• There were many considerations and factors affecting the question of Palestine during the Peace Conference following World War I. Two of the main negotiations were- Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 119.

• Division of the Ottoman Empire

• The Supreme Council’s allocation of Palestinian control to the British as a Mandate, stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

• It took two and a half years between the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and the decisions made at the San Remo Conference, wherein the British Mandate for control of Palestine was issued. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 119. • Between the Balfour Declaration and the San Remo Conference, multiple complications surfaced in the problems concerning Palestine. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 119.

• Allied decisions made concerning the division of Iraq and Syria were not sufficient in the eyes of most Arabs, and Arab nationalism took a much more active role in demanding independence.

• Arguments within the different Christian churches became more noticeable, (regarding control/access to Holy Places) with the disappearance of the “common enemy of Muslim rule”.

• Two British Armies were responsible for the conquest of the Middle East during the First World War; the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The latter was made up of some Italian and French troops as well, in a show of solidarity for the action. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 120. • Although according to international law the Turks had the right to govern their now occupied territories, they eventually left the areas of Palestine and Syria, taking their governing forces and documents with them. With the land itself in total disarray, it was absolutely necessary to place a civil administration to maintain order. France sought a “condominium”, or joint control of the area with Great Britain, but Britain assumed complete control of Palestine, and then in 1918 gave control of Syria to the French. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 120. • Along the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the decisions in August of 1918 divided the Occupied Enemy Territories (O.E.T.) as follows- Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 120.

• The British assumed control of the South zone (Palestine north to Acre and east to the Jordan River).

• French control of the North zone (the coast of Syria).

• Arab control, under Faisal with Arab officers, went to the East zone (Trans-Jordan and the interior of Syria).

• Iraq was not part of these arrangements, and remained under British control.

• According to Albright, et al, these negotiations and divisions were in line not only with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but also satisfied the arrangements of the McMahon Pledge. The British eventually pulled back to their Palestine boarders, leaving France with exclusive control of the coast of Syria and the Arab administration functioned in Damascus. Supervision of this “independence however, remained divided between France and Britain (see “zones” of the Sykes-Picot Agreement). Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 121. • As the First World War came to an end, the Arabs were becoming more anxious regarding the division of land between the French and the British. As a result, in an attempt to pacify the Arab concerns, the Allied powers issued the Anglo-French Declaration, on November 7, 1918. • The Anglo-French Declaration stated that the purpose of Great Britain and France’s position in the East was, “…the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous population.” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939, P. 118, as quoted in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 121. • The Anglo-French Declaration was distributed throughout Iraq, Syria and Palestine. It was viewed, or understood, by the Arabs as a promise for their independence in all Arab-speaking countries in the Near East. • Within the Arab countries, particularly Iraq, the Anglo-French Declaration caused a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. Were the Allies going to remove their support from the region? Who would counsel Iraq? Some felt the Sharif of Mecca should govern the country, while others hoped for a local leader. In addition,

• Unclear on the future of the land, animosities between tribesman/nomadic people and the settled populations began to rise.

• Dissension and fighting between the Shiite and Sunnite sects rose.

• Fearing for their own safety, Christians in the region began to worry about the growing violence and cruelty amongst the Arabs around them.

• Jews in the communities (at the time making up more than one-third of Baghdad’s population) made clear their desire to become “British subjects” rather than be under Arab rule, if an Arab government was put in place.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 122, citing Gertrude Bell, Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, Cmd. 1069, 1920, pp. 126-127. • Making the issuance of the Anglo-French Declaration even more confusing was the manner of rule by the British in Iraq at the time. Executive authority was given to military forces and civil issues were handled by the (British) government of India. Indian currency was even introduced, in order to keep the economy stable. Unfortunately, these governances seemed to undermine the autonomy the Arabs believed they were promised. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, P. 122. • As Arab unrest over British presence began to grow, Damascus became a hotbed of propaganda and extreme Arab nationalist elements. Britain had a difficult time maintaining peace and order, not only in Damascus but also along the border areas of Syria and Iraq. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 123. • In an attempt to quell the unrest in the Arab region, Britain tried to pacify the Arabs by recognizing local institutions and bringing in as many natives to work in the governing administration as possible. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 123. • It does not seem that British efforts to appease the Arabs were effective; in March of 1920, the Syrian Congress declared an independent Arab state in Syria. They chose Faisal as King, and this was followed by a similar declaration by Arabs in Mesopotamia claiming a state in Iraq, with Faisal’s brother (Emir Abdullah) as their King. Albright, et al, note that the position of “king” could not be authenticated at this time without the approval of the British, but what came of these demands for independence was a shift towards more concessions for Arab independence. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 123. • With Arab tensions and unrest particularly high in Syria, the implementation of the McMahon-Husain agreement was tenuous. The Arabs wanted no part of a French mandate in the region, although the coastal area had been designated for French administration.

