R. Chazan, European Jewry and the First Crusade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 85-99.


IV- The Patterns of Response

Efforts to Preserve Jewish Lives

In meeting the variety of threats posed by the crusaders and their burgher collaborators, a number of groups pooled their efforts- a segment of the burgher population, the local authorities, the central authorities and, most of all, the Jews themselves. Various techniques were tried; under given circumstances one or another of these techniques proved successful; in a small number of important instances, all efforts failed.

The first and apparently best line of defense was to establish direct contact with the crusaders, initiating steps to forestall the outbreak of violence. The Jews made serious attempts to deal directly with the crusaders. S, which gives the fuller description of early anti-Jewish agitation, offers the best broad depiction of Jewish efforts to stem crusader violence before it broke out. “When the crusaders began to reach this land, they sought funds with which to purchase bread. We gave them, considering ourselves to be fulfilling the verse- ‘Serve the king of Babylon and live.’”1 For the Jews, such expenditures were eminently sensible. For the crusaders, the money realized helped solve the difficult problem of provisioning an ill-equipped army. It may well be–although there is no specific documentation–that there was some deliberate crusader intention to exploit the Jewish “enemy” in preparation for battle against the Muslim “enemy.”2

Three specific crusading groups are named as [86] recipients of Jewish funds. In one instance, that of Peter the Hermit, the fact that it was thought appropriate that the Jews contribute to the expenses of the crusade is mentioned explicitly. According to L, Peter “brought with him a letter from France, from the Jews, [indicating] that, in all the places where his foot would tread and he would encounter Jews, they should give him provisions for the way. He would then speak well on behalf of Israel.”3 The Jewish community of Trier did in fact give Peter funds and his troops passed through without incident.

The second instance involved important baronial figures. S and L give parallel descriptions of the incident, the former identifying the baron as Ditmar and the latter as Godfrey.4 According to the latter–and somewhat fuller–version Duke Godfrey warned that he would not depart on the crusade “without avenging the blood of the Crucified with the blood of Israel.” Kalonymous the parnas of Mainz elicited an imperial letter enjoining special protection for the Jews. Nonetheless, “the Jews in Cologne bribed him [Godfrey] with five hundred silver marks and the Jews of Mainz bribed him likewise.” In this case no explicit relationship is drawn between Jewish funds and crusader provisions. Whether such a relationship existed in the mind of Duke Godfrey, or of the Jews is open to speculation. More important is the success of payment of bribes in forestalling attacks in these two cases.

In the third recorded incident, the strategy failed. When Count Emicho appeared before Mainz, the Jews attempted precisely the technique that had proved successful with Peter the Hermit and Duke Godfrey. After securing promises of protection from the local authorities, they turned directly to the aggressor. Their thinking is reflected in L’s report- “For this purpose we have disbursed our moneys, giving the archbishop and his ministers and his servants and the burghers approximately four hundred silver zekukim. We gave the wicked Emicho seven gold pounds so that he might assist us. It was of no avail.”5 Their miscalculation was reasonable, but tragic. They were simply not prepared for the radical ideologies that [87] inspired Emicho and his followers. The approach that had worked with Peter the Hermit and a few of the potentially dangerous barons were inappropriate in these unusual circumstances.

A second line of defense for the endangered German Jews was to turn to their burgher neighbors for assistance. While in retrospect the Jewish chroniclers denigrated the ineffective burghers, it is quite clear that the Jews of the Rhineland, during the early stages of the violence, perceived their neighbors as willing and capable protectors. This is surely the only way to understand the tendency of the Jews in such places as Worms, Mainz, and Cologne to seek out the protection of their burgher neighbors. This is particularly striking in Worms,where the community divided itself into two groups. Some of them fled to the bishop in his towers; some of them remained in their homes, for the burghers promised them vainly and cunningly. They are splintered reeds, for evil and not for good, for their hand was with the crusaders in order to destroy our name and remnant. They gave us vain and meaningless encouragement, [saying]- “Do not fear them, for anyone who kills one of you–his soul will be forfeit for yours.” They [the burghers] did not give them [the Jews] anywhere to flee, for the Jews deposited all their money in their [the burghers’] hands. Therefore they surrendered them.6

The after-the-fact recriminations of the chronicler do not obscure the fact that they had expected assistance. The same assumption is reflected in the initial reaction of Cologne Jewry when threatened-

When they heard that the [Jewish] communities had been killed, they all fled to gentile acquaintances. They remained there for the two days of Shavuot.7

While some of the burghers joined the crusaders in attacking the Jews, others were reported to remain staunchly [88] committed to the maintenance of law and order. To be sure, as the magnitude of the danger increased, even the best intentioned of the well-disposed burghers proved ineffective in protecting the Rhineland Jews.

