THE ARAB WAR EFFORT

A Documented Account

THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN PALESTINE COMMITTEE

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This organization combines the American Palestine Committee and the Christian Council on Palestine, and continues the work of both organizations.
We of the American Christian Palestine Committee have felt it imperative to assemble and publish this account of the part played by the Arab lands in the Second World War. In doing this we are motivated by a profound concern with the central issue of our day—the need for shaping a stable peace on democratic foundations.

The tendency to forget the lessons of the past has always been one of man's most dangerous characteristics. It is acutely dangerous now in the decisive days following the great agony of the war. It has become painfully clear that unless we apply to the building of the peace the lessons learned at such cost during the war, we shall not be able to meet the new perils threatening to undermine our life on this planet. One of those hard earned lessons was simply this: that appeasement does not work. The enemies of human freedom could neither be bribed nor cajoled. Munich proved that once and for all.

The material presented in this publication proves it once again. It demonstrates how in the days when Hitler's supremacy seemed certain, Britain was deserted and betrayed in a most strategic part of the world by peoples whose friendship she had strained herself to win. Yet now in 1947 we seem to be returning to the policy of appeasement in dealing with precisely those Arab leaders who did their utmost to aid the Axis powers. The essence of British policy in the Middle East has not altered since 1939. It has been affected but little by the failure of appeasement and by the collaborationist record of the Arab States and of the men who led and still lead them.

The American Christian Palestine Committee believes the pages which follow to be profoundly important. The record they present should make the governments of the western democracies reconsider very carefully their course of action in the Middle East. Are we to follow the barren and perilous line of appeasement and reaction in this nerve center of the world, the Middle East? Or are we to act along new and truly democratic lines? The facts presented here should help us reach a decision.

This publication does not claim to exhaust the subject of the Arab war effort. Of the thousands of available documents, fewer than a dozen are published here. Of the long lists of hundreds of Arab agents on the German payroll, only a few are mentioned. Of the numerous cases of sabotage, only a few are recorded.

We have appended official British and other documents to the text. A number of these have previously been published in the American, European, or Middle East press. We wish also to acknowledge the use we have freely made of the Memorandum on this subject submitted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in February 1946.

Dean Alfragé
Chairman, New York State Chapter,
American Christian Palestine Committee
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Pre-War Links with the Axis

It is not claimed that the facts stated in this document constitute a revelation. They do not appear to be in dispute in any responsible quarter. There seems, however, to be a tendency to ignore them as no longer politically relevant. This tendency, we submit, is a most unfortunate one, for the data herewith presented point to conclusions that are still valid with regard to the political reasoning prevalent among the Arab peoples. Those peoples have now become full-fledged members of the United Nations. Their voices are heard in all international deliberations. The facts about their political and social beliefs and allegiances are thus of genuine importance to all concerned with the establishment of a stable and democratic world order.

That during the war there was a period of Arab collaboration with the Axis is generally, if vaguely, known. Yet—whatever the reason may be—most recent discussions of the Middle East omit or slur over that “unfortunate” period. Arab spokesmen have apparently come to believe that the true facts of Arab pro-Nazi activity have been forgotten. They are now actually claiming rewards for the help which they say the Arabs gave the democracies. In the face of this rather amazing perversion of history, it would seem important to publish a documented account of the Arab war effort—material which otherwise would almost certainly never reach the general public.

No observer of conditions in the Middle East before the war could have denied that animosity towards the British and sympathy with the Axis powers were widespread among the common people of the Arab countries who were not enemy agents in any direct sense. These feelings permeated the majority of the population, while the leaders often cooperated directly with the Axis. Fascist and Nazi ideologies were not so much imitated as paralleled in the Arab world; they fitted into modes of thought already in being and were taken up by existing political clubs and associations. This leaning towards Fascism was strengthened by the “appeasement” policy practiced by the British in the Middle East even before Munich. British colonial officials seemed to believe that it was necessary to make every effort to win over dangerous and extremist elements among the Arabs: those moderate Arab leaders among whom were some real democrats (the late Dr. Shahbandar of Damascus, for instance) could be safely ignored, since they presented no threat to British interests. Hence most of the money spent by the British with a view to gaining Arab sympathy went into the pockets of a few uncompromising extremist leaders, for the most part of Fascist tendencies. Little was done to gain the sympathy of the masses through improvement of health, education, housing, and it was only natural that the masses should come to believe in the infallibility and power of those extremist leaders whose favor the British were curryng.
After the war began, the unpolitical masses were impressed by the propaganda promises and the military successes of the Germans, and they long remained convinced of the ultimate victory of the Axis Powers. The attempts Britain had made to meet what were considered legitimate Arab political demands were interpreted as symptoms of fatal weakness; and British propaganda on Nazi brutality only served to confirm Arab belief in Germany's strength and the wisdom of being on her side. Thus, even the few pro-British Arab leaders felt obliged to conceal their opinions and to pose as anti-British, in order not to forfeit the support of their following.

Significant evidence as to the way the Arab world felt during the war has been given by an Englishman particularly qualified to speak, Glubb Pasha, Commander of the Transjordan Arab Legion. He wrote, discussing the Iraqi revolt of 1941:

The British of course always knew we were going to win the war, but at the time of these operations every Arab was perfectly convinced that Britain was finished for ever, and that it could only be a question of weeks before Germany took over Arabia. The Iraqis were perfectly sure of this or they would not have declared war on us . . .

In brief, during the six weeks before the fall of Baghdad, every Arab was convinced that we were done for. Every Arab force previously organized by us mutinied and refused to fight for us, or faded away in deserts. The men of the Arab Legion alone not only stood firmly by us, but played a most active, energetic and valuable part in our little campaign.¹

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon did not declare war on Germany until February 1945, when the end of hostilities was imminent and victory had become absolutely certain. These declarations of war at the eleventh hour were merely formal, since none of these states took any direct part in military operations. The declarations were obviously aimed at securing seats in the United Nations Organization in the establishment of which at San Francisco only those nations were permitted to participate which had declared war on the Axis before March 1, 1945.

One Arab principality did declare war on Germany as early as 1939. It was Transjordan which was under British mandatory rule and was not independent, having to rely mainly, as it still does, on grants-in-aid from the British Government, which also maintains the country's military force, the Arab Legion. Iraq declared war in January 1943, after the reversal of the fortunes of war at Al-Alamein had proved definite. This declaration was clearly motivated by the need to atone for the stab in the back Iraq had given the Allied cause in 1941.

The general attitude of the Arab States was a reflection of the long-standing relationship between certain Arab circles and the Axis Powers. The trips by Arab students to Germany and Italy, the visits of German politicians and agents to the Arab East, the flow to Arab countries of money and of Arabic newspapers and magazines from Germany and Italy, the propaganda broadcasts in Arabic by the radio stations of the Axis—all these activities had over the years created the state of affairs which was exploited during the war. In the case of Palestine, it is by now generally acknowledged that the Arab Riots of 1936—1939 were stimulated and subsidized by Nazi and Fascist sources. The Mufti of Jerusalem through his agent in Geneva, Emir Shekib Arslan, was in contact with Mussolini years before the war. Some of their intercepted correspondence was published as early as 1935 in Arab papers opposed to the Mufti.

¹ In the appendix to Somerset DeChair's *Golden Carpet*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1945, p. 243
IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON connections between certain groups of Syrian leaders and the Axis States were of long standing. There were a number of strong pre-war Arab-Nazi organizations—the Iron Shirts (led by Fakhri al-Barudi of the National Bloc, member of the Syrian Parliament to this day); the League for National Action (headed by Abu al-Huda al-Yafi, Dr. Zaki al-Jabi and others); the An-Nadi al-Arabi Club of Damascus (headed by Dr. Said Abd al-Fattah al-Imam); the Councils for the Defense of Arab Palestine (headed by well-known pro-Nazi leaders, such as Nabiil al-Azma, Adil Arslan and others); the Syrian Popular Party (led by the Fascist Anton Saade, who escaped during the war to the Germans and was sent by them to the Argentine). The National Bloc, the principal party in Syria, and more particularly the Istiqlal group (headed by Shukri al-Kuwaitli, now President of the Syrian Republic) had for many years been openly pro-Nazi. ²

Before the war Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Jugend, visited Syria on a special mission and established close contact with these circles, particularly the An-Nadi al-Arabi Club, and with the Arab youth organizations.

IN IRAQ, xenophobia has long been characteristic of the political mentality of the country’s leaders, and even the so-called pro-British group is not entirely free of it. The Army plays an important part both in domestic and foreign policy, and it was entirely pro-Nazi before the war. In Iraq, as in Syria, there were a number of pro-Nazi clubs and associations which were in contact with the German Ambassador, Dr. Grobba. Among them may be mentioned the Al-Muthanna Club, founded by Dr. Amin Ruweila, Said Thabit and others, and the Al-Futuwa Club, which sent delegates to the Nuremberg rallies. In the early part of the war, Iraqi politicians had relations with the German ambassadors in Baghdad and Ankara. Von Papen’s top contact man with Middle Eastern Arab circles was the well-known Iraqi politician, Naji Shawkat. ³

At the beginning of the war there were a considerable number of political emigrés in Iraq; most of them had come from Palestine, were violently anti-British and had close connections with the Germans. These included Haj Amin al-Husseini, Jamal al-Husseini, Munif al-Husseini, Daud al-Husseini, Is’haq as-Salah al-Husseini, Amin Tamimi, Hasan Abu Saud, Fawzi Qauqqji, Izz-ad-Din ash-Shawa, Is’haq Darwish, Dr. Amin Ruweila, Salim Abd ur-Rahman, Darwish Maqaddi and many others. With the help of the Iraqi Government, some of them had become civil servants and teachers in Iraq, and were thus in a position to propagate their doctrines among the masses of the people.

Haj Amin al-Husseini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, was the central figure in the group. He had come to Iraq from Syria in mid-October 1939. Nuri Said, then Prime Minister of Iraq, received him with the state pomp and ceremony usually accorded a visiting hero. On October 22nd Nuri Said gave an official banquet in his honor, attended by members of the Cabinet, the Presidents of the House of Representatives and the Senate, Rashid Ali el Kailani, and many other notables. This was the first of a series of similar receptions and celebrations, attended among others, by Taha el Hashimi, Minister of Defense, and Ali Jawdat el Ayyubi, at present Iraqi Minister to Washington.

¹ See below, Document I in the Appendix, a description of Syrian Political Parties taken from an official British Military Handbook, issued by Middle East General Headquarters for the use of British troops about to invade Syria in June 1941. The pro-Nazi character of almost all the parties is obvious at first glance.

The hospitality of the Iraqi Government did not end with these banquets. The ex-Mufti was voted £18,000 by the Iraqi Parliament and was further paid the sum of £1,000 a month out of the Iraqi Secret Service Funds in addition to the 2% attached at source from the salary of every Iraqi Government official, including the military and the police. Over and above these official grants, the Iraqi public responded to the appeals of the Red Crescent Society and the Palestine Defense Society by contributing considerable amounts in order that Haj Amin and his retinue might live in the lavish style to which they had been accustomed.

Haj Amin set out at once on a working program. His first move was to organize into an efficient and active pressure group the Palestinian refugees and Syrian reactionaries who crowded around him. He made his first inroads into the Iraqi Government by engineering into office his own Palestinian and Syrian followers. At the same time Haj Amin extended his influence to certain Iraqi nationalist organizations (some of which already enjoyed German support and money). Fascist in character, they were willing victims of his intrigue.

Immediately upon his arrival in Iraq Haj Amin bent his efforts toward renewing and strengthening his contacts with the Axis agents. Authoritative sources report that he was paid £60,000 by the Germans and £40,000 by the Italians.

As later events proved, far and away the most important of the ex-Mufti’s associations in Iraq, however, was with Rashid Ali el Kailani and the four commanding officers of the Iraqi Army—known as the "Golden Square." These officers now began to interfere quite openly in Government politics and made no secret of their anti-British pro-Axis bias. Their sentiments were soon shared by the majority of Army officers and official military opinion held that a German victory was inevitable. Increasingly convinced that Nuri Said’s British associations would irrevocably compromise Iraq when the Axis finally emerged triumphant, this group forced Nuri Said to resign and on March 31 made Rashid Ali el Kailani Prime Minister.

This maneuver was the first open step in Iraq’s active participation on the side of the Axis. Immediately the reins of Government were in their hands, the rebellion started. The revolt against the British was launched in April 1941.⁴

The Iraqi Revolt

Up to the time of the Iraqi revolt the general line of the Arab governments had been the cautious one of avoiding any definite step which might involve commitment to the Allies or cause offense to the enemy, as long as the issue was in the balance.