• Arab extremists demanded a return to the Damascus Protocol (which included all of Syria under Arab control)

• The French were unsuccessful in maintaining order; inflammatory propaganda circulated regularly, particularly in Damascus. Much of the French military in the region was made up of Armenian forces, who themselves had old scores to settle with the Muslims – this led to actions not sanctioned by the French, but for which they were seen as responsible.

• The Arab administration in Damascus, although headed by Emir Faisal, had little control, either. Nadi el Arab, an extreme nationalist group headed by Ali Riza Pasha, was popular and active.

• Raids of Christian settlements (by Arabs) along the Lebanon-Syria border were not uncommon.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 124-125, citing Loder, op. cit., p. 51. • The King-Crane Commission (out of the U.S.) visited the region of Palestine and Syria during the summer of 1919. Their goal was to determine whom the general population would favor as the Mandatory for the area (choices being either Great Britain or France). During the four-month visit, acts of hostility and violence were subdued, as the Arabs wished to show a united front and make a good impression on their American visitors. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 125. • During the King-Crane Commission’s visit in 1919, a Syrian Congress organized stating that they represented all Arabs of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. They requested a “complete political independence” for all of Syria, including Palestine. The Syrian Congress was decided in their rejection of the lines drawn for the country during the Peace Conference, but was willing to discuss options with the Americans and the British. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 125. • The Syrian Congress made the following statement regarding their position on Palestine, “We oppose the pretensions of Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.” Hanna, op. cit., p. 43, as cited in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 125. • Emir Faisal’s position of authority did not withstand the political unrest of the Syrian Arabs. Although initially declared King of Syria by the Syrian Council (in hopes of keeping him from Allied influence) he was still viewed as a moderate who was working too closely with the French. His popularity waned and when the French Mandate was introduced, Faisal had to choose- reject the Mandate, as he was expected to do by the Syrian Council, or accept and help implement the Mandate, as France expected. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 126. • In addition to accepting the French Mandate in Syria, General Gouraud (High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief for France) posted the following conditions that Faisal would also have to accept if he were to maintain his position of authority with the French. (If he opted not to agree, he would be removed from power)-

• Abolition of a military draft, which the Arabs had implemented

• Bringing the currency from Syria’s eastern zone throughout the country

• France’s right to determine the future of the railway running from Rayak to Aleppo, which meant control of traffic through both Syrian and other Arab zones.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 126, also citing Loder, op. cit., pp. 77-78. • Faisal responded to the dual pressures of pleasing his Arab constituents and the power of the French by agreeing to France’s demands only five hours before French troops were to invade Damascus and remove him. Some claim that his message simply did not reach the French in time; others believe his word was heard, but that the French chose to oust him nonetheless. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 126. • With unrest and upheaval in Syria, conflict in Palestine heightened, as well. Under a military administration comprised of British troops (also drawn from Egypt), sympathies for the Zionists and their goals were rare and attitudes towards the settlers themselves was often hostile. Some of the factors involved included-

• Conflicting pressures for the governing administration – on the one hand the Jews expected them to uphold the Balfour Declaration and their right to be on the land, while Arabs referenced the Anglo-French Declaration, which although did not specify Palestine, did not exclude it, either.

• The Egyptian civil service members amongst the British troops were often more familiar with, and thus sympathetic to the Arab interests.

• Military and colonial officials thought of the Jews as aggressive and demanding, without a proper respect or appreciation for the difficult position the administration was in.

• Jews felt the administration was anti-Semitic and reactionary, and therefore did not pay them the attention or respect one might anticipate for a colonial administration.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 127. • Difficulties in the early administration of Palestine did not go unnoticed.

• It has been postulated that General Allenby himself made comments to the effect that the British may have served their interests better by not issuing the Balfour Declaration, and instead supporting full Arab independence throughout Syria and Palestine (under British guidance).

Charles Breasted, Pioneer to the Past, Scribners, 1943, pp. 247 as cited in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 127.

• An unnamed but high-ranking British military official has been quoted in his opinion that it would require a minimum of 50,000 men to support the ‘Zionist program in the face of Arab opposition.’

J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine the Reality, London, 1939, p. 239, as cited in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 128. • Albright, et al, comment that the British Administration in Palestine seems to have been comprised mainly of individuals who did not support the Zionist idea, who opposed the division of the region and thought it better to support Arabs in the region if Britain were to maintain control. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 128. • The government in London did not reflect the anti-Zionist feelings, no matter how strong within the administration in Palestine at the end of the First World War. They assisted in creating a Commission to Palestine just after the conquest of the area, and it was made up of Zionists from Britain, France and Italy. Chaim Weizmann headed the Commission, and Ormsby-Gore and James de Rothschild went as political officers on behalf of the British government. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 129. • During the Palestine Commission’s trip to Palestine, Weizmann met with many officials and notables. He attempted to calm fears or misnomers regarding the Zionist movement, stating that the Jews considered themselves “brother Semites” to the Arabs, and that they were not strangers “coming” to Palestine but rather “returning” to it. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 129. • Weizmann also appealed to the administrating parties in Palestine at the time, stating that the Zionist goals could be fulfilled in harmony with the existing communities if provided with the right conditions, and that the land could certainly sustain exponentially more people than it currently was. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 129. • To Weizmann’s appeal, the Mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazem Pasha replied in kind, and quoted a saying from the Prophet Mohammad, “Our rights are your rights, and your duties are our duties.” Storrs, op. cit., in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 130. • Albright, et al, comment in their writing that during this period (around 1918), it seems that relations between the Zionists and the Arabs were actually more favorable than those between the Zionists and the Administration. British authorities in Palestine-