As the dimensions of the threat became clearer, the most significant line of defense lay in the intercession of the established political authorities.8 The most powerful of these was of course the emperor. When, according to L, Duke Godfrey announced that he would not leave for Jerusalem without taking vengeance upon the Jews, strenuous efforts were made to thwart him. In addition to bribing Duke Godfrey, the Jews turned to the emperor and received from him a letter of protection. Emperor Henry addressed, inter alia, the duke directly, warning him against anti-Jewish actions. The willingness of the emperor to respond quickly and decisively to Jewish entreaties is not at all surprising or difficult to understand. Emperor Henry was interested in maintaining internal peace and security in general and in protecting his Jewish subjects in particular. More important, the imperial missive, together with bribes paid by Jews, apparently convinced Duke Godfrey to leave the Jews in peace. According to L, the duke responded to the imperial epistle by disavowing any such intentions- “The wicked duke swore that it had never occurred to him to do them any harm.”9 Like bribes, imperial warnings could be and were successful with the well organized and capably led crusader forces. Like bribes, they were also not successful in restraining the popular crusading bands, moved as they were by radical anti-Jewish doctrine. It will be recalled that, during the negotiations between the Jews and the bishop of Trier, the Jews reminded the bishop that he had promised them protection until the emperor would reach Germany. To this the bishop replied- “The emperor himself could not save you from the crusaders.”10

Because of the unfortunate absence of the emperor, a heavy burden fell on the agents of imperial authority in Germany. According to L, when informed of the threat to the Jews, the emperor responded with anger, sending [89] charters “throughout all the provinces of his empire to the barons, the bishops, and the nobles,” ordering that protection and aid be extended to the endangered Jews. The emperor, as a result of his absence, had done all he could do; the Jews themselves and the burghers were relatively powerless. The essential burden had to be borne by the available authorities–the bishops and the secular lords.

To be sure, the Jews played a role in securing the aid of these authorities, as they had done with the emperor. In fact, our information on the negotiations between the Jews and these authorities is much fuller than it is for the negotiations with Emperor Henry. There are, for example, references to contact between the leadership of the Jewish community of Mainz and the archbishop of that town in both Christian and Jewish sources. Albert of Aix gives the following account-

The Jews of this city, knowing of the slaughter of their brethren and that they themselves could not escape the hands of so many, fled in hope of safety to Bishop Ruthard. They put an infinite treasure in his custody and trust, having much faith in his protection, because he was bishop of the city.11

L gives a somewhat fuller account that agrees in its essentials with Albert.

The notables of Israel gathered together to give them good counsel, so that they might be able to be saved. They said to one another- “Let us choose of our elders and let us decide what we shall do, for this great evil will swallow us up.” They agreed on the counsel of redeeming their souls by spending their moneys and bribing the princes and officers and bishops and burghers. The leaders of the community, notable in the eyes of the archbishop, then rose and came to the archbishop and to his ministers and servants to speak with them. They said to them- “What shall we do about the report which we have heard concerning [90] our brethren in Speyer and in Worms who have been killed?” They said to them- “Listen to our advice and bring all your moneys to our treasury. Then you, your wives, your sons and daughters, and all that you have bring into the chamber of the archbishop until these bands pass by. Thus will you be able to be saved from the crusaders.”12

A number of factors made the political authorities responsive to such Jewish overtures. In the first place, there was the imperial order just noted. Beyond this, the bishops and barons, like the emperor, were committed to general preservation of law and order and specifically to protection of Jews. Many of them, like the bishop of Speyer, had undertaken obligations to their Jews. Moreover, the bishops were surely aware of the distortion involved in the anti-Jewish slogans and concerned to maintain the normative Church stance of physical protection for the Jews in Christendom. There may have been humanitarian motives as well. What is not clear is the role of “bribery” or payment for protection. In his report on the fate of Speyer Jewry, S notes specifically that the Jews were saved by Bishop John, “for the Lord inclined his heart to sustain them without bribe.”13 According to Albert of Aix, Archbishop Ruthard of Mainz was careful to set aside the money of the Jews, apparently in order to protect it. According to L, however, the archbishop was heavily bribed to secure his aid. It seems likely in some cases bribes were given, whereas in others they were not.