At the beginning of hostilities, the Arab States did break off diplomatic relations with Germany. When, after attacking France, Italy entered the war on what seemed clearly the winning side, they were by no means eager to break off diplomatic relations with her. In the early years of the war, the Italian embassies and consulates in Cairo, Baghdad and other cities

⁴ Cf. Document III, The Ex-Mufti’s Role in the Iraqi Revolt, report by the British General Service of Intelligence (G.S.I.), December 1, 1941.

⁵ Whereas the revolt broke out in April, it was not until May 2 that the Iraqi Government declared war formally on Britain.
became centers of anti-British espionage and intrigue, and most Arab Governments connived at the activities of Italian diplomats and their Arab agents, despite repeated British protests.

The Iraqi revolt came when the outcome of the war seemed certain. In the spring of 1941 Britain’s fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Neither Russia nor the United States had yet entered the war. The full fury of the Axis was directed against Britain. The British armies had just been driven out of Greece. In Syria the Vichy regime worked hand in glove with the Italo-German Armistice Commission, preparing footholds there for the German armies. In the Western Desert the Axis forces were already on the move. General Glubb’s observations as to Arab confidence in an Axis victory, have already been quoted. The Iraqis, as he said, were perfectly sure of it when they rose against England.

The revolt had of course been planned as an integral part of German strategy. Had the Iraqi succeeded in attaching Iraq to the Axis orbit, the Allies would not only have lost their chief source of oil—Iraq and Iran—but even more crucial results would have come about. Hitler would have split the British Empire in two. The Western half would have been cut off from its source of raw materials (India), while the Eastern half, with its armies in the field would have been left isolated and without supplies. Hitler might thus, at that time, have succeeded in beating each half separately. The Germans would have pushed for an immediate juncture with Japanese forces who had already started the Indian Subhas Bose revolt. The Russians could ultimately have been outflanked by an invasion from Iraq to the Caucasus. Alamein and Stalingrad would have been Axis victories. (See map, p. 11.)

It was indeed a critical moment that the Iraqi rebels, prodded and aided by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, chose for their uprising. For two months the fight hung in the balance. British troops were rushed to Basra from India. A column left Palestine and moved by forced march across the desert into Baghdad. For the rebels, German and Italian airplanes, refueling in Syria, were thrown into the fight. Trainloads of French arms were shipped to Iraq by General Dentz, Vichy High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon, upon instructions from the Italo-German Commission. At the call of Haj Amin and the Iraqi military, subversive elements throughout the Middle East were touched off into activity.*

Looking back, one sees that it was by sheer miracle, by the courage of the British columns converging on Baghdad, but most of all by the heroic Greek and British resistance in Greece and Crete—resistance which held until May 20, 1941, thus preventing the Germans from transporting reinforcements of men and material to Iraq—that the Iraqi revolt was quelled.† In their impatience the rebels had struck just a bit prematurely. Without large-scale Nazi aid Iraq’s army proved no match for two small British columns.

The Kailani coup d’etat was not, as is sometimes thought, the work of a small group of officers and politicians. A collection of documents published in Iraq under the name Al-Wathba shows that the leaders had the cooperation of officials, heads of tribes, workers and Beduin. The heads of the Moslem faith in Iraq, Sunnites and Shi’ites alike, called upon the faithful to

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*See below Document IV, Summons to a Holy War Against Britain.

† “The significance of all this was not, of course, lost on General Smuts. Speaking at Bloemfontein, two years later, of this turning point in the war, when Hitler planned to strike at Russia through Syria and Iraq in 1941, concurrently with his attack from the west, he said, ‘Who prevented this? Greece. Those precious six weeks altered the history of the world. They gave us time to get hold of Syria and save Iraq from rebellion.’” (The Golden Carpet, op. cit., p. x)
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*(See below Document IV, Summons to a Holy War Against Britain.)*

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take part in the rising and destroy the British. Muhammad al-Khatib, Director of the Supreme Moslem Theological Seminary in Karbala, published a *fatwa* on the duty of the Iraqi people to join in the fighting. The Chief Preacher of Baghdad addressed an urgent appeal to the Moslem world for assistance. Many others of the Moslem clergy did the same. The few Iraqi politicians who were opposed to the coup and to the pro-Nazi regime had to flee. Under Rashid Ali, diplomatic and *de facto* relations with Germany were resumed. A treaty was signed giving Germany rights to the oil of Mosul, and the use of the railways and airstrips. In return Germany undertook to provide military help. Haj Amin al-Husseini’s letter to Hitler on the preparation of the revolt, dated January 1941, was later found in Germany.

The rising aroused deep enthusiasm in the Arab world. Outstanding personalities openly expressed sympathy and support. King Faruk of Egypt sent a telegram of congratulations to the rebel Iraqi Regent, Sharif Sharaf, appointed by Kailani after the Regent Abdul Illah fled. Thus Egypt’s official recognition of the insurgent regime was conveyed. In Syria and the Lebanon which were under Vichy rule, sympathy for the Iraqi rising could be expressed more freely. Hashim Atasi, President of the Syrian Republic from 1936 to 1939 and one of the leaders of the National Bloc, sent congratulations and called upon the Syrians to assist the Iraqis. Messages of encouragement were received from Riad as-Sulh (Lebanese Premier in 1943-44 and member of the Lebanese delegation to U.N. in 1946); from Ihsan al-Jabri, a prominent leader of the National Bloc; from the National Party in Aleppo.

Only the fact that the Kailani regime was short-lived prevented the Arabs of other countries from sending concrete assistance. Such assistance was prepared, and to a slight extent funds and arms were actually sent. In Syrian towns, committees were set up for the collection of funds, medical aid, and the recruiting of volunteers. Students at the American University of Beirut informed the Lebanese Government of their desire to form a fighting unit. Some of the most active workers on behalf of the Iraqi rebels (like Adil Arslan, Nabih al-Azma and others) have recently returned from political exile in Turkey and Germany and are continuing their political activities. The majority have become heads and members of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments: Shukri al-Kuwatli, Riad as-Sulh, Habib Abu Shahla, Emile Lahud, Sabri al-Asali, and Farid Zayn ad-Din.

### Palestine and Transjordan

In Palestine there was a marked intensification of the anti-British whispering campaign and distribution of anti-British leaflets among the Arabs. Attempts were also made to recruit active supporters for the Iraqi rebels, but owing to the speedy suppression of the rising and the weariness of the Palestine Arabs after years of terrorism, there was little response. The major contribution which the Palestine Arabs made to the Kailani rising was the

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*Al-Bilad* of May 6th, 1941
*Shakir al-Badri; see *Al-Bilad* of May 27, 1941
*Al-Bilad* of May 13, 1941
*B.B.C. on June 17, 1941. *Al-Thaghr* (Basra Arab daily) of June 18, 1941
*Full details can be found in *Al-Bilad* and other Baghdad papers of April and May 1941; also in *Al-Watba*, mentioned above and the Syrian press.
POTENTIAL RESULTS OF THE IRAQI REVOLT

WITH IRAQ UNDER AXIS CONTROL:

1. Germany would have controlled the oil of Iraq and Iran.
2. German and Japanese forces would have attempted a junction somewhere in Asia.
3. The British Empire would have been split in two.
4. Alamein and Stalingrad would have been Axis victories.
propaganda and organizational activities of their emigré leaders in Iraq. This is described below, as is the direct aid to Germany in espionage, sabotage and recruiting, given by Arabs under the leadership of Haj Amin el Husseini and his followers, operating from Germany and Italy after the failure of the Iraqi revolt.

In Transjordan intensive propaganda was carried on on behalf of the Iraqis, and mass meetings and demonstrations took place. Here, concrete assistance was also rendered. The Beduin tribes in the desert between Transjordan and Iraq made raids upon workers employed on the oil pipe-lines; the line was cut on several occasions and in a number of places. Attempts were also made to obstruct the movements of British troops dispatched to Iraq to suppress the rising.¹³

During the revolt the Transjordan Frontier Force mutinied against the British. German propaganda and anti-British agitation had been carried on in the Force almost openly for some months before the coup in Iraq. The ring-leaders were Arab officers, under one Shukri al-Amuri, who was serving as Acting Adjutant with the rank of Major. When the Transjordan Frontier Force was dispatched to Iraq to help British forces quell the revolt, the command was in the hands of Shukri Amuri. On reaching the Iraqi frontier (H3 Pumping Station) the Transjordan Frontier Force squadrons mutinied, both officers and men refusing to march further. They were arrested, disarmed, and sent to Zerka, the headquarters of the Force. Berlin Radio gave full details that very evening. As the rebels numbered hundreds it was considered unwise by the British Military Authorities to bring them all before a Court Martial. It was feared that this might have a bad effect on other Arab military units. Accordingly, the rebels were not sentenced but were given the option of leaving the Force without receiving the usual bonuses and gratuities.

One whole squadron, numbering 160 men, resigned from the service, with the exception of five who were Circassians or other non-Arabs. Nearly all the men of the other squadrons did the same; in all, 500 men of the Transjordan Frontier Force either resigned or were discharged. Some officers were detained, while others, Shukri Amuri, Amin Izz-ad-Din, and Dib Rashid Ariqat, were discharged, and instructions were issued that they were not to be accepted in any other military formations. The last mentioned officer was re-admitted a short while later into the British Forces with the rank of captain. Unlike the Transjordan Frontier Force, the Arab Legion did not mutiny, a fact which was given wide publicity.

Desertions from the armed forces of Middle East countries—both by high ranking Arab officers and by soldiers—form a chapter of their own. Desertion was repeatedly urged in Nazi radio and leaflet propaganda and by the Fifth Column in each country.

The Arab leaders in Germany vigorously propagandized against enlistment of Arabs in the British Army. This, as it happened, was hardly necessary. So few Palestine Arabs joined the Army that Syrians, Lebanese and Transjordanians were encouraged to cross into Palestine and enlist as Palestinians, to fill the quota fixed for Palestine Arab units. It will be recalled that Jewish enlistment in parallel Jewish infantry units was held down to the Arab rate—a rather peculiar service to the war effort on the part of the Palestine Administration. It took the steadily worsening military situation in the Middle East and the continued pressure by Jewish volunteers to break down this attempt at “equality.” In all, as the Secretary of State for War stated in the

¹³ *Al-Bilad* of May 28, 1941
House of Commons on April 2, 1945, 25,714 Palestinian Jews served in the British Forces and 9,041 Arabs.

Many Arab soldiers from Palestine went over to the enemy. The Germans had some success with the help of Arab leaders in mobilizing recruits for their Arab brigades from among Palestinian Arab prisoners of war. In the liberation of Europe Allied forces took prisoner a number of Arabs in German uniform, who had formerly been soldiers in the British Army.

Apart from desertions to the enemy, there were many hundreds of cases of ordinary desertion by Arab soldiers, some of whom left their units with their arms. At least half the Arab soldiers who joined up in Palestine disappeared from the ranks of the British Army through desertion or through discharge on the ground that they were unfit for service.

Egypt and the War

The declaration of war by Italy was of direct concern to Egypt, which had a common frontier with the Italian North African colonies. The Egyptian Government, however, did not reply with a counter-declaration of war but contented itself with the severance of diplomatic relations. It allowed the Italian diplomatic corps and some thirty-five other Italian nationals to leave Egyptian territory unescorted. The British request to have their documents examined was not acceded to by Ali Maher, then the Egyptian Prime Minister. Numbers of Italians in Egypt were interned, but one suspected spy was granted Egyptian citizenship (he was an official at the Egyptian Royal Court). The pro-Italian tendencies of King Faruk were well-known—it was not without reason that Victor Emmanuel when deposed chose to live in Egypt.

A similar attitude was maintained by Egypt towards Vichy France. The Egyptian Government broke off diplomatic relations in 1942, only as a result of British pressure.

Hostility was shown towards political refugees who escaped to Egypt from German-occupied countries. When King George of Greece reached Egypt, the Government submitted to a German ultimatum and forced him to leave, even though such action was not obligatory by international law.

The anti-British and pro-Fascist sympathies of the Egyptian Court were well-known to the public in Egypt and in Arab countries. Anti-British sentiment ran high in the Egyptian press. The Egyptian Parliament also took up an aggressively anti-British attitude. Not infrequently anti-British allegations levelled in the Egyptian Parliament and press were those broadcast the night before by the Arabic radio of Berlin or Rome, Bari or Athens. The British were accused of eating up the supplies of the country and causing starvation among the poor, despite the fact that hundreds of millions of pounds sterling were spent by the British in Egypt (in military construction, etc.) and that thousands of starving fellaheen were employed and paid high wages by the British Army. Some 350,000,000 pounds—almost one and a half billion dollars—were spent by the Allies in Egypt during the war. Yet the British were blamed even for the Egyptian cotton crisis despite the fact that had they not purchased the entire crop—and at a price forced up in the bargaining—not a bale would have been sold. They were held responsible
for the German air bombings of Egyptian cities. These accusations always culminated in the demand that the British Army evacuate Egypt immediately and forever.14

The anti-British campaign led to acts of petty obstruction and sabotage. British soldiers were attacked and sometimes killed in the streets of Egyptian towns. The greater part of the Cairo "native quarter" was out of bounds to troops. The man who murdered Amin Osman Pasha in December 1945 confessed that in 1940 he had been connected with the assassination of British troops.

