An ancient ban prohibits one person from striking another. Anyone who violates this ban may not be released from it or counted as part of a prayer quorum until he agrees to obey whatever judgment the rabbinic court imposes upon him.

This requirement applies when the injured person brings a complaint. If the injured person makes no claim, the community may release the offender from the ban on its own authority.

Rabbenu Tam further ordained that anyone who strikes another person outside the synagogue must pay a fine of twenty-five dinars. If the assault takes place inside the synagogue, the fine shall be doubled to fifty dinars.

Rabbi Joseph Kara testified that he saw Rabbi Yehiel of Paris decide a case according to this ordinance. If an offender strikes the same person twice, he must pay twice the ordinary fine.

If the person who was attacked strikes back, he loses his claim to the fixed fine. The first attacker no longer requires release from the ban, although the court may impose payments according to the number and severity of the blows exchanged.

The rabbis of France didn’t universally accept the distinction between an assault committed inside the synagogue and one committed elsewhere. They allowed the court to increase or reduce the payment according to the circumstances and the social standing of the attacker and victim.

The fine shall be paid to the injured person rather than to the communal charity fund. This follows the usual principle that compensation and fines arising from an injury belong to the person who suffered it.

A woman or a relative may be accepted as a witness in such a case. A minor may also be believed when the incident occurred under circumstances in which properly qualified witnesses couldn’t ordinarily be expected to be present.

Similar rules apply to someone accused of informing against another Jew to the secular authorities. A single witness or relative may testify against an informer.

Direct testimony isn’t always required in such a case. If witnesses saw the accused speak with a ruler and the ruler subsequently took action against the person who was denounced, the court may accept this sequence as sufficient circumstantial evidence.