The effectiveness of the protection provided by the local political authorities was commensurate with the seriousness of the threat posed. Where the anti-Jewish violence was sporadic and poorly organized, the authorities could save their Jews. Indeed the most impressive instance of protection of Jews occurred in the city of Speyer, where the violence was relatively unorganized. When this violence broke forth Bishop John reacted quickly and decisively-

[91] When Bishop John heard, he came with a large force and helped the [Jewish] community wholeheartedly and brought them indoors and saved them from their [the crusaders and burghers] hands. He seized some of the burghers and cut off their hands.14

Without detracting from the Jewish chronicler’s admiration for Bishop John, it is clear that the military threat which he faced at this early point was far less imposing than that faced, for example, by the prelates of Worms and Mainz. To be sure, Bishop John was subsequently successful in protecting the Jews in his area from the crusading bands. His decisive intervention at the beginning of May, however, was undertaken against a far less formidable foe.

I have also noted sporadic, incipient violence in Mainz and in Cologne; in both cases, the burghers intervened effectively at the outset. It seems highly likely that in both cities the bishops could have successfully protected the Jews against such violence. The strategy of the archbishop of Cologne–removing the Jews from Cologne–would probably have been quite successful, had this sporadic violence been the only threat to Jewish life.

While the local authorities could deal effectively with sporadic and unorganized violence, they were hardly equipped to withstand the assaults of popular crusading armies that numbered in the thousands and perhaps tens of thousands. The Jewish authors, deeply upset by the magnitude of the calamity that had struck German Jewry, sometimes questioned in retrospect the sincerity of these local authorities. Yet, even after the fact, the narrators of the Jewish chronicles seem convinced that the bishops and barons were genuine in their efforts to save the Jews. L, for example, at one moment denigrates the efforts by the archbishop of Mainz by suggesting that the advice to gather up Jewish goods and to bring all the Jews into the archbishop’s palace was simply a ploy designed to despoil the Jews. Yet, in the next breath, the chronicler acknowledges that the archbishop did intend to save Mainz [92] Jewry- “The archbishop gathered his ministers and his servants–exalted ministers, nobles–in order to assist us. For at the outset it was his desire to save us with all his strength. Indeed we gave him great bribes to this end, along with his ministers and servants, since they intended to save us. Ultimately all the bribery and all the diplomacy did not avail in protecting us on the day of wrath from catastrophe.”15

The seriousness of the archbishop’s intentions is clearly indicated by L further on in his account. After failing to save the bulk of the Jewish community, Archbishop Ruthard fled the city. Even at this point, however, he remained committed to honor his obligations toward the group led by Kalonymous, the parnas, which had been spared during the massacre in Mainz. L describes this sense of ongoing commitment in touching terms.

In the middle of the night the archbishop sent someone to the window of the storehouse, to R. Kalonymous the parnas. He called to him and said- “Listen to me, Kalonymous. Behold the archbishop has sent me to you to learn whether you are still alive. He commanded me to save you and all those with you. Come out to me. Behold with him are three hundred warriors, armed with swords and dressed in armor. Our persons are pledged for yours, even to death. If you do not believe me, then I shall take an oath. For thus my lord the archbishop commanded me. He is not in the city, for he went to the village of Rüdesheim. He sent us here to save the remnant of you that remains. He wishes to assist you.” They did not believe until he took an oath. Then R. Kalonymous and his band went out to him. The minister placed them in boats and ferried them across the Rhine River and brought them at night to the place where the archbishop was, in the village of Rüdesheim. The archbishop was exceedingly happy over R. Kalonymous, that he was still alive, and intended to save him and the men that were with them.16

[93] This report leaves little room to doubt the sincerity of Archbishop Ruthard. Even after the massive failure in Mainz, he remained committed to saving the remnant of Mainz Jewry. This brief account also points to the major reason for failure. Three hundred armed warriors, well equipped as they might have been, were hardly a match for the twelve thousand crusaders Count Emicho was said to have under command.