• Were annoyed by the inconvenience of the use of Hebrew

• Did not want to admit any new immigrants, as most there were still quite poor

• Envied the pay subsidies provided by Zionists to Jewish government officials

• Blamed the loss of Turkish land registers as reason for not being able to allocate or complete land transactions.

Such discouraging attitudes developed into a relationship of distrust and suspicion between the Zionists and the administration. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 130. • Again, during the Commission to Palestine’s trip, Weizmann had the multi-fold task of reassuring and calming fears and distrust developing within the Jewish settlements towards to the British military administration, but also to “moderate the extreme expectations that had been aroused by the Balfour Declaration which the Jews in Palestine generally interpreted as a promise of a Jewish state.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 130. • Chaim Weizmann made the point of necessity for patience and understanding amongst the Zionist settlers clear and concise when he said, “At present there is no point in talking about the foundation of a Jewish state in the full sense of the word for we do not have the power to conduct such a state. We must ask for some strong governments, which we may trust to administer our ‘state’ justly, to take matters under its direction, enable us to develop our abilities, our institutions and our colonies, until the time comes when we shall be fit to undertake the administration of the country ourselves.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 131, quoting from Medzini, op. cit., p. 57. • The Commission to Palestine left in September of 1918. For all of Weizmann’s efforts, attitudes in the facilitation of the administration did not seem to change much, and few, if any of the Jewish grievances were addressed or resolved. During the summer of 1919, Justice Brandeis visited Palestine and met with both General Allenby and General Sir Arthur Money. In response to his request that the administration work more cooperatively with the Zionists, particularly in areas of immigration, Allenby responded by saying that until the swamp lands had been drained and cleared of malaria, “the number of deaths would equal the number of immigrants”. Money questioned why more immigrants would even want to come, when so many there were still living in such poverty. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 131. • En route home from his trip to Palestine, Justice Brandeis stopped in London and shared his impressions of the situation with the British government. Reinforcing what had already been reported by the Commission to Palestine, Brandeis’s comments pushed Britain to make clear that the administration of Palestine was to be in accordance with the policy of a Jewish homeland and that this was not just British policy, but also that of France and the United States. Arab propaganda against the Jews was not acceptable. General Money was removed from his post. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 131-132. • In spite of the changes that were to be made, the conditions in Palestine did not really change. When the Syrian Congress was formed in March of 1920, Arab nationalism in Palestine began to boil. The authors note that, “To the Arabs, the Jews now appeared as the chief obstacle to the achievement of a union of Palestine with Syria in the newly created independent Syrian state.” Albright, et al, also point out that Arabs in Palestine may have had reason to believe that the governing administration was on their “side”, and might do little to intervene in actions against the Zionists or the French. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 132. • During the Muslim celebration of Nebi Musa in April of 1920, thousands of Muslims made pilgrimage to Jerusalem, as is custom for the holiday. Once there, the festivities turned into a political demonstration, then violent.

• Huge pictures of King Faisal were hoisted, while anti-Jewish remarks were called out.

• Marchers in the procession then attacked near-by Jews with sticks and knives.

• Some of the Arab police did nothing; others joined in the rioting.

• British troops were not able to calm the situation until late that evening, when they detained several hundred Arabs in a mosque for the night. Rioting resumed when they were released the next day.

• The British were forced to disarm the Arab police force and institute martial law for a period afterwards.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 132-133. • During this time, Jewish defense organizations that had begun to arm themselves in case of such events (not trusting the governing administration to protect them), suffered harsh punishments for having taken up arms in defense. However, in the end the outcome of the Nebi Musa incident resulted in an expedited decision to bring Mandate control of Palestine to Great Britain, and not to halt Zionist development or immigration as may have been hoped. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 134. • By the end of the First World War, neither France or Great Britain was terribly interested in maintaining the Sykes-Picot Agreement, nor the borders designated therein. Britain felt they could acquire even more territory in light of their conquest of Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, and France was happy to renegotiate terms that would not give so much independence to the Arabs. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 134. • Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier, visited London in November 1918 to discuss with Lloyd George what the new British position might be on the partitioning of the Turkish Empire. Lloyd George outlined two changes from Sykes-Picot-

• Adding the Mosul region, rich in oil fields, to Great Britain’s acquisitions

• Place British control over Palestine instead of international rule, and widen the borders from the old Sykes-Picot Agreement to include those from the Old Testament – “From Dan to Be’er Sheba”.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 134-135. • Georges Clemenceau was willing to agree to these new arrangements, on a “quid pro quo” basis. That is to say,

• France would get her proper share of oil and petroleum resources, with British control of the Mosul.