Active sympathy with the Axis was expressed in public demonstrations whenever the German forces approached Egyptian territory. This feeling was largely traceable to organized Fascist and Fifth column activities. The principal center in Egypt was the Fascist Misr al-Fatat organization. Its leaders were detained in 1940, but the young men in its ranks continued to apply the doctrines of their "Fuehrer," Ahmad Husein. Groups of students of Al-Azhar University, too, formed a center of anti-British feeling and some of them were active in the ranks of the Fifth Column.

The most important function of the Fifth Column was the transmission of intelligence to the Germans and Italians. The Arabic broadcasters of the Berlin and Bari radio stations, listened to with great interest and confidence in all Arab countries, were frequently in a position to give political and even military information about events in Palestine, Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and Iraq, on the evening of the day they occurred, with details which, though grotesquely exaggerated, indicated first-hand knowledge. On several occasions secret wireless transmitters were discovered in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. In Palestine the police discovered a secret transmitter in an Arab orange grove, the owners and operators of which are still in detention.

UNDER ALI MAHER, the Egyptian Government had pronounced anti-British tendencies. In the summer of 1941, it became known that Salih Harb Pasha, Ali Maher's Minister of Defense, had handed Italian Military Intelligence the secret plans of Egypt's defenses, as well as British military information communicated to the Egyptian Government. Ali Maher himself and the Egyptian Chief of Staff, Aziz Ali al-Masri, were suspected of complicity. This revelation led the British to secure the detention of Ali Maher, Salih Harb and others. They were released in 1944 and 1945.

As for Aziz Ali al-Masri, his dismissal had long been demanded by the British authorities. All that Ali Maher had done was to give him a protracted leave. Al-Masri came into the limelight again on May 12, 1941, during the anti-British coup in Iraq, when he attempted to reach the Axis lines in an Egyptian military plane. He made a forced landing on Egyptian territory, whereupon he was at last arrested. He was released in 1945, but re-arrested in January 1946 in connection with the assassination of Amin Osman Pasha. Al Masri was not the only one. A military trial was held recently of an officer of the Royal Egyptian Air Force, Salim Radwan, who with his friend Muhamad Abu as-Saud, flew to the Axis camp in an Egyptian airplane on July 7, 1942. Salim was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment; his friend has not yet been traced.

14 An anecdote springs to mind which reveals worlds about the Egyptian feeling that the war was by no means their war. In PM of June 13, 1941, Robert Neville in a dispatch entitled Egyptians Give British Half Hearted Support wrote: "Ed Kennedy of the Associated Press was collecting Egyptian; from a trip to the Suez Canal he brought this one: 'The train that runs from Ismailia and Port Said is equipped with an anti-aircraft gun operated by a British anti-aircraft gunner. The Egyptian State Railways make the gunner buy a ticket for each trip.'"
It is common knowledge that in February 1942 the British had to use force to compel the Egyptian court to appoint a Government from which some measure of loyalty to the British cause might be expected. According to a description of the events of that time later published in Akhbar el Yom, British tanks with their guns trained, surrounded the Abdin Palace, and thousands of fully armed troops patrolled the neighborhood. One tank forced the palace gate and was followed by the British Ambassador, Lord Killearn, and the Commander of British Troops in Egypt. The Royal Bodyguard was overpowered, and fully armed officers accompanied the Ambassador to the King’s study. The palace telephone lines were cut, while police stations and the broadcasting station were surrounded by the British. While the palace was still besieged, the King summoned party leaders and elder statesmen and declared: “You have seen the British tanks. I think you will therefore agree that it is in the country’s interest to accept the ultimatum for a change of government.” Nahas Pasha was then called to form a new Government. He stated later: “Those who were then in power were convinced of the Axis victory and backed the wrong horse. Relations with the British had become strained in the extreme. There were street demonstrations against England with crowds shouting ‘Forward Rommel!’”

Though, like his predecessors, he did not have his country declare war on the Axis, Nahas Pasha succeeded in preventing assaults on British officers and soldiers, and in putting an end to acts of sabotage against lines of communication, but even this he achieved only by arresting and detaining hundreds of Egyptians: politicians, officers, students and officials.

The successive heads of the Egyptian Government—Ali Maher, Hasan Sabri, Husein Sirri and Mustafa Nahas—had all repeatedly announced that they would declare war as soon as any Italian or German military forces set foot on Egyptian territory, but they all refrained from doing so, even when the Axis armies had marched far into Egyptian territory. Instead of responding to the bombardment of Egyptian cities with a declaration of war, the Egyptian Government repeatedly urged the British military authorities to evacuate Cairo and to declare it an open city. When the B.B.C. announced in 1942 that Egypt was about to declare war and contribute half a million men to fight the Axis, Nahas Pasha himself hastened to deny the report; he asked the Spanish Ambassador to inform the Axis Governments of his denial and to assure them that Egypt would preserve its neutrality.

The Egyptian Army was entrusted with certain guard duties in Egypt, but was “relieved” even of these during the critical period of El-Alamein. Nahas Pasha requested that in the event of a German conquest of Alexandria the British should abandon all further defense of strongholds in Egypt, in order to spare the Egyptian people unnecessary suffering. There are grounds for believing that orders to this effect were in fact given to the Commands of the British Eighth and Ninth Armies.

Apart from the regular Egyptian Army, a “Territorial Army” was formed under Abdul Rahman Azzam. Since this leader was known to be connected with Ali Maher, the British military authorities had reason to fear that his “Army,” originally intended as an auxiliary to the British forces in Egypt, might become the nucleus of an anti-British force and Fifth Column. They repeatedly demanded its dissolution which took place only after prolonged efforts on their part.

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18 The incident was described in full by Nahas Pasha in a speech reproduced in Al-Balagh of November 14, 1945.
19 Now General Secretary of the Arab League
The only Egyptian statesman who openly and consistently urged that it was Egypt's duty to declare war on Germany was Ahmed Maher Pasha. During his premiership war was finally declared on the eve of the San Francisco conference in February 1945. Immediately after announcing the decision to the Egyptian Chamber, Ahmed Maher, on his way to repeat the announcement in the adjoining Senate, was shot dead by an Egyptian lawyer who, as late as February 1945, still believed that Hitler would win.

The Levant States

Under the Vichy regime connections with Axis countries and hatred of the British could be expressed without risk in Syria and the Lebanon. There was no need for any hidden Fifth Column, for pro-Axis activity could be conducted in broad daylight. The only political group that seemed sincerely pro-British and anti-Nazi was that of Dr. Abd ur-Rahman Shahbandar. But in 1940 Dr. Shahbandar was assassinated by pro-Nazi Syrians, and after the death of its central personality his group lost influence and finally dissolved. Leaders of the Syrian National Bloc, men who are today at the head of the Syrian State, were openly accused of instigating the murder of their adversary. Three prominent leaders of the National Bloc escaped from Syria the day after Dr. Shahbandar's murder and found refuge in rebel Iraq and later in Saudi Arabia. They were allowed to return home and regain their positions after the British conquest of Syria: through the good offices of Ibn Saud, negotiations for their return were carried on with the British Ambassador to Iraq, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. (For an official British analysis of the pro-Nazi character of almost all the political parties in Syria and the Lebanon, see Document I on page 28.)

During the Vichy regime and the stay in Syria of the German-Italian Armistice Commission, the hotel in Beirut where the Armistice Commission stayed became the center of Syrian political life. Syria served as a link between the Arab States within the British sphere, on the one hand, and insurrectionist Iraq and the Axis States, on the other.

When the British entered Syria, many Arab leaders presented themselves to General Dentz and offered full cooperation in repelling the attack. During the Iraqi Revolt, as has been pointed out, they offered their assistance to the rebels. Those who aided and sympathized with that pro-Axis uprising ranged from extreme nationalists to so-called progressives. They included not only old-style politicians like Shukri Kuwatli, now president of the Syrian Republic, but even Raif el Khoury, considered an outstanding progressive writer and politician. The latter, in a book published in Beirut during the Iraqi revolt, depicted it as an uprising of peasants and laborers against their oppressors.

Pro-Nazi activities in Syria and the Lebanon did not cease with the British occupation. Most of the pro-Nazi leaders fled the country (Nabih al-Azma, Izzat Darwaza, Adil Arslan, etc.) and others were detained (such as Ihsan al-Jabri, brother of the head of the present Syrian Government), but many of those who stayed on and were left at liberty continued their activities underground. It was discovered as late as 1942-43 that espionage on behalf of Germany was being carried on at the American University of Beirut by Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian-Arab students. Some of the students were executed by the British Military.
Haj Amin al-Husseini and the Other Emigrés

Not only Syrian and Lebanese politicians joined the Axis. A great many Palestinians of the group centered around the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and Iraqis connected with the Kailani revolt of 1941, spent the war in Axis and neutral lands and gave active assistance to Germany, Italy and Japan through espionage and Fifth Column work.

The Palestinians included Hasan Abu Saud, Salim Abd ur-Rahman, Musa Abdullah Husseini, Arif Abd ur-Raziq, Saad ad-Din al-Latif, Rasim al-Khalidi, Is’haq Darwish and many others—all of them politicians who had escaped at the end of the 1936-39 disturbances. Among the Egyptians living in the Axis countries during the war were Prince Mansur Dawud (a relative of the King of Egypt), Mustafa al-Wakil (one of the leaders of the Misk al-Fatat movement), and Dr. Tayib Nasr. Iraqis (most of them leaders of the rising) who went to Germany included Rashid Ali al-Kailani himself, Naji Shawkat, Yunis al-Bahri and Fawzi Qawqji, who had been one of the military leaders of the 1936 rebellion in Palestine.

A group of Arab leaders was concentrated in Turkey, where they conducted espionage activities on behalf of the Germans. Some of these sent to Germany intelligence received from agents in the different Arab countries. Among them were: Izzat Darwaza, Akram Zuaytar, Muin al-Madi, Adil Arslan, Adil al-Azma, Nabih al-Azma and some of the Iraqi rebels.

One group of Arab leaders did not succeed in reaching Germany, but was arrested by the British authorities in Iran and sent to Rhodesia. This group included Dr. Amin al-Ruweihia, Dr. Daud al-Husseini, Kamal Hadda, and Jamal al-Husseini, who was permitted to return to Palestine in 1946. Others were arrested by the British in Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, and by the Iraqi authorities in that country.

Preeminent among all the emigrés was, without doubt, Haj Amin al-Husseini. After failing to secure bases for the Axis in Iraq, he fled at the end of May 1941 to Teheran, where he found refuge in the Japanese Embassy. When the Persian pro-Axis revolt failed and British and Russian columns met in Teheran, Haj Amin escaped again. He was an old hand at escaping: in 1920 when he was condemned to ten years of prison by a British military court for instigating a pogrom in Jerusalem, he fled to Transjordan; in 1937 when he learned of his imminent arrest by the British for the murder of thousands of Arabs, Britons and Jews during the 1936 disturbances, he fled from the Holy Shrine in Jerusalem to the Lebanon. In Rome in 1941 Haj Amin was to boast to a correspondent of the *Volkischer Beobachter* that General Wavell had put a price of 25,000 pounds sterling on his head dead or alive.

In October 1941 Haj Amin reached Italy, where he met Mussolini, Ciano and Dino Alfieri and discussed with them the possibilities of Arab-Italian collaboration. From Rome he communicated with the Balkan Moslems under Italian rule in Yugoslavia and Albania.

As soon as it became clear to him that Mussolini was altogether dependent on Hitler, Haj Amin went on to Berlin in December 1941. Here he established his headquarters. He was received by Hitler, and with the aid of such German political and military chiefs as Ribbentrop, Grobbia, Weitzacker, he planned his future activities. A special office for him called
Documents Prove Mufti a War Criminal

By ARTHUR HURWICH
Cable Editor of The Post

Documentary evidence that Haj Amin el Husseini, ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, is a war criminal even under the technical definition given by Hector McNeil, British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, is now in possession of the New York Post.

McNeil told Parliament last Monday: “Technically, the Grand Mufti is not a war criminal since he was not an enemy national and did not serve in the armed forces of the enemy.”