The first sensible step available to the local authorities for warding off the violence of the popular crusading bands was to deny them entrance into the city. This was done at Mainz, where Emicho and his troops remained outside the city for two full days until the gates were opened to them, and at Moers, where the local authority begged the crusaders to remain outside the town, allowing him to try and convince the Jews to convert and thus to avoid violence for both the Jews and the town.17 While sensible, this could hardly be an effective ploy. The town walls were simply too extensive and the defensive forces too limited to create any prolonged barrier against the crusaders. According to S, the gates of Mainz did not even have to be stormed; they were opened by sympathetic burghers.

The sources refer to two efforts to protect the Jews by moving them temporarily from the central city to neighboring locales. In both cases–Speyer and Cologne–the initial violence seems to have been sporadic, rather than massive. The technique of taking the Jews out of main urban centers would seem to have been a sensible measure for protecting them from the popular crusading bands also (these bands were likely to make their way through the major cities, bypassing smaller locales). According to S, the Jews of Speyer were indeed threatened by the crusading bands. “They remained there [in the fortresses], fasting and weeping and mourning. They despaired deeply, for every day the crusaders and the gentiles and Emicho–may his bones be ground up–and the common folk gathered against them, to seize them and to destroy them.”18 These dangers notwithstanding, the fortifications held and the dispersed [94] Jews of Speyer were saved. The experience of Cologne Jewry was the opposite. The effort to save them by removing them from the city failed miserably. As we have seen, the crusading forces hunted down Cologne Jewry and virtually wiped it out.19

The more usual strategy was to discourage the crusaders by gathering the Jews with their possessions in the most formidable strongholds in the city, to discourage the crusaders from attacking, and to make defense possible if they attacked anyway. L’s description of the negotiations between the Jews and Archbishop Ruthard shows the archbishop giving precisely this advice. Albert of Aix corroborates-

Then that excellent bishop of the city cautiously set aside the incredible amount of money received from them. He placed the Jews in the very spacious hall of his own castle, out of the sight of Count Emicho and his followers, that they might remain safe and sound in a very secure and strong place.20

The plan, though sane and sensible, misjudged both the depth of the crusaders’ commitment to destroying the Jews and the military power of their forces.

The ultimate failure of these preventive measures is reflected in the slaughter of the Jewish communities of Worms, Mainz, and Cologne. In a few instances the authorities themselves realized that they were powerless in the face of the crusader forces, a conclusion with which even the Jews agreed. L preserves a series of statements by important local authorities in which they avow utter powerlessness. The archbishop of Mainz, for example, though committed to saving the remnant of Mainz Jewry, even after the massacre of the bulk of the community, eventually admitted–or claimed–total inability to withstand the crusaders, and the reply of Kalonymous the parnas is revealing-

[95] He called to R. Kalonymous and said- “I cannot save you. Your God has abandoned you; he does not wish to leave you a remnant and a residue. I no longer have sufficient strength to save you or to assist you henceforth. Therefore know what you must do–you and your band that stands with you. Either believe in our deity or bear the sins of your ancestors.” R. Kalonymous the pious answered him and cried out in anguish- “It is true that our God does not wish to save us. Therefore your words are true and correct, that you no longer have the power to assist. Now give me time till tomorrow to respond to your words.”21

Similar statements of powerlessness–in all likelihood similarly accurate–are attributed by L to the bishop of Trier and to the municipal authority at Moers.22

By the time the authorities recognized their powerlessness, there still remained the possibility of removing the essential “reason” for the crusader assaults by bringing the Jews, in one way or another, to baptism. According to the Gesta Treverorum, this was done by the bishop of Trier. The chronicle reports a lengthy conversionist address by the bishop to the Jews assembled in the episcopal palace and indicates that these Jews accepted baptism, albeit by and large insincerely.23

L gives a somewhat different report, alleging forced conversion at the hands of the bishop and his men. According to L, the bishop, after exposing himself to considerable danger by attempting to protect the Jews, finally gave up these efforts. He informed the Jews that he could no longer save them from the crusaders and advised them either to convert–thus ending the threat of violence–or leave his palace, likewise ending the threat of violence against the bishop and his followers. In order to frighten the bulk of the Jews into converting, he sent a small number of Jews to meet their death at the hands of the crusaders. When this failed, the bishop’s followers forcibly converted the Jews-

