commonwealth” foreshadowed in the Balfour Declaration.

. . . The Churchill White Paper was the result of consultations between the prospective mandatory Power and the two most important sections of the population of Palestine and, on its basis, the mandate was confirmed by the League of Nations . . . . In fact, it was the authentic comment on the mandate, which was then drawn up, and had ever since been considered as such by the League of Nations. From 1922 until the Statement of Policy of 1937, the mandate had been operated on the basis of the Churchill White Paper–namely, that the Jewish National Home would increase, but it should increase only in proportion to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Thus the eventual creation of a Jewish State had not yet been precluded, as Mr. Churchill himself had testified in 1937 before the Royal Commission.

(pp. 114-115)

M. van Asbeck did not think that illegal immigration into other countries could be placed wholly on the same footing as “illegal immigration” of Jews into Palestine. The Jewish illegal immigrants were people whose historical connection with Palestine had been openly recognised. In that connection, he would like to know the Secretary of State’s opinion on the question whether the word “acquiesce” used in the 1939 White Paper (paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (3)) was really appropriate, seeing that the rather similar expression “sufferance” had been rejected in the Churchill White Paper.

(p. 131)

[16] The new provisions concerning immigration were not in conformity with the mandate of 1922, which placed the mandatory Power under the obligation to facilitate immigration, or the commentary of Mr. Churchill, which laid down the rule of economic absorptive capacity. Further, the mandatory Power proposed, according to the 1939 White Paper, to subordinate Jewish immigration to the consent of the Arabs after a period of five years, which really meant stopping such immigration, by adopting a political standard of which there was no mention in the 1922 White Paper.

. . . It must be acknowledged that to limit the possibilities of purchase of land by Jews and to do away with such possibilities completely should occasion arise in certain parts of the country was not to “encourage” close settlement by Jews on the land.

(p. 201)

The mechanism for which provision had been made [in the White Paper] was based on the idea that the Arabs’ interest in becoming independent was counterbalanced by the Jews’ interest in ensuring the existence of their National Home. The Arabs would not be able to acquire their independence (after ten years) unless the Jews consented (paragraph 8 of the Statement of Policy), and Jewish immigration would not be able to continue after a period of five years without the (tacit) acquiescence of the Arabs (paragraph 14 (3) of the Statement of Policy). It should be noted that provision had been made for two different periods- on the one hand, there was a ten-year period, at the end of which, at the most favourable estimate, independence could be declared, and, on the other hand, a period of five years, at the end of which Jewish immigration could be stopped. Under such an arrangement, even if the independence of Palestine could not be recognised, Jewish immigration would already have been interrupted for at least five years and could never be resumed without the acquiescence of the Arabs. Under those conditions, it was difficult to imagine how the Jewish National Home could be safeguarded. In reality, in that respect, the tendency of the new policy seemed to be to place the Jews at a disadvantage and to endanger the existence of their National Home. Was that in keeping with the mandate?

(p. 202)

M. Orts-

The 1939 Statement of Policy announced (paragraph 10, sub-paragraph (8)) that, if at the end of ten years it appeared to His Majesty’s Government that circumstances required the postponement of the establishment of the proposed independent State, the Government would then consult with representatives of the people of Palestine (that appeared to be a politic step), with the Council of the League of Nations (that went without saying), but also with the neighbouring Arab States. It was thus formally admitted that the Arab States, although foreign to the affairs of Palestine, were to be consulted regarding the advisability of the pursuit, in Palestine, of a certain policy by the mandatory Power. The fact of consulting anyone meant that a right of intervention in the matter was recognised as attaching to that person. Whence had the Arab States derived [17] such a right? By formally recognising that right, was not a further obstacle being placed in the way of a solution which was already beset by so many difficulties?

(p. 183)

Was not consent to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine the price–and a relatively small one–which the Arabs had paid for the liberation of lands extending from the Red Sea to the borders of Cilicia on the one hand, Iran and the Mediterranean on the other, for the independence they are now winning or had already won, none of which they would ever have gained by their own efforts, and for all of which they had to thank the Allied Powers and particularly the British forces in the Near East? There were other peoples who, because they had failed to win independence by their own efforts, had paid for their independence by far heavier sacrifices, and in regard to whom the conscience of the world had nevertheless not been touched, even though the sacrifice demanded was not in any way designed to relieve another people whose fate deserved equal attention.