One document, portions of which are reproduced in an adjoining column, is a report by a British security officer about enemy activity in Iraq during the war. It tells how four enemy agents, whose names are given, parachuted into Iraq on a sabotage mission under orders of the Grand Mufti. It is signed by Wing Commander H. K. Dawson Shepherd, Defense Security Officer. The date is Dec. 9, 1944.

Agents Confessed

This and many other documents available to the British government from its own files prove what is common knowledge—that the Grand Mufti not only served in the armed forces of the enemy but actually organized Axis activities in the Middle East. German parachutists and saboteurs captured in Syria, Palestine and Iraq during the war confessed they had been sent by the Mufti. The 1941 Axis revolt in Iraq was engineered by the Mufti and Rashid Ali Kellani.

Nailing Down the Grand Mufti

Tel Afer Parachute Expedition
Report No. 1

Defence Security Office,
C.I.G.I. Iraq,
Baghdad.

8.405/1/1
9th December, 1944.

B. It is clear, however, that the expedition is sponsored by the Mufti and that the parachutists are all members of the Mufti's Arab Legion. That it intended to create disturbances, there is no doubt. In this connection, the ex-Mufti's broadcast on the occasion of the 'Id-ul-Adha' on the 25th November, reproduced at Appendix E, is not without interest.

Brief description of parachutists.

H K Dawson Shepherd.
Wing Commander.
Defence Security Officer.

Appendices.
A. Personality notes on
B. the four parachutists.
C. The ex-Mufti's speech.
D. Equipment.

THIS BRITISH DOCUMENT, signed by Wing Commander H. K. Dawson Shepherd, tells how Axis agents, sent by the Grand Mufti, parachuted into Iraq during the war.
Buro des Grosmufti\textsuperscript{17} was established in Berlin and later in Oybin with branches in other parts of Germany and in Italy. His activities included:

1. Propaganda
2. Fifth Column activities in the Middle East (Sabotage and Parachutist Expeditions)
3. Espionage
4. Organization of Moslems into military units in Axis-occupied countries and in North Africa and Russia
5. Establishment of the Arab Legions and the Arab Brigade

His activities were so ramified that an attempt will be made here to classify them:

**PROPA**GANDA. On many occasions, Haj Amin broadcast personally on the German controlled radio. Several other Axis stations were also at his disposal. These were: Berlin, Zeissen, Bari, Rome, Tokyo,\textsuperscript{18} Athens, etc. He called on the Arabs of Palestine and on Moslems all over the world, including those in the United States,\textsuperscript{19} to rise against the Allies, join the Fifth Column, commit acts of sabotage, and kill the Jews. Several members of his staff attended to radio activities. Haj Amin’s broadcasts to the Middle East had an important effect on Arabs throughout that region during the dark hours of the War in 1941-1942. In addition, Haj Amin sent over to the Middle East propaganda papers and pamphlets in Arabic.

**ESPIONAGE.** From his headquarters in Berlin and Oybin Haj Amin organized a network of espionage. He had a sub-office in Geneva, Switzerland (directed by the notorious Axis agent, Emir Shekib Arslan) which served as a link between Haj Amin and his agents in Egypt and Turkey. He had another sub-office in Istanbul which had branches all along the Syrian Turkish frontier in Mersine, Alexandretta, Antioch, Adana and Diarbekr. These received information directly from Haj Amin’s agents in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, and were in close contact with the members of the German Intelligence working in Turkey: Hoffman, German Consul General in Adana, Paula Koch in Alexandretta, Rudolf von Roser, Chapeaurouge in Stamboul, von Hentig, etc.

Through this organization, valuable military information regarding British troop movements were supplied to the Germans. News items about sabotage activities or uprisings like the Transjordan Frontier Force rebellion, although kept under strict censorship throughout the Middle East, were regularly and immediately announced on the Berlin radio. As has already been mentioned, several wireless transmitters, operated by friends of Haj Amin were discovered in the Middle East, and the operators were either executed or condemned to long prison terms.

**FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES.** A huge organization for Fifth Column activities was set up by the ex-Mufti. A Parachutist and Sabotage School for Arabs was established in Athens. For special courses in wireless transmission, high explosives and demolitions Arab students were sent to a school in The Hague.

Haj Amin’s agents were infiltrated into the Middle East either by land through Turkey, Syria and Iraq or by parachute. Several parachutist expeditions were discovered by the British and their members, with their equipment (explosives, arms, ammunition, cameras, wireless

\textsuperscript{17} See his official stationery on p. 23.
\textsuperscript{18} The arrangements to record Haj Amin’s broadcasts for Tokyo are described in the letter from the Japanese Embassy in Rome reproduced on p. 23.
transmitters, money in gold), were apprehended. Among these were the Jericho expedition, the Tel Afar expedition (Iraq) and some other expeditions in Northern Syria (Aleppo and Gezira regions and Damascus). One participant in the Jericho expedition of October, 1944, Thuelqif, was captured, while another, a prominent Palestinian Arab, Hasan Salameh, escaped.

In order to avoid being executed, those parachutists who were caught insisted that they were "soldiers in the Mufti's Legion" and, thus, entitled to the treatment accorded to prisoners of war.

With the help of local Arabs, both parachutists and infiltrated agents on several occasions cut telephone and pipe lines in Transjordan and Palestine, and sabotaged railways and bridges in Iraq. Haj Amin boasted that because of his activities the British were forced to maintain large garrisons throughout the Middle East in order to prevent a general uprising and widespread sabotage. He insisted that only the constant vigilance of thousands of Allied troops prevented larger sabotage activities. Throughout the war every bridge and every weak point had, indeed, to be manned and guarded throughout the Middle East. In carrying out both sabotage and espionage, Haj Amin worked in close collaboration with the German Abwehr.

ORGANIZATION OF MOSLEM LEGIONS. One of the accomplishments of Haj Amin, for which he repeatedly claimed credit in his vast correspondence with such dignitaries as Ribbentrop and Himmler, was the organization of Moslem military units to fight for the Axis. In the Balkans Haj Amin rallied more than 15,000 Moslems into the Axis Wehrmacht in the "Black Legion" of Bosnia, etc. On a number of occasions Haj Amin personally inspected the various units and spoke to them. He was in direct contact with various Balkan quislings such as Pavelic, with whom he arranged the organization of these Moslem Wehrmacht Units. With Prof. von de Mende he established a school for politico-religious Moslem army preachers (Imams) in Germany.

Not least in importance were his contacts with the Pro-Axis leaders of the Moslems of North Africa. He submitted to the German Military Command a plan to recruit 500,000 Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian soldiers. In Germany he opened a special North African Bureau (Maktab el Magreb) whose budget came from the Buro des Grosmufti in Berlin. During the North African Campaign (which shattered his plans for a North African Army), Haj Amin broadcast on numerous occasions to North Africa and urged the Moslems to help the Axis impede the Allies as much as they could.

In Asiatic Russia Haj Amin found hundreds of thousands of followers. He collaborated with various Moslem Russian Quislings and White Russian traitors in the formation of pro-Axis Legions. He communicated with the Crimean Tartars, the Tchechen-Ingush, with Azerbaijan, Turkestan, and other anti-Soviet groups under Russian domination. It will be recalled that because of the treacherous behavior of their population, two Russian Moslem Republics were recently abolished, and their population of 400,000 Moslems transplanted to the Trans-Urals.

Haj Amin did not confine himself to the European struggle but offered his aid to the Japanese Government, accepting their suggestion that he broadcast to the Moslems in the South Pacific and India. Numerous broadcasts of his to India, Indonesia, Java were recorded.

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20 Part of the official British Intelligence reports on the Tel Afar Expedition is given in Document No. VI in the Appendix.
21 See photostat on p. 23.
FORMATION OF ARAB LEGIONS AND OF THE ARAB BRIGADE. In 1942, a few months after his arrival in Germany, Haj Amin started organizing Axis-Arab Legions from among the Arab students in Germany, the Arab Prisoners of War and the emigrés who had followed him to Germany. The legionnaires wore the German uniform and had “Free Arabia” patches on their shoulders.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1944, as a reply to Mr. Churchill’s recognition of a Jewish Brigade, based on the 26,000 Palestine Jews fighting with the Allies, Haj Amin got Ribbentrop to consent to the formation of an Arab Brigade. Haj Amin in a broadcast on November 2nd, 1944 and in letters called all Arabs in Germany, hailing from Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and Syria, to join this brigade. Still another aspect of Haj Amin’s wartime activity in Germany was his direct collaboration with the German Extermination Bureau in the murder of six million European Jews. Documents proving this charge have been published by E. A. Mowrer and others, but need not be discussed here, since they are not directly relevant to the Arab war effort.

Postwar Appeasement

After Al-Alamein, when it became evident that there was no prospect of Nazi victory, official Arab spokesmen and the Arab press began to protest their devotion to democracy, their hatred of the Nazis and Fascists, their remarkable contribution to the Allied war effort. Even the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem in his statement published in the New York Times of October 6, 1946 tries to appear as a champion of democracy, claiming the right to form a “democratically constituted government in Palestine.”

The overwhelming majority of the Arab Nazis who were arrested in Syria and the Lebanon by the British and Free French have been released since 1943; many of them have been reinstated in their former positions, some even becoming leaders of their governments.

In Egypt, too, all those who had been arrested during the war as Nazi agents or persons dangerous to public security were set free, and their prospects of attaining power and high office seem no lower than those of others. Some have, of course, already been appointed to high posts.

In Palestine the exiled Arab leaders are all returning. First came those not “directly” implicated in assisting the enemy, such as Dr. Hussein Khalidi, Auni Abd ul-Hadi, Musa Alami,\textsuperscript{23} and others. Although most of them had to sign a pledge not to engage in politics, it was not long before they were all restored to their former positions on local political bodies. They are today accepted as the official leaders of the Palestine Arabs. Next came those arrested and deported at the end of the 1936-39 disturbances, including some notorious gang leaders who are credited with a number of assassinations (such as Shakir Abd al-Aziz of Idnibba, Abd ul-Hamid Jaulani of Hebron, Mohammad Taha Najjar of Yibna, Fawzi Jarjar of Jenin). Some of these had been in hiding for two or three years or had left Palestine for a time, and had succeeded on their return in “coming to terms” with the Palestine police. Other Arab leaders have been allowed to come back one by one during the past year: Dr. Mustafa Bushnaq

\textsuperscript{22} See below, Document VII.
\textsuperscript{23} Musa Alami, ex-representative of Palestine to the Arab League, heads the Arab Office with branches in Jerusalem, Washington and London. For his role in the Iraqi Revolt see Document III, p. 23.
of Nablus (from Egypt), Darwish Maqdadi of Tulkarm (from Iraq), and others. Finally, even those who had openly engaged in anti-British activities during the war and had been caught on their way to Germany and detained in Rhodesia—such as Jamal al-Husseini and his fellows described in the House of Lords by the then Colonial Secretary, Lord Cranborne, as "the really dangerous people"—were allowed to return. They immediately resumed the leadership of their political parties and were recognized by the British as the spokesmen of Palestine's Arabs.

The only member of this group who has not so far been officially pardoned is Haj Amin al-Husseini, whose trial as a war criminal was demanded by the Yugoslav Government in 1945; whom Anthony Eden, Noel Baker, Churchill and Oliver Stanley have on various occasions called an outspoken enemy of the Allied cause. At the end of the war the ex-Mufti was arrested by French troops in their zone of occupation and taken to Paris, where he lived in a sumptuous villa until June 1946. He then "passed" on to Egypt (one can not say he escaped). Today the Palestinian Arab leaders and the Arab League are doing their utmost to obtain his return to Palestine and his recognition as the spiritual and political leader of the Arabs of that country.

It should not be forgotten either that while the Arab States were scarcely affected by military operations, they benefited materially from the war. The Allies spent vast sums in the Arab States which accumulated Sterling balances, the exact extent of which is unknown but is approximately as follows: Egypt—350-400 millions pound sterling; Iraq—50-75 millions; Syria and the Lebanon—50-100 millions. Egypt's budgetary reserve rose from 28 millions in 1938-39 to 60 millions in 1941. The Allies provided the Arab countries with foodstuffs and commodities at a time when the nations of Europe, including the British, were suffering severe restrictions. They arranged for the purchase of the products and resources of the Arab States, such as Egyptian cotton, even when they had no immediate use for it. They provided employment for tens of thousands of Arab workers at unprecedentedly high wages. They contributed to the development of the Arab countries by the construction of roads, airfields and railway lines, as well as through extensive building activity. All this put fantastic wealth into the pockets of profiteers, but it also benefited workers and shopkeepers, and even, to a certain extent, the fellaheen. In addition to these profits, there were various direct subsidies, which reached huge proportions by 1943-44. To give a minor example, the Government of Saudi Arabia was indemnified by the British for financial loss suffered through the suspension of Moslem pilgrimages. And yet, throughout, the sympathies of the mass of the Arabs continued to be with the enemy. The Allies had from the Arabs only such assistance as their force could compel or their money could buy.