[96] After these were killed, the enemy saw those remaining in the palace–that they were as firm in their faith as at the outset and that their hands had not been weakened by what had been done to these first [martyrs]. They said to one another- “All this the women do–they incite their husbands, strengthening their hands to rebel . . . .” Then all the ministers came and each grasped forcefully the hands of the women, smiting and wounding them, and led them to the church in order to baptize them. Afterwards they sent and took forcefully children from the bosoms of their mothers and took them with them, to fulfill what is said- “Your sons and daughters shall be delivered to another people.” The women raised their voices and wept. Three days prior to informing them of this forced conversion, the ministers came to the palace and closed the pit in which water was held in the palace, for they feared lest they throw their children there to kill them. They did not permit them to ascend the wall, so that they not throw themselves from the wall. All night they guarded them that they not kill one another, until dawn. All this they planned because they did not wish to kill them–rather they labored to seize them and to forcibly convert them.24

This account ends with the stories of a few women who thwarted their captors and martyred themselves.

A similar report, somewhat less clear, is given for Regensburg.

The community in Regensburg was forcibly converted in its entirety, for they saw that they could not be saved. Indeed those who were in the city, when the crusaders and the common folk gathered against them, pressed them against their will and brought them into a certain river. They made the evil sign in the water, the cross, and baptized them all simultaneously in that river.25

[97] The account is not fully detailed, and there is ambiguity concerning the Jewish willingness for baptism. Nonetheless the effort to avoid violence against the Jews by forcing them to accept baptism is once again evident.

An even more radical method of saving the town and its Christian populace is reflected in L’s depiction of the incident at Moers. Here too the authorities came to the conclusion that they were powerless in the face of the crusaders and decided to save the town. The speech of the local municipal authority is remarkably explicit, indicating his own sense that the alternatives were destruction of Moers or accession to the demands of the crusaders. The latter of the choices, much preferable to the townspeople, involved either the conversion of the Jews or their surrender to the crusaders. As at Trier, an effort was made to terrorize the Jews into conversion. When the efforts at frightening the Jews into baptism failed, the authorities at Moers simply turned the Jews over to the crusaders.26

The last alternative was self-defense, an option that was exercised frequently. It is not altogether clear if the Jews who donned armor in order to do battle against the crusaders did so in hopes of saving themselves and their community, or if this inclination to battle simply represents a form of martyrdom. While no definite answer is possible, it does seem that the Jewish warriors undertook military operations in the hope of holding back the crusaders and saving their fellow Jews.

The first major instance of self-defense took place at the bishop’s palace in Worms. The initial attack on Worms Jewry was directed at those who had chosen to remain in their houses. Two weeks later a more organized assault took place on the bishop’s palace, and the Jews defended themselves vigorously.

It came to pass on the twenty-fifth of Iyyar that the crusaders and the burghers said- “Behold those who remain in the courtyard of the bishop and in his chambers. Let us take vengeance on them as well.” They [98] gathered from all the villages in the vicinity, along with the crusaders and the burghers; they besieged them [the Jews]; and they did battle against them. There took place a very great battle, one side against the other, until they seized the chambers in which the children of the sacred covenant were.27

The battle that took place at the archbishop’s palace in Mainz was apparently even fiercer-

They came with their standards to the archbishop’s gate, where the children of the sacred covenant were–an army as numerous as sands on the seashore. When the saintly and God-fearing saw the huge multitude, they trusted in and cleaved to their Creator. They donned armor and stripped on weapons–great and small–with R. Kalonymous ben Meshullam at their head.28

A description of hostilities at the burgrave’s palace conveys a similar sense of a small force battling against overwhelming odds, with no real hope of success.

One poorly documented case attests to successful military activity by Jews. Although the report is somewhat suspect, the incident is nonetheless worthy of mention. After the extensive description of the fate of the major Jewish communities along the Rhine–Speyer, Worms, Mainz, and Cologne–L adds a series of briefer accounts of additional persecution–Trier, Metz, Regensburg, and שלא. The account for Trier is detailed and seems relatively reliable; the other three reports are short and sketchy. The last one is particularly problematic. The narrative begins with the usual set of alternatives–conversion or death-

They exacted from the crusaders and their fellow townsmen three days’ time and reported the matter to their lord by means of emissary. For those three days they declared a fast and beseeched the living God with fasting and weeping and crying out. Their prayer was [99] accepted and the merciful God saved them. The lord strengthened their hand during the three-day period and sent them a duke and with him a thousand cavalrymen, girded with sword, along with the Jews living in the city of . . . five hundred young men, armed with swords and men of war, who never retreat before an enemy. They came upon the city confidently and smote greatly the crusaders and the townspeople. Of the Jews only six were killed.29

The best that can be suggested is that rumors of effective Jewish military opposition in central Europe circulated in the wake of the First Crusade. The one conclusion that is solidly established is that Jews surely did resort to arms in certain situations, generally in the face of overwhelming odds.