(p. 184)

. . . To his mind, the mandatory Power’s proposed policy for Palestine was contrary to the mandate. In support of that conviction he could not do better than repeat the evidence already supplied by those of his colleagues who had come to the same conclusion. He associated himself with their arguments, and the Commission would excuse him if he refrained from expressing them again and reviewing once more the various chapters of the White Paper which dealt with the proposed constitution, the decisions regarding immigration and land sales.

(p. 206)

To affirm its respect for the engagements arising out of the embodiment of the Balfour Declaration in the mandate, and at the same time to affirm the conformity with the mandate of a policy, the avowed object of which was to restrict the effects of the Balfour Declaration and within a short time to fix them at their present stage, was to adopt a position which it was not easy to defend, and of which the defence might before long be abandoned. Anyone dealing with Palestine today had to choose between taking his stand on the mandate or taking it on political grounds.

For his part, the Chairman [M. Orts] declined to find any opposition between the “spirit” of the Covenant and the terms of the mandate. He saw no contradiction between those two texts, which for seventeen years had constituted the law that the Commission had applied to the case of Palestine.

. . . Excluded, from the very outset, by the detachment of Trans-Jordan, from a part of the lands promised to it, limited juridically in its development by the recognition of the principle of the twofold obligation, and obstructed at its very source by the temporary suspension of the application of the criterion of economic absorptive capacity and later by the substitution of a political criterion, the Jewish National Home in an independent State with [18] a permanent Arab majority would see its destinies placed in the hands of a race which could not forgive its existence.

(pp. 206-207).

The Mandates Commission could not be expected to consent to any such step, which would amount to a denial of the whole of its past history and a reversal of its decisions. It was necessary to reflect- the argument of necessity–of the necessity of satisfying the majority–might lead very far.

(p. 207)

THE HOGARTH MESSAGE.

M. Rappard-

He did not propose at present to discuss the legal value to be attached to the Hogarth declarations–of which a great deal was now being made after some seventeen years of silence.

(p. 105)

M. Orts-

The Chairman asked whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies took the view that the promise made by Commander Hogarth and that enshrined in the mandate, which was an international instrument, carried equal weight.

Mr. MacDonald-

Mr. MacDonald said he did not take that view at all. He would describe the Hogarth message as important evidence of what the British authors of the Balfour Declaration and the British Government, who had had a great share in the framing of the mandate, had had in mind when they used certain words in the Declaration and in the mandate. It corroborated the case which he had made, but he would not claim that the Hogarth message had anything like the same international status as the mandate. If any conflict arose as between the Hogarth message and the mandate, the mandate, of course, must be accorded greater importance. But his point was that there was no conflict.

(pp. 113-114)

M. van Asbeck-

The basis for that change of emphasis [from the Jews to the Arabs] was the Hogarth message. As that was sent to King Hussein, it was presumably also known to King Feisal. Possibly that might be why the latter, in 1918 and the beginning of 1919, was rather inclined to accept the Jewish National Home and the Balfour Declaration. But it could not have been known to the British and Allied statesmen, otherwise they would have been much more careful when referring to a Jewish State or Commonwealth; and it was unknown in 1922, or it would naturally have been referred to in the Churchill White Paper. It was unknown in 1930 when, at the seventeenth (extraordinary) session, the whole question of Palestine came up [19] before the Mandates Commission. It was unknown to the Royal Commission which did not mention that important message in its report, although it was accustomed to examine thoroughly the material available; and it was not mentioned by the accredited representative of the mandatory Power in his explanations to the Commission at its thirty-second (extraordinary) session in 1937, although there had then been ample occasion and necessity for bringing the message fully to light.

(p. 116)

As to the Hogarth message, he thought the greatest significance must attach to the Secretary of State’s declaration that that message could not have the same legal status as the mandate. He ventured to maintain, in his view, that the Hogarth message did in some respects kill the Balfour Declaration, Political exigencies, of course, sometimes forced Governments to make statements in order to meet a momentary danger, but he would not press that matter. The main point was to have it agreed that the Hogarth message had not the same value as the mandate.

(p. 119)

M. van Asbeck, on the question of evidence, thought that, if the Hogarth message did throw light on the Balfour Declaration, it was an unhappy light, because much more importance had been attached to the proviso to which reference had been made than to the main object of the message itself. From a general point of view, the only existing comment on the mandate was the Churchill White Paper, which, while dealing exhaustively with the meaning of the mandate, was completely silent on the subject of the Hogarth message. The latter could not, therefore, it seemed to him, be taken as evidence to elucidate the meaning of the mandate.