• France’s region of control in Syria would extend from the “blue zone”, or coastal Syria as stated in Sykes-Picot to also include the “A zone” (more or less from Damascus to Aleppo and then west towards the Mosul). Under the prior agreement, France would have had only advisory powers here.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 135. • Interestingly, this unofficial understanding between France and Great Britain was in complete opposition to statements made by both Great Britain and the United States against such annexations just earlier that year (January 1918). The very same Lloyd George had declared, “Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.” And during the same month, American President Woodrow Wilson had claimed in his Fourteen Points address, “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 135, also citing Woodrow Wilson, State Papers and Addresses, 1917, p. 470. • The complications for determining rule in the fallen Turkish Empire lay in maintaining peace and order in the conquered areas, minding the great diversity of religions and national minorities, while upholding the rights to self-determination for even small nations, as proclaimed by the Allied powers during the war. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 136. • The solution to the question of managing the newly conquered areas was found in a dual system of the use of the League of Nations and a mandate system. In short, principal Allied powers (such as England and France) would act as “trustees” for the states that were to be developed from the former Turkish lands. The Mandates would be supervised by the League of Nations. A specific Mandate System was written in to the Covenant of the League of Nations, in Article 22. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 136. • A brief synopsis of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is as follows- 1.) Colonies and territories formerly governed by now fallen States, and “which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” should be protected and developed by the guidelines of this Covenant. 2.) “The tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources… experience…or geographical position” are best suited and willing to take on the responsibility. Governorship will be exercised in accordance with the Mandates, as regulated by the League of Nations. 3.) Mandates will differ according to the “stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.” 4.) Certain communities have already reached a point where they require little more than administrative advice and assistance from a Mandate, until they are completely ready to be on their own. “The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.” Mandates Under the League of Nations, University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 591, 592 as cited in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 136. • During the Peace Conference, Emir Fasail was recognized as the spokesman for the Arab national movement. His stated goal, in carrying on the work of his father, was to create one Arab nation, under one sovereign government. However, he also recognized that the Arab nations were not ready for a hasty politically contrived government, nor should they be subjected to having their land divided by the whims of the Allied powers. He suggested the following- Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 137 – 138.

• Syria, already advanced and developed enough to stand on her own agriculturally and industrially, should be allowed to “manage her own affairs”.

• Mesopotamia, including Iraq and Jezireh, was at the time sparsely inhabited by mostly nomadic peoples. Fasail acknowledged that they would require and invite foreign assistance, materials and even governing of these districts in order to build them up, but that the control should be “Arab in principle and spirit.”

• Arab government would supervise the development and implementation of education in these nomadic areas, to ensure that the tribesmen were advanced to the level of those of the cities.

• The Hejaz should retain complete independence, and develop their own relations with the also independent areas of the Arabian Peninsula such as Yemen and the Nejd.

• For Palestine, he requested the power of “a great trustee”, recognizing that while the Arabs and Jews were closely related, “the Arabs could not assume the responsibility for maintaining peace among the various races and religions.”

• Faisal took his appeal to the Supreme Council in February 1916. He asked that each area within the Arab nations be allowed to choose which country was to have control via a mandate, for the time, and how much foreign involvement would be acceptable. However,

• Faisal did not insist on independence for the region of Lebanon, as the majority of its population was Christian.

• Palestine was to be left to the considerations of all involved, as it held universal interest.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 138. • It is thought that this open-minded opinion towards Palestine was the result of conversations between Faisal and Chaim Weizmann the year before, in Aqaba. He continued to meet with, and be well received by, Zionists and their organizations. The following is a quote from a statement made to a Reuter’s correspondent in London, published in The Times on December 12, 1918. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 139. “Arabs are not jealous of Zionist Jews, and intend to five them fair play; and the Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist Arabs of their intention to see that they too have fair play in their respective areas.” • Faisal made another supportive statement at a banquet in his honor (hosted by Lord Rothschild) at the end of 1918, when he acknowledged that the growth of the Middle East was heavily dependent on the knowledge, ideas and developments of Europe, and that the Jews were the best suited to bridge European experience into Arab life. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 140. • In an agreement discussed with Weizmann and signed one month before he met with the Supreme Council, Faisal expressed willingness for the Arabs to work with the Zionists, as they held ancient cultural and religious ties. He also

• Recognized the Balfour Declaration, as long as friendly relations were upheld between “the Arab state and Palestine” and that Arabs were guaranteed religious freedom and control of their holy sites.

• Encouraged cooperation between Arabs and Jews in the “development of the Arab state”

• Agreed “any matters of dispute which may arise between the contracting parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.”