This is an ironic picture, but no less ironic than the entire story of the Arab "war effort" and the ill-deserved rewards it has reaped for the Arab States. It is true that, with the exception of Iraq, the Arab countries did not actually fight for the Axis. The reason was clearly not their lack of sympathy with Fascism and the Fascist powers. It was rather their fundamental incapacity to wage modern war—their lack of modern armies, trained technicians, skilled workers to run the industries without which modern war is impossible. That they were willing enough to be used by an Axis power ready to supply funds, airplanes and military aid of all sorts, the case of the Iraqi revolt proves. It proves, too, their utter lack of concern for freedom and democracy, their complete readiness to open the way to the downfall of both the Western democracies and Russia. Appeasement had not justified itself. But appeasement is still the British policy throughout the strategic Middle East. One may well ask how secure a foundation it can be for a new and peaceful world order.
Haj Amin writes:

"To Our Moslem Brothers in Japan and to the Moslems of East Africa, on the death of the Muffi of Japan:

"My request of those heading the Muslim Institute in Tokyo and of all Moslem leaders in the Far East is that they continue to go in the noble way of the Muffi, the way of complete and cooperation between the Moslem and the Japanese for the benefit of both that they continue to struggle heroically against the common enemies of the Rising."
The Fuehrer of the German people and Haj Amin, during their meeting in Berlin (December 1941)

Haj Amin and Rashid Ali el Gailani of Iraq, together in Berlin

A unit of the Arab Legion in Germany
Haj Amin reviews Bosnian Moslem troops (cover of the Wiener Illustrierte Zeitung).

Haj Amin, "spiritual leader of Moslems," lovingly fingers the gun of a Moslem volunteer.

Haj Amin reviews Bosnian Moslem troops (from the Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung).
1. Receipt from Jamal Husseini for support in Iraq, reading:

Iraqi Dinars: 65
Received from his Excellency Haj Amin al Husseini the sum mentioned above, sixty-five Dinars, for rent of house 1939-1940. In witness thereof I append my signature.
Signed: Jamal Husseini
December 2, 1939

2. German Money Order to Yunis Bahri, chief Arab broadcaster of Radio Berlin participant in the Iraqi revolt, called the Arab Lord Haw-Haw

Received also fourteen Dinars for the rent of the house for an additional period of one month and one week above the above-mentioned year.
Signed: Jamal al Husseini

3. Form Receipt signed by Yunis Bahri, reading: Received from the Common Fund the sum of 700 marks (seven hundred marks) salary for the month of January 1944, received January 2

Signed: Yunis el Bahri

4. German Money Order to General Ibrahim al Rawi, also of Iraqi origin

These documents were discovered in att...
DOCUMENTS

SELECTED FROM OFFICIAL BRITISH, GERMAN, ITALIAN AND ARAB SOURCES
## MILITARY HANDBOOK

**GHQ M. E. June 1941**

**Syrian Political Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY ARAB NAME</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED ENGLISH TRANSLATION</th>
<th>POLITICAL AIMS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hai’at-Ash-Sha’biya ash-Shahbandariyeh</td>
<td>The People’s Party</td>
<td>Favour a loose federation of Arab States under the aegis of Great Britain, i.e., Syria, Palestine and Transjordan.</td>
<td>Anti-German. They have lost influence since the murder of Dr. Shahrbandar and favour the Amir Abdullah as head of the Federation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. El-Qutla el-Wataniya</td>
<td>The National Bloc</td>
<td>Opposed to Syrian Popular Party and all foreign interference in Syria.</td>
<td>The Party is divided into two main groups. The larger group follows Jamil Mardam and the smaller, comprising the Istiqlal, follows Shukri Kuwali. The larger Party is again divided into Southern Area under the leadership of Jamil Mardam and Northern Area under Jamil el-Ibrahim, Pasha of Aleppo, and Dr. Kayyali. Jamil Mardam is said to favour a Federation of Syria with Iraq. The Party is <strong>pro-German</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hizb-el-Istiqlal</td>
<td>Istiqlal Group of the National Bloc</td>
<td>Working for complete independence and a union of Syria and Palestine under Ibn Saud.</td>
<td>They have <strong>GERMAN</strong> connections. Pro-Nazi. A part of the National Bloc. In very close touch with Ibn Saud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Usbat-el-Amal-el-Qaumi</td>
<td>League of National Action</td>
<td>Anxious for freedom from foreign control.</td>
<td>Directed from Iraq. Now said to be cooperating with the National Bloc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This material was prepared by British Middle East Headquarters for the use of troops invading Syria in 1941. The last two columns make clear the pro-Nazi character of the overwhelming majority of Syrian and Lebanese political parties and their close connections with the Germans.

** President of Syrian Republic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Hizb-el-Qaumi as-Suri</td>
<td>Syrian Popular Party</td>
<td>Favouring independence and complete Pan-Arab federation, with strong Nazi-Fascist tendencies.</td>
<td>Membership reported to be 20,300/30,000 with branches in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan. Leaders paid by Nazis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hizb-el-Dasturi</td>
<td>Constitutional Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>They claim 40,000 members of whom 40% are Armenian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Nadi-el-Arab</td>
<td>The Arab Club</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Nadi-el-Ittihad el-Arabi</td>
<td>The Arab Unity Club</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Nadi-el-Ayubi</td>
<td>The Ayubi Club</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hizb-el-Mustakil</td>
<td>Independent Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Haras el-Arab</td>
<td>The Arab Guard</td>
<td>Pan-Arab and pro-Nazi.</td>
<td>Under the direction of Von Hentig.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A SHORT HISTORY OF ENEMY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN 'IRAQ
1935-1941*

Introduction

History so often repeats itself that much can be learnt from the study of the past. Between the years 1933 and 1939, but six in all, Hitler built up Germany into a first class power, equipped her with the most formidable machinery of warfare and set out to conquer the world. In the meantime, as all the world knows, Great Britain found herself unprepared to meet the greatest onslaught of all time.

A brief review of German subversive activity in 'Iraq between the years of 1935 and 1941 illustrates clearly what might well recur should in the future Great Britain refrain from continuing to maintain a close and objective surveillance on the machinations of foreign powers and thus fail to follow the maxim: "eternal vigilance is the price of peace."

When Herr Hitler turned his mind to activities of a subversive nature in the Middle East, he must have counted himself fortunate in having in 'Iraq the German Minister, Dr. Grobba, who had an extensive knowledge of the Orient and was consequently the right instrument for the work in hand.

In 1935, acting on instructions from Berlin, Dr. Grobba allowed himself and his Legation to be used as a medium for the dissemination of German propaganda and the operation of subversive organisations. The propaganda he set about to spread can be classified under three main headings—commercial, cultural and political. To further this purpose, a local Nazi party was formed under the leadership of a Dr. Jordan, the German archaeologist, its members being recruited from German nationals resident in the country.

In the commercial field, the Germans were active. With the accession to power of Hitler, German export trade came under government control and a drive was made to secure world markets for her commodities and thus to obtain either foreign exchange or bartered products . . .

At the same time that this rapid trade expansion took place, Germany carefully exploited her 'Iraqi commercial contacts to spread the Nazi creed and to disseminate propaganda to the effect that she desired to assist Arab countries in their development. Every facility was given to 'Iraqi business men for visiting Germany and numerous visitors from Germany toured 'Iraqi towns and villages and visited

* This exhaustive British Intelligence report is, for reasons of space and pertinence, published here only in part. All sections reproduced are unabridged.
tribes in the guise of commercial representatives. With all merchandise delivered to Iraq, well prepared propaganda material was enclosed. As trade increased, more Germans came to Iraq and the Legation ensured that they were good Nazis and that they would actively engage in pro-Nazi propaganda. Between the years of 1935 and 1938, the volume of German trade in Iraq practically doubled itself.

On the cultural side, every effort was made to promote the teaching of the German language and civilisation and, in particular, to stimulate an emotional interest in the National Socialist form of Government. A kindergarten school was instituted in Baghdad, the headmistress of which was Fraulein Grampp, and this was attended by German and Iraqi children between the ages of five and ten.

German teachers were introduced into the secondary school. Carefully chosen and extremely active, they spent much of their leisure in teaching German, often free of charge, to private pupils. These teachers, as did other Germans taking up foreign appointments abroad, were obliged before leaving Germany to attend a course at the Deutsche Akademie in Munich which specialised in Nazi educational measures under the directorship of a retired General named Karl Haushofer. Iraqi students, who succeeded in reaching a certain standard of proficiency in the German language, were afforded the opportunity of free educational facilities in Germany. Not long after the inception of this cultural propaganda, the German language having ousted French, became the third in importance in the schools.

In 1937, Dr. Fadhil al Jamali,* at that time Director-General of Education, visited Germany where he was accorded an official welcome and was lavishly entertained. On his return, Dr. Jamali was prevailed upon by the Germans to send an Iraqi delegation to the Nuremberg Rally of 1938. This was headed by Al Aqid (Colonel) Mahmoud Fadhil al Janabi, who was personally introduced to the Fuhrer. The effect of this meeting, together with the impressive marshal atmosphere of the Rally may, in some measure, account for the enthusiasm with which Janabi, on his return to Iraq, reorganised the Futuwa (the Iraqi Youth Movement) on lines similar to those of the Hitler Jugend. The uniform especially designed and worn by the members of the delegation on the occasion of the Rally was later adopted by the Futuwa.

At this time, there may have been in the minds of educationalists such as Dr. Fadhil al Jamali, Dr. Sami Shawkat and others responsible for the influence the Germans succeeded in gaining in the Ministry of Education, merely a desire to inculcate into the youth of Iraq a spirit of healthy nationalism. They had doubtless observed the magic effect that German and Italian methods had had on the youth of those countries and how fanatically patriotic they had become as a result. Surely then such methods could be applied with profit to Iraq, whose youth did not yet know the meaning of "patriotism." They may well have argued, and not without some reason, that the only way to develop an embryo nation is to instil into its people a deep sense of national pride. Be that as it may, it transpired later that the Ministry of Education and the majority of those who were in it worked actively on behalf of the Germans against the British and consequently against the interests of their own country.

Those of the medical profession were also wooed by the Germans. Doctors, who had received their training in Germany, were prevailed upon to spread Nazi ideals among the medical students. The Principal of the Royal Hospital and Dean of the 'Iraqi Medical Faculty, Dr. Saib Shawak, a founder of the ill-famed Muthana Club and later, when it became a tool in the hands of the Germans, its president, visited the Reich in 1937 where he was officially received and presented with a full-dress Nazi uniform.

* Now Iraqi Foreign Minister
In the political field, the Germans were no less active. Spending large sums of money, they set themselves to the dissemination of pro-Nazi, Pan-Arab, anti-British and anti-Semitic propaganda. Dr. Grobb's personal charm, his vitality coupled with his knowledge of the Arabic language and his deep understanding of the Oriental mind won for him the personal friendship of a large circle of influential 'Iraqis. He waived diplomatic precedent aside and himself visited ministers and directors in their own departments. He threw frequent and sumptuous receptions at the German Legation to which he invited the "high and the low." Through the medium of small parties, he lavishly entertained carefully selected 'Iraqis likely to prove useful to the peculiar work of his Legation.

In the 'Iraqi Army, Nazi propagandists were faced rather with a problem of exploitation than of conversion. For they had here an organised body of men strongly Pan-Arab and antipathetic towards the British. Stirred by the manner in which the Arabs were fighting in Palestine and believing, with the personal encouragement of King Ghazi, that the army was a strong and effective instrument, they were eager for action. This action took the shape of interference in affairs of state and, as soon as this came about, the 'Iraqi Army developed into a powerful political weapon.

At the same time no inconsiderable effort was made by the Germans to indoctrinate the army with Nazi principles as they had done in other sections of the community. By their educational policy, the Germans ensured that, as the youth of the country reached maturity, the army would be supplied with a steady flow of young officers with a grounding in the Nazi regime, while, in addition to their network of propaganda cells throughout the country, the German Legation took care to show generous hospitality to army officers and employed attractive young German girls to lend the feminine touch to their parties. The principal focus of German activity remained, however, that of encouraging and subsidising the intrigue and subversive projects of highly placed army officers.

