Legislation Concerning Relations with Non-Jews in the Zadokite Fragments and in Tannaitic Literature, Lawrence H. Schiffman.


Revue de Qumran 11,3 <43> (1983), p.379-389.

The Damascus Document XII, 6–11 contains a series of regulations dealing with relations with non-Jews. These prescriptions form a serekh, (1) a list of laws compiled even before the editor of the Zadokite Fragments redacted this text from its disparate parts. (2) Most of these regulations closely parallel similar prescriptions found in tannaitic literature. This study will examine the sectarian passage and compare it to its Rabbinic parallels.

The complete passage is as follows-

6. אל ישלח את ידו לשפוך דם לאיש מן הגוים

7. בעבור הון ובצע וגם אל ישא מהונם כל בעבור אשר לא

8. יגדפו כי אם בעצת חבור ישראל אל ימכר איש בהמה

9. ועוף טהורים לגוים בעבור אשר לא יזבחום ומגורנו

10. ומגתו אל ימכר להם בכל מאדו ואת עבדו ואת אמתו אל ימכור

11. להם אשר באו עמו בברית אברהם

6/7. Let him not put forth his hand (3) to shed the blood (4) of anyone from among the non-Jews (5) for the sake of wealth (6) and profit. (7)

7/8. And furthermore, (8) let him not carry off (9) any of their property so that they not blaspheme, (10) except in accord with the decision (11) of the Community of Israel. (12)

8/9. Let no one sell pure (kosher) animals and fowl to non-Jews in order that they not sacrifice them.

9/10. And from his threshing-floor and from his wine-press (13) let him not sell to them (the non-Jews) at any price. (14)

10/11. And his man-servant and his maid-servant, let him not sell to them (the non-Jews), since they (the servants) have entered with him into the Covenant of Abraham. (15)

A) Prohibition of the Killing of Gentiles (XII, 6–7).

This regulation prohibits the killing of gentiles for the sake of wealth and gain. SCHECHTER comments that “the meaning of this law is that he is only permitted to kill a gentile when it is a case of self-protection.” (16) It is somewhat curious that most commentators have had little to say on this passage. We shall suggest that the passage is a reflex of the times in which it was written, and that it is a polemic directed against the Hasmonean kings.

Now it is certainly true that it is forbidden in tannaitic law to kill a gentile, Mekhilta’ De-Rabbi Ishmael Mishpatim 4 (17) states- “‘His neighbor (Ex. 21, 14),’ to exclude others (non-Jews). Issi ben ‘Aqaviah (18) says- Before the giving of the Torah we were prohibited from the shedding of blood (of all men). (Do you mean to say that) after the giving of the Torah, instead of the laws becoming stricter, they became more lenient? Indeed they said- He (who kills a non-Jew) is exempt from the laws of man, but his judgment is handed over to Heaven.” (19)

This passage informs us that to the Tannaim, the killing of a gentile did not incur the death penalty as did the killing of a Jew. This was because the gentile, as an idolater, had forfeited his right to live (or was assumed to be deserving of the death penalty). (20) This same view is expressed in Tosefta’, ‘Avodah Zarah VIII (IX), 5 (21)- “(The sons of Noah were commanded) regarding the shedding of blood. How so? … If a Jew (sheds the blood) of a non-Jew, he is exempt.”

Our law from the Zadokite Fragments certainly agrees that the killing of a gentile is forbidden, but it specifies that it is forbidden when undertaken for wealth or gain. SCHECHTER is no doubt correct in assuming that by implication the killing of gentiles when necessary to preserve Jewish lives was regarded by the sect as permissible. (22) Indeed, even the quickest glance at the War Scroll shows that the sect believed that there were circumstances under which the taking of the enemy’s life was permissible.