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 140. • Perhaps the most important passage taken from this signed agreement between Weizmann and Faisal is the following- Article IV- “All necessary measure shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In talking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.” From Jewish Agency for Palestine, Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission, London, 1936, p. 296, as quoted in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 141. • However, in a postscript to the agreement with the Zionists, Faisal added a noted reservation, or clause. As translated from Arabic, it reads “If the Arabs are established as I have asked in my manifesto of January 4th addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be answerable for failure to carry out this agreement.” As Albright, et al, point out, this allowed a loophole for the Arabs, should they not gain independence in all the other areas also outlined in the memorandum. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 141. • The French were not terribly supportive of Faisal as a ruler in Syria; they were in favor of Chekri Ganem, a Syrian living in France. He spoke in favor of an independent Syria under the guidance of the French. He proposed French support of Jews and Zionist settlements in a Palestine united with, not separate from, Syria. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 141. • In a statement framing his stance on the question of Palestine, Chekri Ganem said of the Zionists, “If they form the majority there, they will be the rulers. If they are in the minority, they will be represented in the government in proportion to their numbers.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 142, citing David Hunter Miller, op. cit., Vol. XIV, pp. 399 ff. and pp. 414 ff. • Despite his strong statements and friendly agreements with the Zionists, the Emir Faisal began to waiver in his commitment to Zionist goals, due to pressure from Arab nationalist extremists. Quotes such as the following were taken from an interview he gave the paper Le Matin only a few months after the Peace Conference- In discussing the accessibility of Palestine for the Jews, Faisal said persecuted Jews could find safety in Palestine under a Muslim or Christian rule, “but if the Jews desire to establish a state and claim sovereign rights in the country, I foresee and fear very serious dangers and conflicts between them and other races.” Le Matin, March 1, 1919; Jewish Chronicle, March 7, as quoted in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 142. • Faisal’s support of a Jewish state in Palestine continued to waiver and fluctuate, depending on whom was pressuring him. Albright, et al, highlight that regardless of the changing stances, the agreements made between the British, Arabs and Jews at the time of the Peace Conference, in regard to the Balfour Declaration, were indisputable. Quoting the authors, “…there cannot be any question on the main issue- that the Arab representatives at the time agreed that Palestine should be set apart from the Arab state, and that a regime safeguarded by Great Britain should be instituted, whose purpose would include the development of a Jewish national home.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 143. • In addition, Albright, et al, summarize the other agreements that came from the Peace Conference, in accordance with the Royal Commission Report-

• If/When King Hussein and Faisal secured land for the large Arab state, they would concede “little Palestine” to the Jews.

• Jews would lend economic support and assistance to the development of their neighboring Arab countries.

• Civil and religious rights of Arabs in Palestine would be protected.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 143. • Disagreements over the division and supervision of the Syrian-Palestinian area grew. France wanted no part of any partition that did not adhere to their claims to Syria. They drew on the agreements made between Lloyd George and Clemenceau, insisting that they did not want control of Palestine, but would settle for nothing less than a French mandate for Syria, both interior and exterior. Lloyd George could not concede to this, he pointed, in light of the Husain-McMahon correspondence, which maintained the interior areas of Syria under Arab control. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 144. • As an effort to resolve the impasse between Britain and France, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States suggested that the people living in the regions in question (Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Iraq) be questioned as to whom they would prefer as a governing presence. France and Britain agreed, but were actually unable to ever agree on the manner in which the commission or inquiry would be conducted, etc. The United States moved ahead without them, and chose Dr. Henry C. King and Mr. Charles R. Crane to head the commission (Thus known as the King – Crane Commission). Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 145. • The King – Crane Commission spent approximately six weeks in Palestine and Syria, and reported their findings in Paris in the summer of 1919. They concluded-

• One mandate should administer Syria, under the rule of the Emir Faisal as a Constitutional Monarch

• Responsibility of the mandate would go (according to the wishes of the people) first to the United States, or as a second choice, Britain. France was not in the picture.

• Palestine would fall under Faisal’s domain, joining with Syria.

• Zionism was not viewed as a positive movement, as the majority of inhabitants in Palestine were Arabs, who opposed the Jewish state.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 145. • Disagreements and arguments between the French and British continued, even after the American commission had left without any of their suggestions being implemented. Professor William Yale, who had accompanied the King-Crane Commission, came up with yet another option, that found favor with members of the Arab Delegation (T.E. Lawrence, Nuri Said and Rustum Haidar).

• Palestine would be under British mandate, and the Zionists would continue with their settlements.