(p. 120)

On the other hand, M. van Asbeck thought too much importance should not be attached to a document by which the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. MacDonald, had set great store–namely, the message brought by Commander Hogarth to King Hussein interpreting the Balfour Declaration. In 1922, no-one had mentioned the existence of that message, and the Balfour Declaration had been introduced into the mandate quite independently of the commentary which that message contained. In short, the only criterion by which the Commission could be guided was the mandate, together with the commentary on it given in the 1922 White Paper.

(p. 200)

M. Orts-

Lastly, he would refuse to interpret the mandate in the light of a document (the Hogarth message) of which a great deal had recently been made, and which the League of Nations, a party to the international Convention which the mandate constituted, was unaware of when it conferred the mandate–not to speak of the [20] Mandates Commission, which had been kept in ignorance of it during the whole time it had been supplying reports on the administration of Palestine, the conclusions of which were generally accepted by the Council.

(p. 206)

Observations of the Commission

From the first, one fact forced itself to the notice of the Commission–namely, that the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine mandate.

In order to prove this, it will be enough to say that, only two years ago, the Government of the mandatory Power declared, in the Statement of Policy which accompanied the report published by the Royal Commission, that the present mandate was unworkable. In view of this, the Mandates Commission communicated to the Council its opinion that a mandate which was declared unworkable by the mandatory Power almost became so by that very fact.

In 1937, there was already a conflict between Jewish and Arab aspirations, which the United Kingdom Government admitted its inability to reconcile; that conflict was the principal obstacle to Palestine’s being administered in accordance with the mandate. Since that time, the conflict has become more and more intense. In 1937, the United Kingdom Government, feeling itself unable equitably to administer Palestine under the present mandate, believed that the possibility of so doing was to be found in a territorial partition for which no provision was made therein, while today it considers its new policy to be in accordance with the mandate. Does this not show that that instrument had at that time a different meaning in the eyes of the mandatory Power than that which it has today?

The Commission did not, however, confine itself to establishing this single fact. It went on to consider whether the Palestine mandate might not perhaps be open to a new interpretation which, while still respecting its main principles, would be sufficiently flexible for the policy of the White Paper not to appear at variance with it. The Commission was all the less reluctant to raise this question since, according to the mandatory Power, no such contradiction existed. The Commission learned from the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the mandatory Power considered, on the strength of the opinion expressed by its legal advisors that, in view of the changed situation, the policy which it proposed to pursue was in agreement with the mandate, itself based on Article 22 of the Covenant and on the Balfour Declaration.

During the examination of this latter question, divergent views were found to exist among the members of the Commission.

. . . Four of the latter [M. Orts (Belgium), Chairman, M. Rappard (Switzerland) Vice-Chairman, Baron van Asbeck (Holland), [21] Mlle. Dannevig (Norway)] did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the mandate, any contrary conclusion appearing to them to be ruled out by the very terms of the mandate and by the fundamental intentions of its authors.

The other members, three in number, [M. Giraud (France), Lord Hankey (Great Britain), Count de Penha Garcia (Portugal)], were unable to share this opinion; they consider that existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the Council did not oppose it.

All the members agree in thinking that the considerations put forward in the report of the Royal Commission of 1937 and in the preliminary opinion presented by the Mandates Commission in August of the same year have not lost their relevance- the solutions envisaged in these two documents (excluding the setting-up of two independent States withdrawn at the outset from mandatory control) should be born in mind at the appropriate moment.

(p. 275)

[22] III. THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND THE WAR.

Dr. Weizmann to the Prime Minister.

29th August, 1939.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

In this hour of supreme crisis, the consciousness that the Jews have a contribution to make to the defence of sacred values impels me to write this letter. I wish to confirm, in the most explicit manner, the declarations which I and my colleagues have made during the last months, and especially in the last week- that the Jews “stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies.”

Our urgent desire is to give effect to these declarations. We wish to do so in a way entirely consonant with the general scheme of British action, and therefore would place ourselves, in matters big and small, under the co-ordinating direction of His Majesty’s Government. The Jewish Agency is ready to enter into immediate arrangements for utilising Jewish man-power, technical ability, resources, etc.

The Jewish Agency has recently had differences in the political field with the Mandatory Power. We would like these differences to give way before the greater and more pressing necessities of the time.

We ask you to accept this declaration in the spirit in which it is made.

I am, dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Ch. Weizmann.

The Prime Minister to Dr. Weizmann.

2nd September, 1939.