We can best understand the prescription before us as a polemic against the Hasmonean wars of conquest which, to the sect, were seen as intended only to bring wealth to the Jewish empire. Despite the fact that these wars also had as their purpose the Judaization of the Land of Israel, they involved attacks against gentile cities purely for the sake of adding them to the Jewish domains and, hence, collecting revenue from them. The spoils of these wars of conquest must have been great, and this could have been another impetus for the undertaking of such campaigns. (23) The text under discussion here claims that such acts are forbidden, since they do not involve the defense of the Jewish people or their country but are only intended to lead to increased wealth and profits from the conquered regions.

B) Prohibition of the Plundering of Gentiles (XII, 7–8).

This next regulation has been the subject of extensive treatment by L. GINZBERG. (24) GINZBERG translates ’al yisa’ mehonam kol as “one shall not accept anything from them,” which he takes to mean that “one should not accept any contributions for charitable purposes from gentiles.” GINZBERG cites numerous Rabbinic parallels to demonstrate the antiquity of this restriction. According to him, the latter half of our prescription indicates that on occasion, this rule can be set aside, with the permission of “the high council of the sect.” (25)

This interpretation, however, is not plausible. First, the introduction of our law with the word we-gam calls attention to its connection with the preceding. Our law, then, can only refer to the taking of non-Jewish property violently, which is here prohibited. The text says that not only is it prohibited to kill non-Jews in order to take their property, but it is even forbidden to take their property without killing them. Yisa’ must mean to carry off violently in our passage. (26)

Nor can GINZBERG’s conclusions regarding the council be accepted. When he wrote, the Qumran scrolls had not yet been discovered. (27) He could not know that the “high council” of the sect was tilled the moshav ha-rabbim, a term which we have discussed in detail elsewhere. (28) RABIN is certainly correct in connecting the hibbur yisra’el with the hever ha-yehudim of the Hasmonean period. (29) This latter body is known only from coins. (30) On the other hand, it seems to be synonymous with the council (gerousia) discussed by JOSEPHUS and would have been representative of the nation. (31) Our text is saying that only with the consent of this council was it permitted to undertake campaigns against the gentiles. We would suggest taking this clause as referring to both this and the preceding prescription. Again, whether gentiles were killed or not, no attacks were permitted without the council’s approval.

The Temple Scroll requires the existence of a council of twelve priests, twelve Levites, and twelve Israelites. Whereas this scroll seems to ascribe great importance to this council (LVII, 11–15), its role in military matters is apparently non-existent. This scroll gives the king the right to call out the army for defensive purposes without seeking anyone’s approval (LVIII, 3–11). For offensive wars, the scroll requires the permission of the High Priest who must seek the advice of the urim we-tumim (LVIII, 15–21). (32)

That the prescriptions of the Temple Scroll are not in agreement with those of the Zadokite Fragments poses no problem since we have taken the view elsewhere (33) that the Temple Scroll was not authored by members of the sect. It was a part of their library but is not to be seen as reflecting teachings held authoritative by the Dead Sea sect.

The prescription of the Zadokite Fragments is very similar to that of Mishnah, Sanhedrin I, 8- (34) “We do not send (the army) out to an optional war (milhemet ha-reshut) except with the approval of the Court of Seventy-one.” This passage specifies the tannaitic requirement that offensive wars be conducted only with the permission of the High Court of Seventy-one.

The text of the Zadokite Fragments gives us a reason for the law it has stated. It tells us that it is forbidden lest the gentiles blaspheme (ba-‘avur ’asher lo’ yegaddefu). (35) Presumably, the rubbing of gentiles by force would reflect poorly on the God of Israel. Indeed, a tannaitic tradition considers the robbing of a gentile to be forbidden. Tosefta’, Βανα’ Qamma’ X, 15 states- (36) “One who steals from a gentile is obligated to return (the property) to the gentile. Stealing from a gentile is more serious than stealing from a Jew because of the profanation of (God’s) name.”

Our Qumran law states the same idea. The robbing of gentiles by Jews will reflect badly on the Jewish people, whose actions will, in turn, be taken as a reflection on their God.