• Mount Lebanon would be under a French mandate, separate from other political units

• Syria would also be under the mandate of France, but areas from Maan and Akaba to Aleppo, including ports of Tripoli and Latakia would “provisionally” independent, with Arab Government representatives.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 146, also citing David Garnett, ed., The Letters of T. E. Lawrence, Doubleday Doran, 1939, p. 286. • Interestingly, Albright, et al, note that all the otherwise “deadlocked” parties in these negotiations were prepared to accept and implement Professor Yale’s plan, under United States (outside) guide and enforcement; but the American Commission did not want to shoulder the responsibility for it. Thus, this agreeable arrangement was never perused. Comment by David Garnett, op. cit., p. 288, as appears in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 146. • It was not until 1920 that a final agreement on the division of the former Turkish Empire was ultimately reached. The Turkish Treaty took place at the Supreme Council’s assembly in San Remo. The arrangement made was as follows-

• Syria and Mesopotamia would be “provisionally” independent states, yet under a mandatory control.

• The Mosul would be included in Mesopotamia, and French interests would compose twenty-five percent of the oil/petroleum resources there. In exchange, France would be responsible for building the pipelines from Syria out to the Mediterranean.

• Palestine would be separate from Syria, and would be written into the Turkish Treaty just as was worded in the Balfour Declaration.

• No mandatory powers were named in the treaty.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 147. • An idea of the provisions for Palestine, as worded in the Turkish Treaty, can be seen in the following excerpts- “The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the British Government and adopted by the other Allied Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done that may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing on-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 147 – 148, as quoted from J. Stoyansky, The Mandate for Palestine, Longmans, Green, 1928, pp. 24-25. • As word of the San Remo agreement spread, Jews around the world responded with enthusiasm and renewed hope. Celebrations and positive demonstrations were held, but the Zionist leaders took a more reserved approach. In different addresses, Weizmann and Sokolow both commented on the success as being one in a series of steps towards the full realization of the Zionist dream. Justice Brandeis addressed the Zionist Conference saying, “The work of the great Theodor Herzl as completed at San Remo. The effort to acquire the public recognition of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine for which he lived and died has been crowned with success. The nations of the world have done all that they could do. The rest lies with us.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 148, quoting Brandeis on Zionism, Zionist Organization of America, Washington, 1942, p. 113. • Weizmann, true to form, continued to attempt to ease the apprehensions of the Arabs. During a speech in Jerusalem in 1920, he said, “Our historical rights to the country can only be realized side by side with the Arab population. I trust that cooperation will convince them that we are not coming in the spirit of Prussian Junkers, but in the spirit of those serving a sacred national ideal, to whom right and justice are the supreme virtues.” Jewish Agency for Palestine, Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission, p. 90, as quoted in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 149. • Lord Balfour also weighed in on the question of Arab relations. Although still firm in his belief in the Zionist goals and abilities, he knew the path was not clear of obstacles. Urging the Arabs to be mindful of the land they had recently acquired under the new divisions, Balfour said, “And I hope that , remembering all that, they will not grudge that small niche, for it is not more geographically in the former Arab territories than a niche – being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it, but who surely have a title to develop on their own lines in the land of their forefathers.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 150, citing Stephen S. Wise and Jacob de Hass, The Great Betrayal, Brentano’s, New York, 1930, pp. 166 –67. • Throughout the many conferences, meetings and discussions held between 1918 and 1919 regarding Palestine, the term “Jewish Commonwealth” was often used interchangeably with the term “Jewish Homeland”. Albright, et al, state that the notion of a Jewish state was seen as “an ultimate goal rather than as an immediate objective.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 151. • Throughout the conferences and discussions, the Zionist plan always made a point to reference civil and religious rights and freedoms and rights for all populations of Palestine, and to specifically consider Arab rights in cultural matters and the protection of and access to Muslim sites. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 151. • American Zionists, under Justice Brandeis, developed the Pittsburgh Program (concerning the Jewish state). As a “statement of social policy rather than a definite political program”, the ideas contained in it were socialist in nature. They included-

• Political and civil equality for all, regardless of race, sex or religion

• Hebrew as the national language and as the language for public instruction

• Social cooperation in the development and organization of industry, agriculture, finance and commerce

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 152, also citing “The Pittsburgh Program,” The Maccabaean, XXXI, 1918, p. 237. • In Palestine, during December of 1918, another program was formulated by those settlers already living there (for consideration to be presented at the Peace Conference). It was titled “Outline for the Provisional Government of Palestine” and it emphasized the request for a Jewish colonization society, to be appropriated by the League of Nations. The colonization society would-

• Oversee immigration

• Acquire and develop state land

• Contract for railroads, harbors and irrigation systems

• Be the sole developers of natural surface resources

The outline also called for recognition of Arabic as well as Hebrew as state languages. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 152 – 153, including quotes from “Demands of Palestine Jews,” The Maccabaean, Vol. XXXII, 1919, p. 197. • Also in December 1918, the American Jewish Congress adopted a resolution to be taken to the Peace Conference on their behalf. By March 1919, they had formalized a memorial that they submitted to President Wilson, called “The Jewish Title to Palestine”. It called for the following points-

• The Peace Conference declaration should be used in developing a state constitution

• Jews should be equally represented in the executive and legislative bodies of any governing system, and have say in the selection of civil and public servants.