There is little doubt that as early as 1936, the coup d'état engineered by General Bekr Sidqi, Chief of the General Staff, who was shortly afterwards to marry a German woman, received moral and probably financial assistance from Germany, which he had visited before the coup d'état took place. The coup d'état of 1936 brought the army into the field of politics in which it has played a part ever since to the detriment of good government. Bekr Sidqi's action created a precedent, full use of which was to be made five years later by the 'Iraqi Quisling, Rashid Ali .

In April 1939, an incident occurred which serves to illustrate the ill-feeling which then obtained against the British due largely to the effectiveness of insidious German propaganda. On April 3rd, King Ghazi, the late King of 'Iraq, was killed in a motor accident not far from his palace to which he was believed to have been proceeding. Immediately after the news of his death had been received in Mosul, an incensed and fury stricken mob, which had been led to believe by the agents of Dr. Hatchek, a German eye specialist in the town, that the British Government were responsible for the King's death, besieged the British Consulate. The British Consul, Mr. Monk Mason, came out of his house unarmed to appease the crowd. He was attacked from the rear by a fanatic armed with an axe, struck down and murdered. The rumour that the British had been responsible for the death of the King became widespread throughout 'Iraq and it was not until arrangements had been made for the public to visit the scene of the accident where the shattered car had been left unmoved that 'Iraqi suspicions were dispelled.

When, therefore, war broke out on September 3, 1939, bringing with it the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and the internment of her nationals, the virus ofNazism had already been effectively introduced into the body politic of 'Iraq. For nearly five years the enemy had worked incessantly and objectively with little obstructions by way of counter-propaganda from the British . . .
Enemy influence, far from diminishing after the departure of the Germans and internment of those who, for one reason or another, were unable to return to the Vaterland, increased considerably. The Germans merely transferred the greater part of the direction of their subversive activities to the Italians. Full use was made of the Italian diplomatic bag and cypher facilities which provided a swift and secure means of communication with Europe.

Judging by the number of well-known suspects who now began frequently to visit the Persian Legation, there is but little doubt that a link through that Mission was also maintained between those working on behalf of the enemy in 'Iraq and the highly developed Nazi organisation in Persia.

In October 1939, Axis activity received fresh impetus from the arrival of the notorious ex-Mufti carrying in his wake a large number of Palestinian and Syrian followers, most of them political refugees. He was admitted to 'Iraq on a promise that he would not indulge in undesirable activities, but he did not keep his word for long.*

In November 1939, the Japanese set up a Legation in Baghdad with the primary object of developing a greater volume of trade with 'Iraq. It was not long, however, before this Legation also became a centre for Axis subversive activity.

Towards the end of 1940, a host of Syrian and Palestinian teachers, many of them fanatically Pan-Arab and anti-British, arrived in 'Iraq to take up educational appointments. It was about that time that the ex-Mufti formed a miniature government of his own, consisting of Pan-Arab elements. Baghdad could now be described as having become a hub of the Pan-Arab world and consequently the centre of anti-British intrigue. The ex-Mufti, who had the backing of Berlin, was careful not to overstep the mark and did not at first allow himself to be in the public eye. He kept well in the background and did not come into the open until Nuri Pasha's Cabinet fell at the end of March 1940, and was replaced by that of Rashid Ali on his first coming to power.

From then on the ex-Mufti associated himself more and more with the Italian Legation, maintaining direct communication, through the medium of that Mission, with the German and Italian Foreign Offices.

With the stimulus that the ex-Mufti exerted and with the German armies sweeping victoriously over the Continent of Europe, the Muthana Club, Moslem Guidance Society, the Palestine Defense Society, the Tajaddad Club, and the Arab Rover Society, to quote the names of but a few bodies and societies, intensified their pro-Nazi subversive activities in the hopes that by so doing they would eventually, through enemy assistance, realize their Pan-Arab aspirations . . .

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Axis powers were able to exert so great an influence over the internal affairs of the country as to convert it from an ally of Great Britain into an enemy. In May 1941, when the 'Iraqi Army invested the R.A.F. base at Habbaniya and hostilities broke out between Great Britain and 'Iraq, the British were hard pressed everywhere. They were also in the process of evacuating Greece. German mechanised forces had advanced to the Egyptian frontier, the enemy had also occupied the Greek Island of Lemnos off the Turkish coast and it was only to be a few weeks later that they were to land parachute troops in Crete whence, but eleven days later, the British were to evacuate some 15,000 survivors.

* Cf. Mr. Bevin's statement in Commons on October 23, 1946, revealing that the British Ambassador to Egypt has complained to that country's Government about Haj Amin's failure to keep his promise to refrain from political activity while in Egypt. Another case of history repeating itself.
The German military star was well in the ascendant. Many were convinced that the British Empire had had its day and was already beginning to crumble. The Iraqis, who had been saturated with Nazi propaganda, chose this moment to turn on their old Ally knowing full well that little immediate assistance could be dispatched to strengthen her garrisons. It was not until after the battle of Habbaniya had been fought and miraculously won that any real effort was made by the British to break the grip in which the Axis powers had held Iraq so long. Had that machinery which was then installed to combat Axis subversive activities been set in motion long before the outbreak of war, it is believed that hostilities would not have broken out in Iraq.

What the Axis powers have done in the past, other foreign powers with hostile intentions can do in the future unless the British continually watch and combat their subversive activity.

P. REX MARRIOTT, Major
for Wing Commander
Defence Security Officer

Defence Security Office,
C.I.D.I., 'Iraq,
(R.A.F. Head)

11th April 1945.

**A short History of Enemy Subversive Activity in Iraq 1938 - 1941**

**Introduction**

History so often repeats itself that much can be learnt from the study of the past. Between the years 1933 and 1939, but six in all, Hitler built up Germany into a first class power, equipped her with the most formidable machinery of warfare and set out to conquer the world. In the meantime, as all the world knows, Great Britain found herself unprepared to meet the greatest onslaught of all time.

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Rex Marriott, Major
for Wing Commander
Defence Security Officer
(P. REX MARRIOTT)
THE EX-MUFTI’S ROLE IN THE IRAQI REVOLT

G.S.I. (General Service of Intelligence) 1/12/41

The Ex-Mufti fled from Syria and arrived in 'Iraq in October 1939. As soon as he arrived he was generally acclaimed as an Arab national hero and parties were given in his honor by every leading personality in the Capital, from the Prime Minister downwards, as well as by all Nationalist Clubs and Societies. To these parties were invited other well known Syrian and Palestinian political refugees as well as 'Iraq's own reactionary politicians and they became veritable demonstrations of Arab nationalist feeling and unity.

As the British were the cause of the “martyrdom” of Palestine, these parties allowed much ventilation of anti-British propaganda and the ex-Mufti and his partisans indulged freely in expressing not only their anti-British sentiments but in the spreading of deliberate and scandalous lies about the British and the Jews and about British and Zionist actions and policy in Palestine. The 'Iraqis, ready to believe anything anti-British and dreaming of 'Iraq as the nucleus round which a United Arabia was to form, swallowed the propaganda as though it were a wholesome diet and these receptions and parties greatly increased the ex-Mufti’s prestige with the 'Iraqis, and although the Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha, promised the ex-Mufti had given an undertaking not to indulge in politics while in refuge in 'Iraq and that he would be closely watched by the Government, the ex-Mufti commenced his political activities without check from the first day of his arrival in the country. In these activities he was encouraged by the reception he was accorded on all sides, including parties given by responsible Ministers and Nuri Pasha, the Prime Minister himself, which have already been referred to above.

The ex-Mufti soon had his old Palestine “Headquarters” established and modified to suit the new conditions under which he was working. Jamal al Husaini was his Chief of Staff. Shaikh Hassan abu Saud was the Islamic religious adviser and expert. Musa bey al 'Alami was the legal adviser and critic on occidental affairs and, with the authority of his background, he spoke convincingly to responsible and willing listeners on the “British injustices.” Fawzi al Qaoukji was the militant member and contacted the 'Iraqi Army, raising from this source arms and ammunition and the facilities to train men for guerilla warfare. Salim Abdur Rahman was Press Officer and publicist. Ishaq, Munif, Musa and Towfiq Saleh al Husaini, Emil Ghori, Izzat Darwaza, Ibrahim Darwish, Izzuddin ash Shawa and others formed the Foreign relations committee who were responsible for propaganda, intrigue and subversive activities inside and outside 'Iraq.

The ex-Mufti held the money bags and paid these, as well as many other refugees, their allowances as most had no other livelihood but what they were paid from this source. The ex-Mufti’s funds for this purpose were considerable, and it is known that he was voted ID. 18,000** by the 'Iraqi Parliament.

** Iraqi Dinar=Pound Sterling.

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was paid ID. 1,000 a month from 'Iraqi secret service funds, was paid 2% of the salary of every 'Iraqi government official, including the Military and Police (all stopped at source), considerable sums raised by the Palestine Defence Society, by the Red Crescent Society and through public collections. In addition authoritative sources now claim he was paid ID. 60,000 by the Germans and ID. 40,000 by the Italians, he also raised other monies from outside 'Iraq—including generous gifts from Ibn Saud and Egypt. This money enabled him, his followers and even Syrian political reactionaries to live in affluence, many owning cars and keeping up reasonable establishments. Several were beyond doubt also getting additional allowances from Axis sources.

These were unfortunately not all the implements at the command of the ex-Mufti in 'Iraq. He had another valuable method of obtaining influence within the government and also money for those working for him. These he commanded by furnishing the 'Iraqi Government with Palestinian and Syrian nominees to fill essential government positions that 'Iraq’s illiteracy prevents her from providing for herself. These include education experts, schoolmasters, doctors, dentists, etc., and were largely enlisted from political undesirables found in Syria and Palestine. Most of them would have obtained no livelihood in the countries of their origin. The ex-Mufti in 'Iraq could get these appointed, dismissed or promoted at will through his influence in Government Departments (many of these have complained to the writer of these notes that an adverse report from the ex-Mufti could either have their contract terminated or not renewed on its expiration). These officials were spread throughout the length and breadth of 'Iraq and nearly all were used, willy-nilly, as "cells" for the ex-Mufti’s propaganda campaign. Among the most active and influential of these may be mentioned Akram Zu’aitir, Darwish Maqdadi, Daoud al Husaini, Abdul Qadir al Husaini, Sat’ al Hasri and Mustafa Wakil, the Egyptian.

These elements by no means cover the picture of the ex-Mufti’s activities and he quickly won to his cause certain Nationalist organisations which were willing victims of his intrigues and some of which had already benefited by German support and money. The most important of these are the Muthana Club, the Moslem Guidance Society, the Rover’s Society, the Teachers Club and the Olympic Club. Through his influence in these quarters he and his followers contacted many of the 'Iraqi officials and Army personalities on whom his gang soon were able to exercise their will. They concentrated most on the following classes of official—Police, Army, Schoolmasters, Doctors, and those of the legal professions. The ex-Mufti was completely successful in his efforts in this direction and was soon making each Government Department carry out his benefits, e.g.—passports were issued at his request, refugees from Palestine were not allowed to remain in 'Iraq unless he agreed they were genuine "nationalists," refugees cars were admitted duty free and paid no taxes, the Press and Propaganda Department did not interfere with his papers—especially the Istitgal paper whose Editor, Osman Qassim, had been Editor of his paper Al Liwa in Palestine (this paper was subsidised by both Germany and the 'Iraqi Government and was consistently pro-German, anti-British and Pan-Arab in complexion).

During the whole period of his stay in 'Iraq, up to the rebellion of April and May, the ex-Mufti was always made a special guest at State or public functions. He and his followers were, on such occasions, given special places of honour equal to those of Ministers of State and seldom were the feelings of British officials attending such functions considered in allowing the ex-Mufti such considerate treatment.

There can be no doubt that the ex-Mufti was assisted in bluffing and insinuating himself on the
official class and the common people by the respect and esteem in which he was held by the highest authorities in the land; each wished to become the Arab hero who solved the Arab problem in Palestine and in consequence all basked in the sunshine of his grace full of helpfulness and expectancy. It was felt by these that England at war, and threatened, would be ready to strike a bargain over Palestine in order to ensure Arab friendship—each hoped to enhance his own prestige by negotiating this bargain. If they were unable to achieve their object, their small minds only concluded that by increasing the intensity of the ex-Mufti’s campaign and the outcry of the public, the potentialities of the threat to Great Britain would be sufficient to make her cave in and accept Arab demands. In the hopes of achieving success the Government of Nuri Pasha allowed the Mufti and the press to carry on their anti-British campaign and their extreme nationalist demands for both Syria and Palestine and the future of these two countries became more than ever in the eyes of the Iraqis a national concern.