On the other hand, attention must be called to Tosefta’, ‘Avodah Zarah VIII (IX)- (37) “Regarding one who stole or one who robbed… If a Jew did it to a non-Jew it is permitted.”

The temptation to suggest that this corrupt passage must be emended so as to agree with the Tosefta’ passage quoted above must be dismissed in light of Sifre Devarim 344. (38) This passage tells a story about two Roman officials who came to the academy of Rabban Gamliel to find out, about the nature of the Torah. When they left, they indicated their approval of everything except the ruling that- “You say that the stolen object of a non-Jew is permitted but that of a Jew is forbidden.”

These two passages can be interpreted in one of two ways. It is possible that they are in agreement with the Tosefta’ passage we have quoted. If so, the latter two passages speak only of the Torah’s law, what the Amoraim called de-’orayta’, according to which all agree that there is no prohibition. The Tosefta’ material indicates that the Tannaim nevertheless prohibited it as a profanation of God’s name. This is most likely since the import of the Sifre passage is clearly that this law does reflect badly on Israel. It is also possible that some Tannaim did not impose the rabbinic prohibition, apparently because they were not as greatly concerned with the issue of hillul ha-shem, the profanation of God’s name. (39) Our text from the Zadokite Fragments does not mean to imply that such improper action could somehow be legalized by the permission of the high council. Rather, it indicates that when necessary, the Jewish people could go to war. The permission of the council would guarantee that this was not a case of killing gentiles purely for gain or of simply plundering them, actions which would result in blaspheming, what the Tannaim later termed “the profanation of God’s name.”

C) Prohibition of Sale of Kosher Animals to Gentiles (XII, 8–9).

The next regulation prohibits selling animals and fowl which are kosher (tehorim, literally “pure”), to gentiles in order that they not sacrifice them. Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I, 5 provides a parallel to this regulation. This mishnah states- (40) “The following things are forbidden to be sold to gentiles- … the white rooster. (41) Rabbi Judah says- It is permissible to sell him (the non-Jew) a white (rooster) among (other) roosters. When he (the white rooster) is (to be sold) alone, he may cut off its toe and sell it to him, because they do not sacrifice an incomplete (animal) for idolatrous worship.” (42)

While the exact extent of the prohibition was being debated in the first century C.E., tannaitic opinion was one on the basic question- Fowl that might he used for idolatrous worship were not to be sold to gentiles. This prescription is quite similar to our Qumran law according to which pure (kosher) animals suitable for sacrifice, including fowl, were not to be sold to non-Jews.

As to the matter of animals (cattle and sheep), the establishment of tannaitic parallels is somewhat more complex. GINZBERG has discussed our passage in detail and has called attention to its relevance to a problem in Talmudic studies. (43) Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I, 6 and Pesahim IV, 3 rule- (44) “In a place where they are accustomed to sell small animals (sheep and goats) to gentiles, they may sell (them). In a place where they are accustomed not to sell (them), they may not sell (them)… Everywhere, it is forbidden to sell them large animals, calves and foals, (40) whether healthy or injured. Rabbi Judah permits it in the case of an injured animal, and Ben Betera permits it in the case of a horse.”

These mishnayyot give no reasons for the prohibitions included in them. The Palestinian and Babylonian Talmudim both interpret this law in various ways before arriving at the conclusion that the prohibition was for reasons of Sabbath law. (46) One was forbidden to sell these work animals to non-Jews since sometimes animals were given on approval, and in such cases the gentile might work the Jew’s animal on the Sabbath, thus causing the Jew to incur transgression for indirectly causing his animal to labor. This explanation cannot be taken as reflecting the origin of this legislation, however.