• All inhabitants of Palestine are entitled to free education, regardless of race, ethnicity or religion. Hebrew will be “one” of the official languages, but used for all documents and other government papers.

• Shabbat (Jewish Sabbath) and all other Jewish Holy days will be recognized as “legal days of rest”

• Already existing rights of current inhabitants will remain safeguarded

• Upon a specified date (then yet to be determined), each resident of the state of Palestine will be considered citizens of Palestine (unless they choose, in writing, to retain their citizenship in another country). From that day forward, they and all persons born or naturalized afterwards will have citizenship and be protected by the laws and provisions of the mandatory in Palestine.

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 154, quoting “Jewish Title to Palestine,” The Maccabaean, Vol. XXXII, March 1919. • Views of leading Zionists in London were summarized in an unofficial proposal given by Chaim Weizmann to Lord Balfour in December 1918. The highlights included requests for-

• Official recognition of the historical land rights of Palestine to the Jews, but with the understanding that non-Jewish populations would be respected and protected

• A “Trustee” to be appointed to the supervision of Palestine, with the understanding that the Zionists would select Great Britain

• An organization of representing Jews to be authorized to make arrangements with the “trustee”, as necessary for the development of Palestine as the Jewish National Home

Balfour accepted these points, and stated that he felt Great Britain would accept the policy of the national home and voice support at the Peace Conference. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 155, also citing Reports of the Executive to the XIIth Zionist Congress, 1921, I, p. 19. • Chaim Weizmann reiterated many of the ideas he spoke of with Balfour, when he addressed a group of Zionists in London in December 1918. Outlining the need for getting more Jews to live in Palestine before it could consider statehood, Weizmann called for the following-

• World recognition of Palestine as land which had belonged to the Jews in the past, and so would rightfully again in the future.

• Opportunities and incentives should be provided in order to create conditions that would facilitate more Jewish immigration to Palestine

• The Mandate should be given to the authority of Zionist choice, Great Britain.

Cited in part from Reports of the Executive to the XIIth Zionist Congress, 1921, I, p. 19, as written in Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 155. • With so many different ideas and versions of what the “official” Zionist requested Mandate policy for Palestine should be, the process took time. They knew any Mandate that was going to be accepted by Britain would have to eliminate certain proposals that were thematic in many of the suggested versions, including the idea that the government head of Palestine should be Jewish and/or that the majority of government officials should be Jewish. These stipulations were thought to be “excessive.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 156. • On February 3, 1919, the official Zionist proposal to the Peace Conference was submitted for review. Entitled “Statement of the Zionist Organization Regarding Palestine”, it can be summarized in the following points-

• Recognition of the historic title of Palestine to the Jews

• Recognition of the right for Jews to reconstitute a homeland in Palestine

• A Mandate system, as devised with the League of Nations and entrusted to Great Britain, will be in place

• Palestine will be protected and developed politically, economically and administratively in a manner that will “secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home, and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth…”.

• Nothing will be done to reduce or infringe on the civil or religious rights of non-Jews living in the area.

• The Mandatory power (Great Britain) will “promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land” again keeping in step with the protections of non-Jews living there.

• The Mandatory power will encourage as much self-government as possible.

• A council should be devised that consists of Jews in Palestine as well as around the world, to be included in consultations and to develop Jewish education.