Thus the efforts to save the lives and property of Jews were many and varied. Where the threat was minimal, these efforts were usually successful. Where the threat was overwhelming, neither the Jews nor the authorities were capable of meeting the challenge. Appeals based on reason, accepted norms, or material blandishments failed with the ideologically motivated crusading bands. When force was marshaled against force, the crusaders generally emerged with the military victory.

[317] 1. N&S, 47, Habermann, 93-94; Eidelberg, 100; Chazan S.

2. See below, chap. VI.

3. N&S, 25; Habermann, 53; Eidelberg, 62; Chazan, L.

4. S- N&S, 48, Habermann, 94; Eidelberg, p. 100, Chazan, S. L- N&S, 3; Habermann, 26-27; Eidelberg, 24-25; Chazan, L.

5. N&S, 5, Habermann, 29; Eidelberg, 29; Chazan, L.

6. N&S, 48-49; Habermann, 95; Eidelberg, 101-102; Chazan, S.

7. N&S, 17; Habermann, 43-44; Eidelberg, 49; Chazan, L.

8. This line of defense was carefully analyzed by Sarah Schiffman in Heinrich IV und die Bischöfe cited above. This study includes a number of useful observations on the political realities of late eleventh-century Germany. It would have benefited from a clearer analysis of the precise sources of danger and destruction associated with the First Crusade.

9. N&S, 3; Habermann, 27; Eidelberg, 25; Chazan, L.

10. N&S, 26, Habermann, 54; Eidelberg, 64; Chazan, L.

11. RHC, Occ. IV-292.

12. N&S, 3; Habermann, 26; Eidelberg, 24; Chazan, L. Cf. N&S, 51; Habermann, 98; Eidelberg, 106; Chazan, S.

13. N&S, 48; Habermann, 95; Eidelberg, 101; Chazan, S.

14. N&S, 48; Habermann, 94; Eidelberg, 101; Chazan, S.

15. N&S, 3; Habermann, 26; Eidelberg, 24; Chazan, L.

16. N&S, 15; Habermann, 40-41; Eidelberg, 45; Chazan, L.

17. Mainz- N&S, 52 and 5; Habermann, 99 and 29; Eidelberg, 107 & 28; Chazan, S & L; Moers- N&S, 23; Habermann, 50; Eidelberg, 58; Chazan, L.

18. N&S, 48; Habermann, 94; Eidelberg, 101; Chazan, S.

19. N&S, 18-25; Habermann, 44-52; Eidelberg, 50-61; Chazan, L. The somewhat suspect report in L on the Jews in שלא also mentions this strategy- “Of the Jews only six were killed. The Light of Israel saved the rest of the community and led all of them together to a town opposite the city of . . . , across the river,” N&S, 29; Habermann, 57; Eidelberg, 68; Chazan, L.

20. RHC, Occ., IV-292.

[318] 21. N&S, 15; Habermann, 41; Eidelberg, 45; Chazan, L.

22. N&S, 26 and 23; Habermann, 54 and 52; Eidelberg, 64 and 59; Chazan L.

23. MGH, Scrip., VIII-190-191.

24. N&S, 27-28; Habermann, 55-56; Eidelberg, 66; Chazan, L. It is of course not surprising that the Christian source describes the conversion as the result of episcopal exhortation, while the Jewish source sees it as forced.

25. N&S, 28; Habermann, 56; Eidelberg, 67; Chazan, L.

26. N&S, 23; Habermann, 50-51; Eidelberg, 59; Chazan, L.

27. N&S, 49; Habermann, 96; Eidelberg, 103; Chazan, S.

28. N&S, 53; Habermann, 99-100; Eidelberg, 108; Chazan, S. Cf. N&S, 6; Habermann, 30; Eidelberg, 30; Chazan, L.

29. N&S, 28-29, Habermann, 57; Eidelberg, 67-68; Chazan, L.

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