Our passage from the Zadokite Fragments would certainly suggest, as GINZBERG has noted, that the original prohibition of selling animals to non-Jews was motivated by a desire to avoid their sacrificing these animals. GINZBERG maintains that at some later point, after the destruction οf the Temple, the Tannaim, as part of their general tendency to enact regulations designed to reduce the economic and agricultural role of gentiles in the Land of Israel, adapted this prohibition to the needs of the day. The Tannaim, therefore, prohibited only the selling of useful farming animals which would help the pagans in their economic activities. Other animals, such as sheep or goats, were generally permitted. The old custom, says GINZBERG, persisted in some places where it was forbidden to sell any animals to non-Jews, as indicated in the Mishnah.

GINZBERG’s interpretation has much to recommend it. Although from a formal point of view the original context of this mishnah is certainly the meqom she-nahagu collection of Mishnah, Pesahim IV, 1–5, the fact that the redactor(s) placed it as well in Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah indicates that they must have thought that it related to idolatrous worship or idolators in some way. After all, the subject matter of Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah is clearly that which is forbidden because of its indirect connection with idolatrous worship. (47) It is difficult to believe that a Sabbath regulation would have appeared in that context. It seems, then, that GINZBERG’s suggestion ought to be accepted. Our Qumran passage shows that the original prohibition was enacted because of fear that the animals would be sacrificed. Eventually this law was made more lenient, applying only to the three days before pagan holidays (Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I, 1–2). When the Tannaim sought to limit the role of gentiles in the economy of Palestine, the law was then adapted to prescribe that only certain draught animals were forbidden, and so it appears in our Mishnah texts. Nevertheless, the Mishnah testifies that some communities in tannaitic times continued to maintain the old prohibition and refused to sell pagans any animals which were fit for sacrificial offering.

D) Prohibition of Sale of Untithed Produce to Gentiles (XII, 9–10).

This next law is usually taken to prohibit selling non-Jews grain or wine regardless of the price. GINZBERG notes that according to tannaitic halakhah, it is permitted to sell these items to non-Jews. Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I, 8 states- (48) “It is permitted to sell them (agricultural produce) once it has been cut.”

This passage means that once harvested, any agricultural produce may be sold to non-Jews. GINZBERG correctly notes that our passage, on the other hand, speaks of the threshing-floor (goren) and winepress (gat), and, therefore, that the passage refers to food which has not yet been properly tithed. According to our document, the sale of such produce, before tithing has taken place, is forbidden. Essentially, our text rules that sale to non-Jews does not exempt the original Jewish owner from tithing the produce. For this reason, until the produce is brought into the storage place and then tithed, as tithing was done at that time, the produce was not permitted to be sold to gentiles.

GINZBERG’s second suggestion that we emend be-khol me’odo to be-khol yom ’edan [read better- ’edam], “on any of their festival days,” would not bring the law before us into agreement with Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I, 1 as GINZBERG claims, since this sectarian passage deals only with grain and wine and not with the many other things prohibited immediately before pagan festivals in Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I. Nor are we helped by KOHLER’s proposal that we emend to mo‘adeyhem, which raises the very same problems as does the emendation proposed by GINZBERG. (49)

E) Prohibition of the Sale of “Canaanite” Servants to Gentiles (XII, 10–11).

Our text next prohibits the selling to non-Jews of male and female slaves who have entered the covenant of Abraham. Tannaitic halakhah required that non-Jewish slaves be given a period of up to one year to accept a conversion process to Judaism. Slaves who did not wish to undergo this rite were to be sold within a year. Otherwise, slaves, both male and female, would begin a process of conversion which culminated only if freed, at which time they would be full-fledged Jews. Thus the Tannaitic ‘eved kena‘ani (“Canaanite” slave) was in reality a servant in the process of conversion. (50) Once a slave had begun this process, which in the case of males started with circumcision, it was forbidden to sell him to non-Jews under any circumstances. Accordingly, Mishnah, Gittin IV, 6 rules- (51) “If one sells his (“Canaanite”) slave (52) to a non-Jew, … he goes free (immediately).”
The same was true of the female slave. Once she had begun her conversion, she also could not be sold. If a “Canaanite” slave were sold and subsequently escaped, he would he considered a free man in the eyes of the halakhah. Indeed, the very same reality underlies the sectarian law under study here. Our sectarian passage prescribes the very same law as found in later tannaitic halakhah.