• Freedom of religion throughout Palestine

Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 157. • As comprehensive as the “Statement” was, it met with great criticism when the Actions Committee of the Zionist Organization met a few weeks later. It was considered to be a watered down version of the Balfour Declaration, with no mention of the use of the Zionist flag as the flag of Palestine. Many were concerned with the majority population of Arabs in the country, and wished perhaps that the “…Arabs of Palestine should gradually be resettled in the new and vast Arabian Kingdom…” These more extreme ideas were clearly not reflected at all in the Zionist statement. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 159. • While the Action Committee discussed their concerns regarding the Zionist statement, several officials of American and European Jewry and Zionism were asked to convene in Paris, before the Council of Ten. The Council of Ten was comprised of Lords Balfour and Milner (Great Britain), Tardieu and Pichon (France), Lansing and White (United States) and the Baron Sonnino (Italy). There was also a Japanese representative. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 159. • Those invited to the Council of Ten included Weizmann and Sokolow (Zionist Organization), Jacob de Haas (Zionist Organization of America), Andre Spire (French Zionists) Sylvian Levi (French Jewry). Mr. de Haas was unable to attend, and it was requested that Ussishkin (Russian Jewry) be invited to take his place. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 159. • The subject at hand for the Council of Ten appeared to be a clarification of the Zionist position. Many questions were asked of those assembled, particularly around what was meant by “Jewish National Home”? Weizmann responded that Zionists were not seeking an autonomous Jewish government, but rather an administration, under the Mandate, within Palestine, which would allow between 70,000 and 80,000 Jews to immigrate annually. Eventually, Weizmann stated, when the Jewish presence formed a large majority of the population, they would seek establishment of their own government that could administer the development of the state and the Zionist ideals. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 161 • In an interview with Walter Duranty only a few days after the Council of Ten, the Zionist position as reported by Weizmann was published in the New York Times (March 3, 1919). Although similar in content to the official Statement crafted earlier that year, it is interesting to note that here, Weizmann made specific reference to the boundaries for the Jewish State in/of Palestine- “Fixation of the boundaries of Palestine- The whole of Palestine from the Lebanon Province to the Egyptian frontier and from the sea to the Hedjaz will be open to Jewish settlement, which will ultimately develop into an autonomous Jewish Commonwealth.” Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 162. • The British and the Zionist delegates to the Peace Conference began their discussions and negotiations towards a final draft for the Mandate in the spring of 1919. Albright, et al, account the process in seven stages, to be outlined below- Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, pp. 164 – 174. 1.) A tentative draft is sent in a letter from Felix Frankfurter to David Hunter Miller, March 28, 1919. In it, Frankfurter refers to the Mandatory power as working in conjunction with representatives of the people of whom they are the trustees, that it should be a Mandate free of discrimination and that “restrictions [are] applicable to the specific mandatory area, having in mind the establishment of Palestine as the Jewish Homeland.” He also stated in his draft, “Whereas the League of Nations and the Signatory Powers recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute Palestine as their national home- and there to establish the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth…” (p. 164) 2.) Next, a draft was synthesized from the many suggestions and ideas previously noted. The Zionists had compromised on some points, hoping to keep it acceptable to the British at the Peace Conference. The synthesized draft still held fast to the goal of the Mandate being the “creation in Palestine of a self-governing commonwealth” and that “Jewish immigration and colonization should be facilitated by the British government”. (p. 169) 3.) This draft was criticized by the more staunch Zionist positions, and was therefore amended in August 1919. The use of the phrase “historical connection” was not thought to appropriately represent Jewish ties to the land, and they felt the only acceptable term was “historical title”. Another concern was that the boundaries for the homeland should be specific, not limiting settlements to a part of Palestine but rather all of Palestine. Quoting a memorandum, “The Declaration should take cognizance of the fact that it is the National Home of the Jews which is to be re-established, and not merely a National Home in Palestine…” Additional clauses that were added included- (pp. 170 – 171)

• Recognition of the Jewish Sabbath and Holy days of rest

• Cooperation between the Zionist Organization and the Mandatory regarding immigration and colonization

• The right for women to vote and hold office

• The Mandate may be subject to change without “prejudice to the principle of the Jewish National Home”

• Access by the Jewish Agency to the Council of the League of Nations

4.) By the end of 1919, another official tentative draft had been drawn, this one meeting with much approval from the British government. It still referred to the historical “connection” and not “title”, but otherwise included many of the requests made during stage three. One very noticeable omission was any reference to a “Jewish Commonwealth”. (p. 171) 5.) When, in the spring of 1920, Lord Curzon replaced Lord Balfour as Foreign Secretary, a far less favorable draft was written. It reflected, perhaps, the growing tensions with the Arabs in the Middle East, as well as Curzon’s less than vested interest in the Zionist cause. The most dramatic differences included- (p. 172)

• No mention or recognition in the preamble making any historical connection between the Jews and the land in Palestine

• No right of the Jewish Agency to be consulted in concessions

• Withdrawal of the statement reflecting the establishment of a Jewish National Home as being a goal or principle for the Mandate

• No expression of support for the Jewish Sabbath or holidays

6.) Realizing that they stood to lose much of what they thought they had secured, the Zionists refocused attention on those points they felt most essential. They reiterated the need for a “historic connection clause”, a self-government clause and the established right of a Jewish agency to be consulted in matters of concessions. (p. 173) 7.) During the seventh stage, the British Foreign Office initially conceded to reinstating the historic connection clause, with pressure from influential men such as Balfour, Milner and Rothschild. In the end, however, the only phrase that made it to the final draft was “historic connection”. There was no mention of a Jewish Commonwealth, nothing specific to give Jewish settlers the right to eventually self-govern, and very little authority for any Jewish agency over concessions. At the time, the only true victory for Zionists in this seventh stage was the retention of the Balfour Declaration, in its entirety, within the Mandate. (pp. 174 –175) • As the finishing touches were put on final versions of the draft for the Mandate, a harsh blow was dealt to the Jews and the Zionists. In 1921, and additional article was added to the Mandate, Article 25, which stipulated that the Mandate had the right to withhold the Balfour Declaration and its applications to the territories east of the Jordan. At the time, this was done for British political purposes, but would have a powerful impact on the future of the region. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 176. • The League of Nations formally accepted the British Mandate for Palestine on July 24, 1922. It was declared effective as of September 29, 1923. Albright, et al, Palestine- A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. I, 1947, Yale University Press, p. 177. Summary by Rina Abrams.