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

I should like to express my warm appreciation of the contents of your letter of August 29th, and of the spirit which prompted it. It is true that differences of opinion exist between the Mandatory Power and the Jewish Agency as regards policy in Palestine, but I gladly accept the assurance contained in your letter. I note with pleasure that in this time of supreme emergency, when those things which we hold dear are at stake, Britain can rely upon the whole-hearted co-operation of the Jewish Agency. You will not expect me to say more at this stage than that your public-spirited assurances are welcome and will be kept in mind.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Neville Chamberlain.

[23] Statement by the Executive of the Jewish Agency.

His Majesty’s Government has today declared war against the Germany of Hitler.

At this fateful moment, the Jewish community has a threefold concern- the protection of the Jewish homeland, the welfare of the Jewish people, the victory of the British Empire.

The White Paper of May, 1939, was a grave blow to us. As heretofore, we shall defend to the utmost of our ability the right of the Jewish people in its National Home. Our opposition to the White Paper was, however, never directed against Great Britain or the British Empire.

The war which has now been forced upon Great Britain by Nazi Germany is our war, and all the assistance that we shall be able and permitted to give to the British Army and to the British People we shall render wholeheartedly,

We do not know what will be in store for our country in this war. Our first duty is to ensure the survival and the welfare of the Jewish community, to strengthen it materially and morally, and to prepare it for the great and difficult task which Jewish history has assigned to it.

We have to maintain and strengthen the positions and creative achievements built up by two generations of Jewish pioneers in our Homeland. During two generations we have devoted our forces to constructive effort. If need be, we shall now show our strength in war also.

Let us close our ranks, let us unite in a spirit of responsibility and mutual help, discipline and national devotion, and let us be prepared.

Jerusalem,

3rd September, 1939,

Registration for National Service.

A joint meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency and of the General Council of Palestine Jews (Vaad Leumi) was held yesterday at the offices of the Jewish Agency.

The meeting dealt with the emergency created by the declaration of war. Among other matters, it was decided to carry out a registration of volunteers (men and women) for national service during the period of the emergency. Volunteers will be registered-

(a) to serve the needs of the Jewish Community as regards security, economic life and other public requirements.

(b) to be at the disposal of the British military authorities in Palestine for such services as they may require.

All men and women between the ages of 18 and 50, who register [24] for such voluntary service, will be required to furnish, details of their technical qualifications and special experience, and to indicate the tasks in which they are prepared to serve the Jewish Community or the British Army in Palestine.

Details of the registration will shortly be announced.

It was further resolved to set up, under the auspices of the Jewish Agency, an Economic Council composed of prominent members of the Jewish Community whose function will be to deal with the requirements of the Jewish economy in Palestine, in the fields of agriculture, industry, labour, supplies; credit, transport; import; export, etc.

The committees previously established by the Jewish Agency for dealing with the question of supply, banking and transport will continue to function in cooperation with the central Economic Council now to be set up.

(“Palestine Post,” 4th September, 1939)

An analysis of the final figures of 136,000 Jewish men and women who registered for voluntary national service is of considerable interest. The relevant figures were-

Men . . . 85,781 63 per cent.

Women . . . 50,262 37 per cent.

136,043 100 per cent.

The registrations comprised 71 per cent of the men in the total age group eligible for service and 42 per cent of the women.

The enrolments encompassed all males and females between the ages of 18 and 50 years, divided into two age groups, the second over 35 years. Most of the volunteers were given a thorough medical examination, on the lines given to recruits joining the Army, and the relevant particulars were noted on their application forms. There are to be three categories-

(1) Men aged 18 to 35 who are capable of active service;

(2) Men over 35, who will be put into a reserve or for passive defence services;

(3) Women.

Courses in first aid and other duties are to be opened for the women volunteers. The men in the first category are now in training.

(“New Judaea,” October, 1939, p. 5)

[25] APPENDIX A.

Jewish Refugees in Palestine

Illegal Immigrants

To the Editor of The Times.

Sir,–According to the White Paper of May, 1939, for each of the next five years “a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed . . . “subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, and to the further proviso (under para. 14 (4)) that “the number of any Jewish illegal immigrants who . . . may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.”

And here is paragraph 14 (1) (b)—

In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents. Thus it was stated in terms which admit of no doubt or “reinterpretation” that for these 25,000 refugees there were to be no yearly quotas, and that nothing was to delay their admission once “their maintenance is ensured.”