The text under study here concerns a series of regulations for which no scriptural authority is indicated. Indeed, the matters pertaining to idolatry and idolatrous worship taken up by the Torah are here given no attention. Instead, the subject of our tract, like that of Mishnah and Tosefta’, ‘Avodah Zarah, is that of forbidden dealings between Jews and their idolatrous gentile neighbors. This is in marked contrast to what we find in the Temple Scroll which deals, as usual, with the very same matters raised in the Biblical tradition. We may repeat here that the Zadokite Fragments augment biblical law, discussing only matters not explicitly mentioned in the Bible. They deal with legal matters, part of what the sect called the nistar, the hidden laws, those known only to the sect. (53) The Temple Scroll, on the other hand, represents a very different approach to Scripture, exegesis and law, and, it seems to us, stems from different circles than those who authored the works of the Dead Sea Sea.

The code of laws we have examined here from the Zadokite Fragments is one in which practically every prescription had its close parallel or was virtually identical with that of tannaitic halakhah. While this is usually not the case, it certainly is so in the area of Jewish-gentile relations. Indeed, we can probably assume that in this respect the Qumran sect and the Pharisees of the Second Commonwealth period would have been in full accord. In the one case in which the sect appeared to differ with the later tannaitic tradition, we saw that the correct understanding of that tradition rendered it almost identical in its earlier stages to what we found in the Dead Sea corpus. This study reminds us that in the rush to differentiate the Judaisms of the Second Temple period, the common elements must not be ignored.

(*) Professor Stuart MILLER of the University of Connecticut at Storrs was kind enough to read a draft of this paper and to offer helpful suggestions.

(1) On this term, see my The Halakhah at Qumran (Ε. J. Brill, Leiden, 1975), pp. 60–68.

(2) See my Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Courts, Testimony and the Penal Code (Scholars Press, Chico, California, 1983), pp. 7–11.

(3) For ŠLH followed by YAD and an infinitive introduced by the preposition lamed, see 2 Sam. 1, 14.

(4) See Gen. 9, 6 which is one of the verses underlying the enigmatic Dam. Doc. IX, 1. Here it probably served to indicate to the sect that the shedding of any man’s blood, Jewish or gentile, was prohibited by the Torah.

(5) Note here the use of the post-biblical expression goyim. See Halakhah at Qumran, p. 104, n. 135, and p. 105, n. 139, on terms for non-Jews in the Dead Sea corpus.

(6) Note the biblicizing nature of Qumran terminology which persists in the use of this wisdom term.

(7) Hebrew besa‘ denotes “unjust gain” (so BROWN-DRIVER-BRIGGS, sub verbo).

(8) On we-gam, see below.

(9) See Num. 16, 15; 1 Sam. 17, 34 and possibly Jud. 21, 23.

(10) Biblicizing terminology for what the Tannaim called hillul ha-shem. See Num. 15, 30. The root GDF is used to describe the actions of the enemies of the sect in Dam. Doc. V, 11–12, Hodayot II, 35; Habukkuk Pesher X, 13, and Rule of the Community IV, 11. See also Ben Sira 48, 18. Tannaitic megaddef is one who reviles God (Mishnah, Sanhedrin VII, 4–5).

(11) ‘Esah in Qumran terminology denotes the council/counsel of the community, that is, the body which makes the decisions as well as the process by which the decisions are made. A similar usage appears in Temple Scroll LVII, 15 regarding the king’s council.

(12) For the comparison with hever ha-yehudim, see below. Note the tannaitic phrase hever ‘ir and the thorough discussion of L. GINZBERG, Perushim We-Hiddushim Bi-Yerushalmi III (Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, 1941), pp. 411–428. GINZBERG sees this as a representative body of city leaders. C. RABIN, The Zadokite Documents (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1954), p. 61 calls attention to the occurrence of hever in Dam. Doc. XIII, 15 and XIV, 16. This raises the question of whether our text is to be emended to hever, or the other occurrences are to be vocalized hibbur.