Above it has been shown in outline how the ex-Mufti was enabled to set up his organisation in Iraq and win his way into the hearts of the Iraqi people but so far no mention has been made of his contacts and influence with Iraqi political leaders, the Axis and the Army leaders. It was his contacts with these that enabled him to use his organisation successfully and to make the rebellion in Iraq, and, because in Iraq itself there were absolutely no grounds or pretext for stirring up that anti-British feeling necessary to create a rebellion, the feeling had of necessity to be worked up over the recent happenings in Palestine. To make the sequence of events clear certain old events have to be related and these are mostly connected with Taha Pasha al Hashimi, who undoubtedly did more than any other Iraqi politician to further both the German and the ex-Mufti’s plans in Iraq.

Before Taha Pasha became Minister of Defence in December, 1938, he had been President of the ‘Iraqi Palestine Defence Society. This Society had been responsible for making the Mufti’s propaganda in Iraq, they issued their own paper, they wrote articles and fabricated news items for other papers, and prepared Arabic broadcasts for the German Minister to cable to Germany for broadcasting in the Berlin Arabic broadcasts. This work threw Taha Pasha into close touch with the German Legation staff who naturally were highly desirous of making contacts with this anti-British body. This was not Taha Pasha’s only contact with the Germans and Palestinians and perhaps his most important contact was his close friendship for Dr. Amin Ruwaiha—Germany’s No. 1 Arab Agent. Dr. Amin’s wife’s sister became Taha Pasha’s mistress and a close friendship was established between these two. Amin Ruwaiha had been closely connected with Fawzi al Qaoukji and had assisted him to get arms and to get his gang to Palestine in the summer of 1936. He was also very much on the inside of the Mufti’s intrigues at this time, and was, until his detention by us in Palestine after the outbreak of war, a close collaborator with the ex-Mufti in all his schemes and was largely responsible for bringing the Mufti into the German orbit.

At the same time as Taha Pasha was working for the Palestinians and being nursed by the Germans he was intriguing with those officers in the ‘Iraq Army who were to be known later as the “Golden Square” and who were largely responsible for the rebellion in April and May, 1941. He was trying to get these to make a coup d’Etat and oust the Jamil Madfa’i Cabinet and force the King to bring him and his supporters to power. He succeeded in this scheme towards the end of December, 1938, and Nuri Pasha became Prime Minister and Taha Pasha the Minister of Defence. Rashid ‘Ali was rewarded for his part in the plot by being made Head of the Royal Diwan and having the guardianship of the Gailani Waqfs returned to him. Taha Pasha, after becoming a Cabinet Minister, resigned from the Palestine Defence Society but continued his connections with the Germans and his Palestine friends. As Minister of Defence he supported his Army friends of the “Golden Square” and helped
to further their schemes to obtain for themselves the key positions in the Army. These officers had been the leaders of the anti-Bekr Sidqi group in the Army, and their ambitious aspirations had long been clear to even casual observers. Their anti-Bekr Sidqi sentiments had endeared them to Nuri Pasha, their Minister of Defence favored them and the Chief of the General Staff was weak and could almost be classified a "time server." Salah Uddin their leader, and by far the cleverest of them, was at this time Director of Operations in the Ministry of Defence. He controlled the 'Iraqi Army Intelligence Branch and exerted his influence on the Chief of the General Staff. In reality he was now the most influential, if not the most powerful, officer in the Army. In consequence his following among the Army officers increased. He soon became a frequent visitor of the German Minister, whom he met at Taha Pasha’s house and through Amin ar Ruwaiha. It is believed that money was given from German sources to both Taha Pasha and Salah Uddin at this time. (Taha Pasha’s greed and love of money was a byword in the country.)

Nuri Pasha was apparently aware that something of this picture was going on and in the summer of 1939 told the writer of this report that Amin ar Ruwaiha was dangerous and was intriguing hard for Germany. He also mentioned he was suspicious of Salah Uddin and Amin al ‘Umari (then Commanding the 1st Division and now C.G.S.). He said he was watching them and intended to get rid of them as soon as a convenient opportunity arose. The writer told Nuri that Taha Pasha was more implicated than any of the three he had mentioned but Nuri Pasha insisted on treating Taha as "stupid" and of "no consequence." Nuri had, however, more enemies than friends in 'Iraq and his position, his livelihood and his very life depended on the support of Taha Pasha and his military following. Nuri even told the Ambassador in August, 1939, that he could not for the moment shut down the "Istiqlal" paper for its anti-British and pro-Axis writings as its proprietor, Abdul Ghafur Badri, was "stupid" Taha’s man and he did not want to fall out with Taha at the moment. His reason for this statement was clear, and Nuri knew as well as we knew and the Germans knew that the Army was all powerful in 'Iraq and chose the Government they wanted to be in power. When war came with Germany, Nuri Pasha—opposed by his Minister of Defence—broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. Immediately Nuri was labelled a tool of the British and Army opinion accused him of having endangered the safety of 'Iraq by this action. Nuri’s unpopularity increased in the country and he feared to take strong action to kill the seeds of disaffection and forcibly uphold it as the essential duty of 'Iraq to uphold the Anglo-'Iraqi Alliance of Friendship. He feared the Army and feared the reputation he had acquired of being pro-British and merely their instrument. He took refuge in showing himself as being Pan-Arab and the champion of this movement. In October of that year he welcomed the ex-Mufti to 'Iraq as a refugee from Syria. He hoped to use the ex-Mufti and his group to popularise himself and offset his reputation of being pro-British. Nuri’s fears and consequent weakness at this critical juncture allowed the pro-German group to exploit to the fullest measure the arrival of the Mufti and his followers in the country and the consequent intensification of anti-British feelings it had endangered among the 'Iraqis.

After his arrival the ex-Mufti quickly realized the political situation prevailing in the country and in starting his organisation worked in closely with Taha Pasha and the Army leaders—one of the "Golden Square," Mahmoud Salman, who then commanded the Cavalry but later became O.C. I.R.A.F., had been an old friend and admirer of the ex-Mufti since the last War. Meetings were soon being held unostentatiously between the ex-Mufti and Army officers in the house of Mahmoud Salman or in the house of Hassan Abu Sa’ud as the ex-Mufti did not want attention drawn to himself by having officers visit him in his own house. The Army was soon affected and the anti-British feeling which had
been smouldering some time under the surface became much more pronounced. The general belief grew that Germany was bound to win the war and German propaganda began to make headway apace. Nuri’s action in breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany was considered not only a mistake but to have endangered ’Iraq’s safety. Public opinion was aroused through propaganda and rumours being circulated to the effect that Nuri Pasha was to give Britain ’Iraqi soldiers to fight their battles. In spreading all this propaganda and rumours of a subversive and alarming nature the Palestinians and Syrians played a leading part from the commencement.

Rashid ’Ali was himself well in the swim with both Taha Pasha and his military clique and in addition Rashid ’Ali was now beginning to hold secret meetings with the Italian Minister and other members of the Italian Legation staff. While these activities were in progress, Generals Husain Fawzi and Amin al Umari, the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the 1st Division respectively, became alarmed at the growing influence of "The Golden Square" through Taha’s favours and Nuri’s weakness. They saw their own influence in the Army being taken from them by this group of officers whose comparative youth and extreme nationalism popularised them with the younger officers. Early in 1940 Amin al ’Umari and Husain Fowzi planned a coup d’etat to get rid of Nuri Pasha’s Cabinet and re-instate Jamil Madfa’i as Prime Minister, but owing to the quick counter measures taken within the Army by the "Golden Square" this attempt failed after a night of considerable tension when it looked as though a pitched battle might be fought between the rival Army factions. The result of this failure was that Husain Fawzi and Amin al ’Umari were placed on pension and the whole control of the Army passed on to the "Golden Square" with a weak and foolish officer, in the person of Amin Zakki, as C.G.S. The "Golden Square" were now situated as follows:

O.C. 1st Division.................................................................Kamil Shabib
O.C. 3rd Division.............................................................Salah Uddin Sabbagh
O.C. R.I.A.F.................................................................Mahmoud Salman
O.C. Mechanised Force....................................................Mohammad Fahmi Sa’id.

From this time these officers began quite openly to interfere in the politics of the country and their anti-British and pro-Axis sentiments were patent to everybody. Their views were soon the views of the majority of the Army officers and official military opinion held that a German victory was inevitable. They feared that Nuri Pasha’s pro-British sympathies would lead to ’Iraq having irrevocably compromised herself with Great Britain by the time the Axis were victorious. They sought a Premier who would once again place ’Iraq on the side of the Axis. Nuri Pasha was a tired man and quite unequal to continuing the struggle. In January, 1940, he had been considerably upset by the assassination of his old colleague and Finance Minister, Rustam Haidar, and his prestige had further suffered through his unsuccessful efforts to fix the responsibility for this assassination on certain of Jamil Madfa’i’s leading supporters. Unpopular with the masses and attacked on all sides it was decided that he should resign and his place be taken by Rashid Ali. The Army would only accept Rashid Ali as Premier, and further demanded that he would retain Taha Pasha as Minister of Defence. On March 21st, 1940, Nuri Pasha tendered his resignation with an acrimonious covering letter showing his reasons for resigning as being due to the intrigues and plots that were being woven against the interests of the country. This letter he made public and when Rashid Ali was nominated his successor, he refused to take office in view of the above mentioned letter which had clearly indicated the future policy of the succeeding Government. This compelled Nuri Pasha to continue in office until Rashid Ali could be placated and persuaded to take office. This he agreed to do on March 31st, 1940, but only
after a good deal of negotiations and meetings with the Army leaders, Taha Pasha, Naji Shawkat and the ex-Mufti. The important part played by the ex-Mufti in making these arrangements was well known and caused some surprise in Baghdad and it was at this juncture that it was first realised what an important part the ex-Mufti was already playing in Iraq’s domestic affairs.

All this happened when Nuri Pasha was on the eve of visiting King Ibn Sa’ud to clear up some outstanding difficulties which had arisen over the Sa’udi-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship. The writer was to be in Ibn Sa’ud’s Camp during Nuri Pasha’s visit and was somewhat surprised on the morning of his departure to be sent for urgently by Nuri Pasha to be told that Nuri feared the Germans might use his enemies to assassinate him whilst he was in Sa’udi Arabia. He wished me to stick close by him while he was there and to warn Ibn Sa’ud of his fears and ask him to take special precautions for his, Nuri’s, safety. Nuri Pasha seemed at this time to have special information about what was taking place but would reveal nothing beyond he “hoped we were watching the Mufti’s activities.”

As well as Taha Pasha, Rashid Ali’s Cabinet contained another well known pro-German in Naji Shawkat. He was Minister of Justice and was used by Rashid Ali throughout the summer of 1940 to establish touch with von Papen in Turkey with a view to making secret negotiations with Germany to undo any of the harm Nuri Pasha has done to Iraq’s future relations with the Axis through his “obliging” Britain by breaking Iraq’s diplomatic relations with Germany after the declaration of War.

With Rashid Ali’s succession to office the part played in politics by the Army and the ex-Mufti became more and more pronounced. In May, 1940, the Director of Press and Propaganda was replaced by a military officer (Abdul Majid al Hashimi) who was the nominee of Taha Pasha and the “Golden Square.” He in turn introduced into the Department in important posts two officials who were leading lights in the Moslem Guidance Society, which had now come completely under the ex-Mufti’s influence. This change was soon felt and the Press and Propaganda Department began to follow Rashid Ali’s policy of “Iraq’s strict Neutrality.” The better known agitators of the Moslem Guidance Society, including the ex-Mufti’s religious “Advisor” Shaikh Hassan abu Saud, were given opportunities to broadcast talks on Islam. The Iraqi Army leaders also gave talks on military matters and a general campaign was made to lionise the Iraqi Army and Air Force in the eyes of the people and all the time in the background was the sinister figure of the ex-Mufti using his own propaganda organisation to make anti-British and pro-German propaganda of a more subversive nature.

Italy’s entry into the war did not occasion much comment, as the Arabs hate Italy, but the Iraqis saw the war getting nearer to them. Rashid Ali refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy. The collapse of France occasioned almost universal Arab rejoicing, especially from the Palestinians and the Syrians. These elements and the Army “Napoleons” were convinced that Britain could not possibly hold out alone against both Germany and Italy. They thought that without French assistance Britain would not be able to prevent Italy conquering Egypt and that Britain herself would be in German hands by the end of the summer.
SUMMONS TO A HOLY WAR AGAINST BRITAIN

A “Fatwa” Issued by Haj Amin al-Husseini, May, 1941*

In the name of Merciful and Almighty God.

I invite all my Moslem brothers throughout the whole world to join in the Holy War for God, for the defense of Islam and her lands against her enemy. O Faithful, obey and respond to my call.