But in the House of Commons on July 20, Mr. MacDonald stated that because some 4,000 illegal immigrants had entered Palestine since May 24, and another 4,000 were expected, no immigrants of any kind shall be allowed during the half-year October, 1939, to April, 1940. To quote his own words—

“. . . something like 8,000 illegal immigrants have either got into Palestine or are about to go into Palestine at the present time. That figure cancels out the quota of legal immigration which we had contemplated permitting during the next six months period.”

The words “which we had contemplated permitting” are significant. Mr. MacDonald apparently did not wait to see for how many refugees–admittedly in the most desperate need of a refuge–maintenance could be ensured in Palestine by their relatives, friends, or by refugee organisations, but seems to have settled that matter in his own mind beforehand. He has obviously already digested these 25,000 refugee certificates into yearly quotas, irrespective of the urgency of the need, the possibilities in Palestine, and the terms of the White Paper.

It seems doubtful whether under the terms of the White Paper deductions for illegal immigrants can be made at all against the [26] 25,000 special refugee certificates or only “from the yearly quotas.” But even assuming that deductions from the 25,000 refugee certificates could be made, it seems clear that so long as there is an unexhausted balance of that figure remaining after such deduction has been made, it can on no view be permissible to stop the admission of refugees whose maintenance is ensured.

The Jews do not, and never will, acknowledge the legal validity of Mr. MacDonald’s White Paper, but it now appears that neither docs Mr. MacDonald himself.

I am, etc.,

L. B. Namier.

July 26. 15, Gloucester Walk, W.8.

(The Times, July 28, 1939).

[27] APPENDIX B.

Palestine and the Jews

The New Land Policy

To the Editor of the Times

Sir,–In accepting the Colonial Secretary’s case for land restrictions in Palestine you state that further land sales to Jews threaten “the disastrous swelling of a landless Arab proletariat.” The Jewish Agency has repeatedly asked the Government for the data by which such statements can be justified, but its request has been ignored.

The only detailed inquiry into the facts was made in 1931-32, following on Sir John Hope Simpson’s Report, and only some 600 Arabs, mostly tenants, were found to have been displaced during the 10 years in which the Jews had purchased 115,000 acres of land; of these displaced Arabs only about 100 availed themselves of the opportunity of resettlement offered by the Government, and according to the Official Report for 1937, some 50 of these families have “deserted the settlement and are engaged, for the most part, in other than agricultural work.” Since then the Government has passed a Tenants’ Protective Ordinance to prevent further displacements. As to peasant proprietors no facts have ever been adduced to show that they are being dispossessed. In fact, Arabs sell land which they can spare, and with the proceeds develop the remainder. Such sales of surplus land have been the chief source of capital for improving Arab agriculture. You rightly say that “the ultimate wealth of a country is measured not by its crops but by its men”; but the well-being of men depend on their crops, and the volume of crops does not depend on space alone, but on how that space is used. The new measure will condemn large areas to economic stagnation.

But why argue the case on economic grounds when it is the political reasoning of the White Paper of 1939 that inspires the present measure? You define the prohibited zone as consisting of “the hill country, together with certain over-populated regions in the South,” which may suggest that these regions have become over-populated as a result of sales of land to Jews. But it is precisely in the hill region and the southern area in question that the Jews have bought very little land, while in the coastal strip constituting the “free zone” they have acquired considerable areas. And where the Jews have not bought land the Arab population has increased very little; whereas in the coastal plain it has increased greatly. Is it on economic grounds that the Government forbids the Jews to apply their labour and resources to the development of the land which the Arabs admittedly cannot cultivate? This, according to the Arab Delegation at the Palestine Conferences, comprises about two-thirds [28] of Western Palestine. Again, how can a congested Arab village benefit by another village, with surplus land, being forbidden to dispose of it to their own advantage–unless indeed the Government contemplates collectivising and redistributing Arab land-holdings?

The new restrictions are political in character, designed to crystallize the Jewish National Home territorially in the same way as the Immigration Clauses of the White Paper are meant to crystallize it numerically, in each case without regard for the adverse economic consequences to the country. As to the far-reaching effects of the measure on the Jewish position, I would quote from a fetter addressed by Mr. D. Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, to the High Commissioner for Palestine—

The new land policy strikes at the heart of the Jewish national home by depriving the Jews of the right to settle on the land outside a small pale of settlement, and compels them–as in the Diaspora–to be town-dwellers. This attempt to frustrate the age-long aspiration of the Jewish people to become rooted again in the soil of their ancient homeland is made at a time when millions of Jews are being mercilessly persecuted by a cruel enemy. And this blow is being inflicted by the Government of the great nation which undertook to restore the Jewish people to their national home. The Jewish people will not submit to the conversion of the Je

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