(13) RABIN, p. 61, notes the use of post-biblical gat rather than biblical yeqev.

(14) On me’od, see below.

(15) See Mishnah, ’Avot III, 11. GINZBERG is correct that in Rabbinic parlance berit ’avraham is a term for circumcision. Nonetheless, this term appears here to refer to both male and female servants who have begun the process of conversion to Judaism.

(16) S. SCHECHTER, Documents of Jewish Sectaries (Ktav, New York, 1970), p. 82, n. 13.

(17) Ed. HOROVITZ-RABIN, p. 263. See Mekhilta’ De-Rabbi Shim‘on bar Yohai to Ex. 21, 14 (ed. EPSTEIN-MELAMMED, p. 171).

(18) So MSS. Ed. HOROVITZ-RABIN has Aqiva’. Confusion regarding this Tanna makes it impossible accurately to date him.

(19) The initial anonymous statement which appears to say that it is permitted to kill a non-Jew only means that this case is not covered by the scriptural laws presently under discussion. This is clear from the earlier statement quoted with the introductory phrase be-’emet ’ameru. See GINZBERG, p. 122.

(20) See ’Encyclopedia Talmudit 5, pp. 355–356.

(21) Ed. ZUCKERMANDEL, p. 473.

(22) GINZBERG, Sect, p. 122.

(23) On these wars, per E. SCHÜRER, A History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ I (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1973), pp. 207–210 (John Hyrcanus), 220–221, 223–227 (Alexander Janneus). Note the Pharisaic opposition to these Hasmonean rulers which may also have been linked to the Hasmonean foreign policy. But see G. ALON, “Did the Jewish People and its Sages Cause the Hasmoneans to be Forgotten?” in Jews, Judaism and the Classical World, translated by I. ABRAHAMS (Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 1–17, from “Ha-Hishkihu Ha-’Ummah We-Hakhameha ’et Ha-Hashmona’im?,” Mehqarim Be-Toledot Yisra’el (Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Tel Aviv, 1967), I, pp. 15–25.

(24) GINZBERG, Sect, pp. 73–76.

(25) Compare GINZBERG, Sect, pp. 90–91, in which he suggests emending Dam. Doc. XIV, 15 so that, it would describe the requirement that charity be dispensed to non-Jews. To this he compares Tosefta’, Gittin V, 4 (ed. LIEBERMAN, 111 (V), 13). The emendation he proposes is hardly likely, however.

(26) See above, n. 9.

(27) His Eine unbekannte jüdische Sekte (New York, 1922), was first published as a series of articles in Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 55 (1911)–58 (1914).

(28) Halakhah at Qumran, pp. 68–75.

(29) RABIN, Zadokite Documents, p. 61.

(30) See SCHÜRER I, p. 211 and n. 25. He identifies the hever ha-yehudim with the gerousia. This phrase appears on coins of John Hyrcanus (211) and Alexander Janneus (227). See D. JESELSOHN, Hever Yehudim—A New Jewish Coin, in Palestine Exploration Quarterly 112 (1980), pp. 11–17.

(31) On the gerousia see SCHÜRER II (1979), pp. 202–204.

(32) See Y. YADIN, Megillat Ha-Miqdash (Israel Exploration Society, Jerusalem, 1977), I, pp. 264–270.

(33) Sectarian Law, pp. 13–14, and “The Temple Scroll in Literary and Philological Perspective,” in Approaches In Ancient Judaism II, ed. W. S. GREEN, Brown Judaic Studies 9, 1980, pp. 143–155. Cf. B. LEVINE, The Temple Scroll- Aspects of its Historical Provenance and Literary Character, in Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, no 232 (1978), pp. 5–23.


(35) See JOSEPHUS, Ant. IV, VIII, 10 (207).

(36) Ed. ZUCKERMANDEL, p. 368.