O Moslems!

Proud ’Iraq has placed herself in the vanguard of this Holy Struggle, and has thrown herself against the strongest enemy of Islam certain that God will grant her Victory.

The English have tried to seize this Arab-Moslem land, but she has risen, full of dignity and pride to defend her safety, to fight for her honor and to safeguard her integrity. ’Iraq fights the tyranny which has always had as its aim the destruction of Islam in every land. It is the duty of all Moslems to aid ’Iraq in her struggle and to seek every means to fight the enemy, the traditional traitor in every age and every situation.

Whoever knows the history of the East has everywhere seen the hand of the English working to destroy the Ottoman Empire and to divide the Arab countries. British politics toward the Arab people is masked under a veil of Hypocrisy. The minute she sees her chance, England squeezes the prostrate country in her Imperialist grasp, adding futile justifications. She creates discord and division within a country and while feeding it in secret openly she assumes the role of advisor and trusted friend. The time when England could deceive the peoples of the East is passed. The Arab Nation and the Moslem people have awakened to fight British domination. The English have overthrown the Ottoman Empire, have destroyed Moslem rule in India, inciting one community against another; they stifled the Egyptian awakening, the dream of Mohammed Ali, colonizing Egypt for half a century. They took advantage of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire to stretch out their hands and use every sort of trick to take possession of many Arab countries as happened to Aden, the 9 Districts, the Hadramut, Oman, Masqat and the Emirates of the Persian Gulf and Transjordania. The vivid proof of the imperialistic designs of the British is to be found in Moslem Palestine which, although promised by England to Sherif Hussein has had to submit to the outrageous infiltration of Jews, shameful politics designed to divide Arab-Moslem countries of Asia from those of Africa. In Palestine the English have committed unheard of barbarisms; among others, they have profaned the el-Aqsa Mosque and have declared the most unyielding war against Islam, both in deed and in word. The Prime Minister at that time told Parliament that the world would never see peace as long as the Koran existed. What hatred against Islam is stronger than that which publicly declares the Sacred Koran an enemy of human kind? Should such sacrilege go unpunished? After the dissolution of the Moslem Empire in India and of

* Translated from:—“Oriente Moderno,” 1941, pp. 552-553; broadcast over the ‘Iraqi and Axis radios
the Ottoman Caliphate, England, adhering to the policy of Gladstone, pursued her work of destruction to Islam depriving many Islamic States both in the East and in the West of their freedom and independence. The number of Moslems who today live under the rule of England and invoke liberation from their terrible yoke exceeds 220,000,000.

Therefore I invite you, O Brothers, to join in the War for God to preserve Islam, your independence and your lands from English aggression. I invite you to bring all your weight to bear in helping 'Iraq that she may throw off the shame that torments her.

O Heroic 'Iraq, God is with Thee, the Arab Nation and the Moslem World are solidly with Thee in Thy Holy Struggle!

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**DOCUMENT V**

**ADDRESS TO AMERICAN ARABS**

*Excerpts from a Radio Speech by Haj Amin al-Husseini*

_March 19, 1943, in Rome_

The Arabs and Moslems will not be deceived by Britain once again because not only have they known its true intentions but they have also known those of Britain’s allies—America—and I want to draw the attention of the Arab emigrants in America to this fact, reminding them of their glorious past when they supported the National movement. I would also like to remind them that their efforts will be wasted if, God forbid, America and her Allies may be victorious in this War because at such a time the Arabs will never rise again. I therefore know that those Arab emigrants in America will refrain from helping Roosevelt or taking part in a war which he brought on to his country.

If those Allies win this war the Jewish influence will be the arbiter in the world resources and one can thus imagine the future of the Arabs and Moslems, and the dangers which they are exposed to in their fatherlands and beliefs if the Jews and their Allies dominate them and spread the latent hatred on to them.

Then the world will become Hell—God forbid: But Allah is too just and merciful to grant such murderous violators any victory. We are sure that victory will be ours and that of our friends. We have not the slightest doubt about that, we shall not slacken our struggle nor will we be deterred or quietened. Do not be deceived by the allegations of your enemies, because you know full well about their intrigues, and be sure that the nation which fights, sacrifices and awaits will be the victorious one in the end.
TEL AFAR PARACHUTE EXPEDITION*

Report 1

The information contained in this report is derived chiefly from the preliminary interrogations of Khalil Rassool and Ahmed Humaid Fellah, the two parachutists captured at Tel Afar on the 28th November 1944. Some valuable information, however, had already been recorded in this office about the four parachutists before they arrived and has consequently helped us in making up the histories as Appendices A, B, C, and D.

2. These interrogations have not been carried out under ideal conditions largely due to the fact that there is not only one but two Security Services interested in the expedition—the British and the 'Iraqi. Each Security Service has its own methods of interrogation, equally effective when it comes to extracting information from most Orientals but each Service requires information of a somewhat different nature. While the interrogations have, for the most part, been held jointly, the stage has not yet been reached when the British themselves can question the prisoners alone for many consecutive hours.

3. In gauging the accuracy of our information, it should be borne in mind that we are not yet satisfied that the two parachutists are telling the absolute truth. Furthermore, it has become obvious that the leader of the expedition, Karradi, unfortunately still at large, is the only person who has been fully briefed and that he has withheld much of the information we require from his other three colleagues.

4. We feel, however, that we have now acquired sufficient pieces of this intricate jigsaw puzzle to make up at least part of the general picture. Much of the information contained in this paper will doubtless be subject to revision as further details reach the office.

5. The longer interrogations proceed, the less clear becomes the purpose of this expedition. At first it seemed that the intention of the parachutists was to create irregular armed bands, gradually developing these and expanding them into a rebel movement against the Government of 'Iraq and the British in Palestine. On reaching a certain stage of preparedness, they were to receive assistance in the form of arms and trained Arabs from Germany. Their headquarters were to be somewhere in the Wadi al Qassab area (Long. 43 deg. East. Lat. 36 deg. North).

6. Later as a result of further interrogation, it appears that the expedition was not intended for 'Iraq at all, but for causing trouble in Palestine. The expedition on arrival in 'Iraq was to make its way into Palestine.

7. We feel that we can rely little on this information and the discrepancy between the two alleged

* Only the most relevant portions of this lengthy British Intelligence Report are here reproduced.
technical abilities. As far as Rassoul knew, the only other Arab closely associated with the ex-Mufti was the Egyptian Dr. Wakil, who said goodbye to them at Karradi's flat on the morning of November 26...

17. Although living as civilians and enjoying the company of German women, the party of four did not have an entirely frivolous time on their return from Holland. Practice with W/T was continued and transmissions to Berlin were made from the Lehnnitz W/T school and from Oybin 20 and 225 kms. respectively from Berlin. Karradi went away on a special W/T course in September 1944. (N.B. This confirms the “Chacun” Party report that an Iraqi named Abu Saleh had arrived at Rhodes from Kalamaki on the morning of 15th September. Karradi made tests with three W/T sets and returned three days later to Athens.) ...

(signed) H. K. DAWSON SHEPHERD
Wing Commander
Defence Security Officer

APPENDICES.
A. Personalities
B. List of Arabs in E.O.T.
C. Dr. Mustafa Wakil

DISTRIBUTION:
As for D.S.O., C.I.C.I. 'Iraq (Baghdad), Security
Intelligence Summary, with the addition of:
P.A., Northern Area.
Commander, North 'Iraq Area.

APPENDIX C: DR. MUSTAFA WAKIL (EGYPTIAN)

Born Suwaif 1913. Educated at London University and was Vice-President of the Egyptian Green Shirt Movement and of the National Islamic Party. Delivered at least one strongly anti-British speech to the N.I.P. Was reported to have had firearms hidden in his house and to have taken part in a N.I.P. discussion on a rebellion against the British in Egypt. He was detailed for the job of murdering the new Prime Minister of Egypt.

Wakil arrived in 'Iraq in 13/10/40. Passport No. 61785 of 21.9.40 with visa No. 710 of 2.10.40 (free) issued by 'Iraqi Legation in Cairo. He first stayed at the "Babylon Hotel" in Baghdad and later moved to the "Maude Hotel." He later lived with Ramiz Suleiman at Sheena's Drug Store, Baghdad.

He came to 'Iraq to fill an appointment as a Physics teacher in the Teacher's Training College, Baghdad. He was receiving ID. 60 per month from the 'Iraq Government. It was reported that his main objects in coming to 'Iraq were:

(a) To work on the initiation of a rising in 'Iraq.
(b) To commence propaganda on the principles of the N.I.P.
(c) To provide the N.I.P. in Egypt with political news of 'Iraq.
(d) To act as a link between the ex-Mufti and Ahmed Hussein, leader and founder of the N.I.P.

Ahmed Hussein is extremely anti-British and was also the leader of the Egyptian Green Shirt Movement.

The question as to whether he would be allowed to leave Egypt or not was carefully discussed and, while it was fully realised that he was a dangerous agitator, it was considered that he would probably do less harm in 'Iraq than he would do in Egypt. Arrangements were made to keep Wakil under observation and to intercept his correspondence. There had to be considered the likelihood that he would use the diplomatic bag through the influence of Azzam Bey* to avoid censorship.

* Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey, now general secretary of the Arab League
Following his arrival in 'Iraq, Wakil persistently pushed himself forward as a Nationalist and mixed with extreme Arab-Nationalists, especially the ex-Mufti's group. He was an extremely anti-British talker and expressed pro-German sentiments. In early 1941, the 'Iraqi Government was making arrangements for Wakil's return to Egypt.

There is a record of a letter written by Wakil on November, 1940, to Ahmed Hussein in which Wakil states that he was being well looked after in 'Iraq and had been presented to the Emir Abdul Ilah, the Prime Minister Rashid Ali al Gailani and other dignitaries. He stated that he was in touch with Palestinian personages and named Akram Zu'aitir (Pal/2), another rabid Arab Nationalist and extreme anti-British agitator who was in German and Italian pay and being "kept on the ice" for future use in rebellion in Palestine with Axis backing. Wakil wrote anti-British articles in the 'Iraqi newspapers during the May 1941 rebellion and made a wireless speech in support of Rashid Ali. Wakil was stated to be the intermediary through whom Raphael Butti was paid a subsidy of ID. 400 from Axis funds for the purpose of carrying out pro-Axis propaganda.

Wakil passed through Ankara by Taurus Express on his way to Turkey on 10.7.41. He was using the address in Istanbul of the Egyptian Consulate in October 1941 and it was in this month that he left for Bulgaria, it was presumed for Germany. There is a report to the effect that Wakil had been in Rome in August 1941, and he was again reported to be in Rome in October 1942. The Zantut interrogation revealed that Wakil was working at the Arab Bureau in Rome in November, 1942, and he was stated to be the ex-Mufti's Adviser on Egyptian affairs.

The interrogation of Abdul Latif Thulkif, the Palestinian parachutist (para. 30), states that Dr. Wakil, who generally resided in Berlin, was living with the ex-Mufti at Oyben from April 1944 to September 1944.

DOCUMENT VII

News Digest No. 1322*
December 21, 1943

MOSLEMS IN THE GERMAN ARMY

A20. Transocean (for Far East), 18.12.43. Moslems of South Eastern Europe are fighting in the Waffen-SS defending Europe against the Anglo-American attacks. Except for the red fez with the German emblem and swastika, these Moslems wear the same uniform as all other SS units. On their collars, instead of German emblems, they wear the insignia of a scimitar held in a Moslem's fist flanked by swastikas. These volunteers receive a thorough military training in the use of the most modern weapons of the German Armed Forces.**

A21. DNB, 17.12.43. The first pictures of the weekly newsreel presented an unusual scene, showing the Grand Mufti's visit to Moslem troops in the German Armed Forces. From the expression and features of these men we can tell that they know how to wear the field-gray uniform. Enthusiasm and discipline are visible in every one of their movements.**

* British official monitoring. DNB: Deutsche Nachrichten Buro—German Office of Information. TRANSOCEAN: German News Agency. ** The Munchier Neuste Nachrichten of December 23, 1943 reports on the activities of the Arab Wehrmacht Legion and states that they wear the regular German Army uniform with a patch on their sleeves reading "Free Arabia."
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*For reasons of space, a great many names mentioned in this publication have had to be omitted from the Index. In certain cases, variations in the transcription of proper names will be noted in the Documents, which have been reproduced from the original texts without any changes. These variations are due to differences in pronunciation and transcription in the various Arab countries. The abbreviations used in the Index are as follows: Eg.—Egypt, Ir.—Iraq, Syr.—Syria, Pal.—Palestine, Leb.—Lebanon, T.J.—Transjordan, Min.—Minister, Def.—Defense.