(37) Ed. ZUCKERMANDEL, p. 473.

(38) Ed. FINKELSTEIN, p. 401, cited in J. CARMIGNAC, É. COTHENET, H. LIGNÉE, Les textes de Qumran II, (Letouzey et Ané, Paris, 1963), p. 197. For a full discussion of parallels, see S. KANTER, Rabban Gamaliel II- The Legal Traditions (Scholars Press, Chico, 1980), pp. 213–224. The considerably more developed version of Palestinian Talmud, Bava’ Qamma’ IV, 3 (4b) attributes the prohibition on the stolen object of the gentile to Rabban Gamliel, but this is surely a secondary feature.

(39) See Encyclopedia Talmudit 5, pp. 487–495.

(40) MS. KAUFMANN. Cf. D. ROSENTHAL, Mishnah ‘Avodah Zarah (Hebrew University Dissertation, Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 13–14.

(41) Cf. J. N. EPSTEIN, Mavo’ Le-Nusah Ha-Mishnah (Magnes Press, Jerusalem and Dvir, Tel Aviv, 1963/4), p. 1104. EPSTEIN argues that the absence of the waw (‘and”) in many tests shows that tarnegol lavan, the white rooster, is a kind of casus pendens. This would mean that the only opinion expressed in this regard was that of Rabbi Judah. The statement of the sages would in no way make reference to the white fowl.

(42) See S. LIEBERMAN, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, 1962), pp. 153–163 on blemishes in sacrifices.

(43) GINZBERG, Sect, pp. 76–77, cf. pp. 358–360.

(44) MS. KAUFMANN to Mishnah, Pesahim IV, 3. Cf. ROSENTHAL, ‘Avodah Zarah, pp. 15–16.

(45) The reading qyyhyn in MS. KAUFMANN to Mishnah, ‘Avodah Zarah I, 6 is clearly a scribal error.

(46) Yerushalmi, Pesahim IV, 3 (30d–31a) and Bablî, ‘Avodah Zarah 15a.

(47) Cf. Ch. ALBECK, Seder Mo‘ed (Mosad Bialik, Jerusalem, and Dvir, Tel Aviv, 1954), “Hashlamot We-Tosafot”, to Mishnah, Pesahim IV, 3.

(48) MS. KAUFMANN. Cf. ROSENTHAL, ‘Avodah Zarah, p. 18.

(49) GINZBERG, Sect, pp. 77–78; K. KOHLER, cited in M. H. SEGAL, “Sefer Berit Dameseq,” Ha-Shiloah 26 (1912), p. 501.

(50) Cf. E. E. URBACH, The Laws regarding Slavery as a Source for Social History of the Period of the Second Temple, the Mishnah and Talmud, in Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies London I (1964), pp. 1–94, translated from “Hilkhot ‘Avadim Ke-Maqor Le-Historiyah Ha-Hevratit Bi-Yeme Ha-Bayit Ha-Sheni U-Vi-Tequfat Hα-Mishnah We-Ha-Talmud,” Zion 25 (1960), pp. 141–189. See also my “At the Crossroads- Tannaitic Perspectives on the Jewish-Christian Schism, in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition”, vol. II, ed. E. P. SANDERS, with A. I. BAUMGARTEN, A. MENDELSON (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 136–137.

(51) MS. KAUFMANN. Cf. ALBECK, Seder Nashim, “Hashlamot We-Tosafot,” p. 200.

(52) That this mishnah indeed concerns a “Canaanite” (non-Jewish) servant and not a Hebrew servant is certain from the parallel in Tosefta’, ‘Avodah Zarah III (IV), 16 which discusses the need for a get shihrur, a writ of manumission. Such writs have validity only in the case of “Canaanite” servants and have no relevance to Hebrew servants in Talmudic law.

(53) Sectarian Law, pp. 212–214; Halakhah at Qumran, pp. 22–32.

What do you want to know?

Ask our AI widget and get answers from this website